...

Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015

by user

on
Category: Documents
2034

views

Report

Comments

Transcript

Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
IN THIS ISSUE:
Capital market development and emergence of
institutional investors in the Asia-Pacific region
Infrastructure financing, public-private
partnerships and development in the Asia-Pacific
region
Climate finance in the Asia-Pacific region:
trends and innovative approaches
Trade finance for sustainable development in
Asia and the Pacific
Financing sustainable development – What can we
learn from the Australian experience of reform?
The secretariat of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and
the Pacific (ESCAP) is the regional development arm of the United Nations
and serves as the main economic and social development centre for the
United Nations in Asia and the Pacific. Its mandate is to foster cooperation
among its 53 members and 9 associate members. It provides the strategic
link between global and country-level programmes and issues. It supports
Governments of countries in the region in consolidating regional positions
and advocates regional approaches to meeting the region’s unique
socioeconomic challenges in a globalizing world. The ESCAP secretariat
is in Bangkok. Please visit the ESCAP website at <www.unescap.org> for
further information.
The shaded areas of the map indicate ESCAP members and associate members.
ASIA-PACIFIC
DEVELOPMENT
JOURNAL
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
United Nations publication
Sales No. E.15.II.F.17
Copyright © United Nations 2016
All rights reserved
Manufactured in Thailand
March 2016 – 800
ISBN: 978-92-1-120712-5
e-ISBN: 978-92-1-057888-2
ISSN: 1020-1246
ST/ESCAP/2747
This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part for educational or non-profit purposes
without special permission from the copyright holder, provided that the source is acknowledged.
The ESCAP Publications Office would appreciate receiving a copy of any publication that uses this
publication as a source.
No use may be made of this publication for resale or any other commercial purpose whatsoever
without prior permission. Applications for such permission, with a statement of the purpose and
extent of reproduction, should be addressed to the Secretary of the Publications Board, United
Nations, New York.
Advisory Board
Members
DR. YILMAZ AKYÜZ
Chief Economist, South Centre (former Director and Chief Economist,
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)),
Switzerland
PROFESSOR ASHFAQUE HASAN KHAN
Principal and Dean, School of Social Sciences & Humanities, National
University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Pakistan
DR. MYRNA AUSTRIA
Vice-Chancellor for Academics, De La Salle University, Philippines
PROFESSOR RAJESH CHANDRA
Vice-Chancellor and President, University of the South Pacific, Fiji
PROFESSOR TAKATOSHI ITO
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan
DR. MURAT KARIMSAKOV
Chairman of the Executive Body of the Eurasian Economic Club of
Scientists, Kazakhstan
DR. SAMAN KELEGAMA
Executive Director, Institute of Policy Studies, Sri Lanka
PROFESSOR DEEPAK NAYYAR
Jawaharlal Nehru University (former Chief Economic Adviser to the
Government of India), India
PROFESSOR REHMAN SOBHAN
Chairman, Centre for Policy Dialogue, Bangladesh
DR. CHALONGPHOB SUSSANGKARN
Distinguished Fellow, Thailand Development Research Institute, Thailand
PROFESSOR YU YONGDING
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China
Editors
Chief Editor
Dr. Aynul Hasan
Director, Macroeconomic Policy and Financing for Development Division
Editorial statement
The Asia-Pacific Development Journal is published twice a year by the
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.
Its primary objective is to provide a medium for the exchange of knowledge,
experience, ideas, information and data on all aspects of economic and social
development in the Asian and Pacific region. The emphasis of the Journal is on the
publication of empirically based, policy-oriented articles in the areas of poverty
alleviation, emerging social issues and managing globalization.
Original articles analysing issues and problems relevant to the region from the
above perspective are welcomed for publication in the Journal. The articles should have
a strong emphasis on the policy implications flowing from the analysis. Analytical book
reviews will also be considered for publication.
