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BEFORE THE STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA .

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BEFORE THE STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA .
BEFORE THE STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
.
In the Matter of the Appeal of
ROY L. AND PATRICIA A. MISSKELLEY
)
For Appellants:
Roy L. Misskelley,
in pro. per.
For Respondent:
Bruce R. Langston
Counsel
O P I N I O N
This appeal is made pursuant to section 19057,
subdivision (a), of the Revenue and Taxation Code from
the action of the Franchise Tax Board in denying the
claim of Roy L. and Patricia A. Misskelley for refund of
personal income tax in the amount of $3,147.19 for the
year 1978.
-360-
Appeal
of
- Roy L. and Patricia A. Misskelley
-
The issue in this matter is whether appellanthusband (hereinafter "appellant") was a resident and
domiciliary of California from June 16, 1978, through
December 31, 1978.
Appellants filed a joint California personal
income tax return for 1978, On that return they listed
their address as "24 Piper Court, Novator CA." On
October 22, 1981, appellants filed an amended return
claiming a refund of $3,147.19, The primary adjustment
on this return was a $42,871.07 reduction in total income
reported. By way of explanation, appellants wrote that
the "[olriginal return included income made in Nevada as
a permanent resident of Nevada."
Respondent requested further information from
appellants about their residency status for taxable years
1977 through 1980. The information provided showed that
appellants had lived in California from 1950 through 197'7,
that appellant left California and moved to Nevada on
July 16, 1978, and that appellant's wife left California
and moved, to Nevada on October 4, 1979. Appellants also
indicated that during all of 1978 Mrs. Misskelley held a
California driver's license, had an automobile registered
in California, and transacted the majority of her banking
activities in California. Although appellant held a
California driver's license, registered his car in
California, and maintained
in California during 1978,
savings
and
checking
accounts
he apparently also acquired a
Nevada driver's license, registered his car in Nevada,
and opened bank accounts in Nevada during the latter part
of that year. Appellants' children apparently attended
school in California during al:1 of 1978. Based on the
information supplied by appellants, respondent determined
that both Mr. and Mrs. Misskelley were California residents for all of 1978 and disallowed the claimed refund.
This appeal followed.
Revenue and Taxation Code section 17014,
subdivision (a), defines the term “resident" to include:
(1) Every individual who is in this state
for other than a temporary or transitory
purpose,
(2) Every individual domiciled in this
state who is outside the state for a temporary
or transitory purpose.
Section 17014, subdivision (c), also states that:
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Appeal-of Roy L. and Patricia A. Misskelley
Any individual who is a resident of this
state continues to be a resident even though
temporarily absent from the state.
Respondent's determination of residency status
and the proposed assessments based thereon are presumed
to be correct and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving
respondent's actions erroneous. (Appeal of Robert J.
Addington Jr., Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., Jan. 5, 1982;
Appeal ot Pafricia A. Green, Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., June
22, 1976.)
However, the presumption is a rebuttable one
and will only support a finding in the absence
of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Respondent's determination is not
[Citations.]
evidence to be weighed against evidence produced
by the taxpayer. The presumption of correctness,
disappears once evidence which would support a
[Citations.]
contrary finding has been submitted.
eal of Janice Rule, Ca.1. St. Bd. of Equal., Oct. 6,
There is no question that appellant's wife was
a resident of California during all of 1978 as she did
not leave the state until late 1979. There also is no
question that appellant was a resident of California until
June 15, 1978. The only status in question is that of
appellant for the period June 16, 1978, through December
31, 1978. Since appellant was outside the state for that
period, his status must be determined under section 17014,
subdivision (a)(2), supra. Therefore, we must first
decide whether or not he was still domiciled in California.
If not, then he was not a resident of California.
In support of his claim that he was not a
California resident during the period in question, appellant argues that he left the state with the intent of
remaining indefinitely in Nevada. Appellant has stated
that he wanted to move to Nevada for better job opportunities, but that his wife, for a variety of reasons, refused
to accompany him. This disagreement resulted in a spousal
separation when appellant moved to Nevada and his wife
remained in California. He further stated that upon
arriving in Nevada, he established a business, acquired
a residence, and opened two bank accounts there. About
fourteen months after he first moved to Nevada, he and
his wife reconciled. their differences.
Mrs. Misskelley
moved to Nevada in October 1979, and the whole family has
resided there ever since.
-362-
Appeal of w L. and Patricia A. Misskelley
In regard to determining an individual's domicile for income tax purposes, we had occasion to summarize
the applicable California law in the A peal of Robert J.
and Kyung Y. Olsen, decided on October
*
"Domicile" has been defined as "the one
location with which for legal purposes a person
is considered to have the most settled and permanent connection, the place where he intends
to remain and to which, whenever he is absent,
he has the intention of returning. . . .”
(Whittell v. Franchise Tax Board; 231 Cal.App.2d
278, 284 [41 Cal.Rptr. 6731 (1964).) A person
may have only one domicile at a time (Whittell,
supra), and he retains that domicile until he
acquires another elsewhere. (In re Marriage of
Leff, 25 Cal.App,2d 630, 642 [mm,Rptr.