This special issue contains five selected discussion papers, from the AsiaPacific High-level Consultation on Financing for Development, which was held in
Jakarta on 29 and 30 April 2015. It highlights the importance of raising substantial
financial resources through various sources, including from new innovative sources of
finance to invest in the social sector and infrastructure development and efforts to
tackle climate change in order to ensure a transformative change to bring about
inclusive growth and sustainable development in the Asia-Pacific region. The papers
provide an opportunity for Asia-Pacific policymakers and stakeholders, and those from
the private sector, academia and civil society organizations, to actively engage with
the regional dialogue process for a follow-up to and review of the financing for
development outcomes and the means of implementation of the Sustainable
Development Goals in the Asia-Pacific region. Sudip Ranjan Basu has co-edited this
special volume on financing for development.
Manuscripts should be sent to:
Chief Editor
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Macroeconomic Policy and Financing for Development Division
ESCAP, United Nations Building
Rajadamnern Nok Avenue
Bangkok 10200
Thailand
Fax: 66 2 288-3007 or 66 2 288-1000
E-mail: [email protected]
iv
ASIA-PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT JOURNAL
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
CONTENTS
Page
Hans Genberg
Capital market development and
emergence of institutional investors
in the Asia-Pacific region
Gilberto M. Llanto,
Adoracion M. Navarro and
Ma. Kristina P. Ortiz
Infrastructure financing, public-private
partnerships and development in the
Asia-Pacific region
27
Ilaria Carrozza
Climate finance in the Asia-Pacific region:
trends and innovative approaches
71
Sailendra Narain
Trade finance for sustainable
development in Asia and the Pacific
103
Wayne Swan
Financing sustainable development –
What can we learn from the Australian
experience of reform?
135
v
1
Explanatory notes
References to dollars ($) are to United States dollars, unless otherwise stated.
References to “tons” are to metric tons, unless otherwise specified.
A solidus (/) between dates (e.g. 1980/81) indicates a financial year, a crop year or an
academic year.
Use of a hyphen between dates (e.g. 1980-1985) indicates the full period involved,
including the beginning and end years.
The following symbols have been used in the tables throughout the journal:
Two dots (..) indicate that data are not available or are not separately reported.
An em-dash (—) indicates that the amount is nil or negligible.
A hyphen (-) indicates that the item is not applicable.
A point (.) is used to indicate decimals.
A space is used to distinguish thousands and millions.
Totals may not add precisely because of rounding.
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do
not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the
United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its
authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
Where the designation “country or area” appears, it covers countries, territories, cities
or areas.
Bibliographical and other references have, wherever possible, been verified. The United
Nations bears no responsibility for the availability or functioning of URLs belonging to
outside entities.
The opinions, figures and estimates set forth in this publication are the responsibility of
the authors and should not necessarily be considered as reflecting the views or carrying
the endorsement of the United Nations. Mention of firm names and commercial
products does not imply the endorsement of the United Nations.
vi
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT AND EMERGENCE
OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN
THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
Hans Genberg*
Bank credit is traditionally the largest source of finance in the Asia-Pacific
region, but the role of capital markets has increased over time. There is
substantial heterogeneity across countries. For capital markets to develop
further, macroeconomic stability, strong property rights and enforcement
of securities laws have been identified as particularly important
considerations, together with building a state-of-the-art financial
infrastructure, including trading platforms and clearing and settlement
systems, and transparent information-sharing arrangements. Institutional
investors tend to have long-investment horizons and, as such, contribute
to the stability of the local market. It may therefore be appropriate to
explore ways to increase their presence in the domestic bond and equity
markets. Two possible approaches to accomplish this are to promote
savings through national pension funds and insurance companies and to
encourage the participation of foreign institutional investors in the
domestic market by making it more accessible to them while at the same
time being mindful of the risks to domestic financial stability associated
with greater openness to international capital flows. Policymakers may
also explore ways to take advantage of the emerging field of impact
investment to support funding for projects that are intended to generate
environmental and social impacts.
JEL classification: F21, F34, G15, G23.
Keywords: Capital market development, institutional investors, impact investment,
Asia-Pacific region.
* Executive Director, South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) Research and Training Centre, Kuala
Lumpur (e-mail: [email protected]). Research assistance from Nicole Genberg is gratefully
acknowledged.
1
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
I. INTRODUCTION
It is generally agreed that capital markets play an important role in the
intermediation of funds from savers and investors. While banks have traditionally been
a major source of finance for investments in developing and emerging markets, it is
recognized that active bond and equity markets serve an important complementary
role. The view that a vibrant financial sector has a positive effect on economic growth
and development has long been uncontroversial. Recently, however, and as a reaction
to recent financial crises in the United States of America and the eurozone, some
economists have argued that if it grows beyond a certain size, the financial sector
may become so large that its marginal contribution to growth would be negative
(Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015; Arcand, Berkes and Panizza, 2012). The size at which
this occurs appears relevant mostly for advanced economies and is far beyond the
current state of financial development in developing and emerging markets in general
and in the Asia-Pacific region in particular.
The present paper is based on the premise that further development of capital
markets in developing and emerging markets is beneficial, and asks what can be
done to encourage growth in bond and equity markets. Particular emphasis is on
what measures might be taken to induce financial markets to channel funds to
infrastructure and sustainable development investments and on the role that
institutional investors may play in this process.
The next section of the paper reviews the current structure of financial markets
in the Asia-Pacific region.
Recognizing that the vast diversity of financial development in the region
makes it nearly impossible to draw general conclusions, most of the discussion
focuses on emerging markets with nascent financial markets. The section also
reviews what is known about the economic and institutional reasons behind observed
differences in financial development across countries.
Section III looks specifically at the role of institutional investors in financial
intermediation and capital market development. It notes that institutional investors,
particularly pension funds and insurance companies, have an incentive to be
long-term investors as their liabilities have long terms to maturity. By taking on
liquidity risk, they can add to their return performance. The section also notes that
there are reasons to believe that long-term investors can have a stabilizing effect on
financial markets, and that policymakers may for this reason consider ways to
encourage the growth of the institutional investor base in their financial markets. How
this can be accomplished is discussed with reference to international experiences.
2
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Special characteristics of infrastructure and sustainable development projects
and the implications for public policy vis-à-vis financial markets are discussed in
section IV. An important characteristic of such projects is that they typically entail
significant spillover effects, or “externalities” to use the technical economic term. The
presence of such spillovers introduces a wedge between private and social returns,
which implies a role for public policy. The section discusses what role policies aimed
particularly at financial aspects of infrastructure and sustainable development projects
can play.
Section V contains a discussion of a new class of investors and investment
approaches, which may reduce the wedge between social and private costs and
benefits inherent in environmental and sustainable development investments. The
new approach is referred to as impact investment, which is generally defined as the
provision of capital that is expected to generate both a financial return, usually in line
with the market but not necessarily, as well as a social or environmental return. As
such, it internalizes the externalities associated with economic activities that have an
environmental and social impact. The section points to actions policymakers may
take to promote this kind of investment.
The penultimate sector of the paper briefly takes up a trade-off identified with
an aspect of financial development that involves the liberation of international flows of
capital. Opening domestic capital markets to foreign investors and removing
restrictions on outward financial investments by domestic residents has been
advocated as a way to permit greater risk diversification and increased competition in
the domestic market, thereby supporting economic development. At the same time,
however, it has been noted that greater international financial openness makes an
economy vulnerable to volatile international capital flows that may threaten domestic
financial stability. The section discusses the extent to which regional financial
integration may help improve the terms of the trade-off.
The final section lists some of the key policy messages that emerge from the
analysis.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT
This section reviews the basic characteristics of the financial sectors of the
economies of the Asia-Pacific region, focusing first on the size and evolution of
capital markets and then on what is known about the determinants of the structure of
capital markets across economies.