195] (1972).) The establishment of a new domicile requires actual residence in a new place
and the intention to remain there permanently
or indefinitely.
(Estate of Phillipz, 269
Cal.App.2d 656, 659 [75 Cal.Rptr. 3011 (1969).)
One's acts must give clear proof of a concurrent
intention to abandon the old domicile and establish a new one.
(Chapman v. Superior Court,
162 Cal.App.2d 421, 426-427 [328 P.2d 231
(1958).)
As noted above, to prove that a new domicile
has been established, appellant must show:
(1) actual
residence in a new place, and (2) the intention to remain
there permanently or indefinitely. Respondent does not
dispute that appellant actually resided in Nevada. It
does appear to dispute appellant's intention to remain
in Nevada permanently or indefinitely, based on two
generalized propositions which it inaccurately applies
to appellant's situation.
First, respondent cites prior decisions of this
board which state that absences for reasons of employment,
even for extended periods, are usually not regarde.d as
establishing a change of domicile.
(See Ap eal of
Robert J. and Kyung Y. Olsen, supra; Appea
hnard
and Helen Fernandez, Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., June 2,
1971.) However, the cases cited by respondent involved
employees who were sent out of California to perform their
jobs for their employers. Appellant, on the other hand,
was apparently a self-employed construction contractor in
California, and he established a construction contracting
business in Nevada immediately upon his arrival there.
-363-
Appeal of-Roy L. and Patricia A. Misskelly
Respondent's citations have no relevance to appellant's
situation. We view appellant's establishment of a business, and its apparent immediate success as tending to
indicate that appellant did intend to remain in Nevada
permanently or indefinitely.
Respondent's second proposition was that appellants maintained their marital abode in California during
this time, and that this is 'Oa significant factor in
resolving the question of domicile." (Resp. Br. at 5.)
However, appellants have explained that a marital disagreement was at the root of the decision to split the
family during the period on appeal. There is no evidence
that appellant ever returned to the home in California
after leaving it or that he, or his wife, continued to
consider it as his home. Given appellant's uncontradicted
statements that there was a marital separation, we do not
feel justified in attributing to appellant the intention
of returning to California simply because his estranged
spouse lived there. Consequently, contrary to the view
held by respondent, Mrs. Misskelley's decision to remain
in California when her husband chose to go to Nevada does
not support the conclusion that appellant retained his
California domicile.
In our view, the information provided by
appellants is sufficient to overcome the pr,esumption of
correctness attaching to respondent's determination.
Respondent has presented conjectures, but no evidence
whatsoever, to contradict appellant's statements, We
find, therefore, that appellant was not domiciled in
California during the period at issue and was not a
"resident" of California, as that term is defined in
Revenue and Taxation Code section 17014.
As respondent points out in its brief, our
finding that appellant was not a domiciliary of California
does not end this matter. Marital property interests in
personal property are determined under the.laws of the
acquiring spouse's domicile. (Schecter v. Superior Court,
49 Cal.2d 3, 10 [314 P.2d 101 (?957) Rozan v. Rozan, 49
Cal.2d 322, 326 [317 P.2d 111 (l957)f) Income earned
during a marriage constitutes community property in
Nevada.
(Nev. Rev. Stats. 5 123.220 (1979).) Therefore,
appellant's income earned as a Nevada domiciliary was
community property, and Mrs. Misskelley is liable for
California income tax on her one-half community interest
in those earnings. (Appeal of Robert M. and Mildred
Scott, Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., March 2 1981; Ap eal of
WD. and Carole C. Elzey, Cal, St. Bd. of Equa
-%-Aug. 1, 1974.) Additionally, her tax liability must be
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Appeal of Roy L. and Patricia A. Misskelley
computed using the rates for a married person filing
separately, since a joint return may not be filed where
one spouse was a nonresident for part of the year.
(Rev. & Tax. Code, § 18402, subd. (b)(l).) These adjustments will reduce somewhat the amount of refund to which
appellants are entitled.
(Res,p. Ex. G.)
0
-365-
Appeal
---_of Roy L. and Patricia A. Misskelley
O R D E R
Pursuant to the views expressed in the opinion
of the board on file in this proceeding, and good cause
.
appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED,
pursuant to section 19060 of the Revenue and Taxation
Code, that the action of the Franchise Tax Board in denying the claim of Roy L. and Patricia A. Misskelley for
refund of personal income tax in the amount of $3,147.19
for the year 1978, be and the same is hereby modified to
reflect adjustments resulting from appellant's status as
a Nevada domiciliary, as set out in the foregoing opinion.
Done at Sacramento, California, this 8th day
of
May
I 1984, by the State Board of Equalization,.
with Board Members Mr. Nevins, Mr, Dronenburg, Mr. Collis,
Mr. Bennett and- Mr. Harvey present.
Richard Nevins.
I
Chairman
Ernest
I
Member
Dronenburg,
J.
Jr.
Conway H. Collis
I Member
F7illiam M. Bennett
I Member
Walter Harvey*
I
Member
*For Kenneth Cory, per Government Code section 7.9
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