3
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
The size and evolution of the banking sector and capital markets
Diversity in economic structure and financial development
The Asia-Pacific region is diverse in terms of most indicators of economic
development, including gross domestic product (GDP), industrial structure,
commodity dependence, size of primary versus tertiary sectors. Data from ESCAP
show that gross national product (GNP) per capita differs by a factor of one hundred
between the poorest and the wealthiest economies (ESCAP, 2014a, table 24).1 The
size of the agricultural sector varies between essentially 0 per cent of GDP in some
economies to close to 60 per cent in others. Industrial sector value added accounts
for less than 10 per cent of GDP in the least industrialized economies to between 40
and 50 per cent in the most industrialized ones, and the size of the service sector
varies between 30 and 90 per cent. One common characteristic of the region’s
economies is that most are highly open to foreign trade as measured by standard
criteria, such as exports/GDP or imports/GDP.
In view of the diversity in economic development and economic structures it is
not surprising that significant diversity also characterizes financial sectors. One
indicator, given in table 1, shows the domestic credit provided by the banking sector
to the economy as a percentage of GDP, a common indicator of the size of the
banking sector.2 The variation across countries is large at about a factor of thirty.
There is a notable increase, 28 per cent on average, in the importance of bank credit
in most countries from before the financial crisis of 2008-2009, attesting to the
continued special role of bank credit in the region. The diversity remains, however, as
shown by the coefficient of variation across countries, which was high before the
crisis.
Similar diversity is found in terms of capital market development as illustrated
in table 2 by the size and evolution of stock market capitalization. The gap between
the least and most developed markets is large as expected. As in the case of bank
lending, there is a notable increase in the size of stock markets (relative to GDP) in the
past decade, attesting to the ongoing deepening of the financial markets in the
region. In fact, when a comparison is made for the group of countries for which data
on stock market capitalization are available, the increase from 2000 is almost the
same for the two measures. It is noteworthy that the diversity in both measures, even
1
2
The statements refer to the year 2011.
The average of 2010 and 2012 is taken as the latest observation (data for 2011 are not presented in
the source) in order to be comparable to stock market capitalization data presented in table 2. The latter
are from 2011.
4
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Table 1. Domestic credit provided by the banking sector (% of GDP)
2000
Average of 2010 and 2012*
Solomon Islands
26.5
12.0
Brunei Darussalam
38.6
19.7
Myanmar
31.2
24.8
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
9.0
26.5
Cambodia
6.4
33.9
Papua New Guinea
28.2
37.0
Indonesia
60.7
42.6
Kazakhstan
12.3
43.3
Sri Lanka
43.7
44.4
Pakistan
41.6
46.0
Philippines
58.3
50.1
India
51.2
73.9
Singapore
77.9
91.0
Viet Nam
32.6
114.8
Malaysia
138.4
130.5
China
119.7
150.7
Australia
93.2
154.5
Thailand`
138.3
156.2
Republic of Korea
74.7
165.8
Hong Kong, China
134.0
198.0
Japan
304.7
335.4
Average
72.4
92.9
Coefficient of variation
0.94
0.87
Source:
Asian Development Bank Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific, 2014.
Note:
* 2011 for Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar.
5
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Table 2. Stock market capitalization (% of GDP)
2000
2005
1
15
Pakistan
9
34
17
Kazakhstan
9
13
28
Sri Lanka
8
19
34
Indonesia
27
26
45
Viet Nam
2011
China
38
32
59
Japan
84
91
69
India
34
57
69
Philippines
38
34
74
Papua New Guinea
46
63
81
Thailand`
35
69
82
Republic of Korea
55
71
96
Australia
97
118
103
Malaysia
140
132
144
Singapore
182
243
145
Hong Kong, China
Average
Coefficient of variation
Source:
366
374
396
77.90
86.10
91.10
1.21
1.13
0.99
World Bank, Global Financial Development Database. Available from http://data.worldbank.org/datacatalog/global-financial-development.
though high, has been declining somewhat over time as measured by the coefficient
of variation.
Given that some economies in the region are at very early stages of financial
development and only have rudimentary capital markets, the discussion in following
sections of the potential role of institutional investors in Asian capital market focuses
on the economies with more developed markets.
Emerging capital markets in Asia in the global context
In a recent comparative study of financial systems in emerging Asian
economies and emerging and developed economies in other regions, Didier and
Schmukler (2014) provide a broad perspective on capital market developments. The
study compares the state of the markets in the 2000s with that in the 1990s and
6
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
focuses on seven Asian economies, namely China, India, Indonesia, the Republic of
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, while the comparison groups are G7
economies, seven other advanced economies, seven emerging economies of Latin
America and seven emerging economies of Eastern Europe (see Didier and
Schmukler, 2014, pp. 202-203, for a full list). Among the authors’ findings, the
following seven are particularly relevant for this paper:
First, financial systems in Asia have grown over the past two decades and are
generally more developed than those in Eastern Europe and Latin America. They
remain less developed in advanced countries, however. This suggests that there is
scope for further growth in Asian markets, and that they appear to have attributes that
make them more attractive than emerging markets in other regions as a destination
for investment allocation. It is important to note, however, that even among the
restricted group of Asian emerging markets considered in the Didier-Schmukler paper,
there is considerable diversity in terms of the size of capital markets. This is illustrated
in table 3 for stock markets and in table 4 for bond markets. The markets in Malaysia
and the Republic of Korea stand out as having the greatest depth, while those in
Indonesia are still in relatively early stages of development. The markets in the
Philippines and Thailand occupy the middle.
Table 3. Stock market capitalization (% of GDP)
2000
2005
2011
Indonesia
8
19
34
Philippines
84
91
69
Thailand
97
118
103
Republic of Korea
97
118
103
Malaysia
140
132
144
Average
85.20
95.60
90.60
0.56
0.47
0.46
China
38
32
59
India
34
57
69
36
44.5
64
Coefficient of variation
Average
Source:
World Bank, Global Financial Development Database. Available from http://data.worldbank.org/datacatalog/global-financial-development.
7
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Table 4. Bond market capitalization (% of GDP)
Government
Corporate
Total
Market
Indonesia
Thailand
2005
2014
51
13
2005
6
2014
2
2005
2014
58
15
0
12
0
4
1
16
Philippines
40
35
1
7
41
42
Malaysia
43
61
32
43
75
104
Republic of Korea
47
62
43
89
89
151
Average
32
42
16
29
53
65
0.56
0.68
1.20
1.29
0.65
0.92
Coefficient of variation
Source:
Asian Development Bank.
Second, the role played by bond and stock markets has increased over time, in
absolute terms and relative to the role played by the banking sector.3
Third, the nature of bond financing is changing, though slowly. For example,
private sector bond issues in the domestic market have longer maturities. The
increased role of bond and stock markets and the ability of debtors to place longer
maturity issues are also attributes that contribute to the attractiveness of the region as
an investment destination. This appears to be supported by conclusion four, namely
that institutional investors have gained importance, and sovereign wealth funds are
also growing rapidly.
A further positive development is finding number five, which states that
institutional investors are moving towards environmentally and socially responsible
investment strategies, a topic that will be covered in some detail in section III.
Not all findings in the Didier-Schmukler study are positive, however. The sixth
conclusion states that capital-raising activities have often not expanded beyond a few
large companies that continue to capture most of the issuances, suggesting that
small and medium-sized enterprises may have difficulties in financing expansion with
debt instruments. The public sector also captures a significant share of the bond
market, raising concerns that the private corporate sector may be crowded out. As
3
This is also a feature of the data presented here. A careful comparison between tables 1 and 2 shows
that while bank credit was about twice as large as stock market capitalization as a ratio to GDP in 2000,
the difference in 2011 declined to 1.6 times as large. Hence, even though the banking sector still
dominates, the equity market is gaining ground. Similar remarks can be made with respect to bond
market development.
8
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
illustrated in table 4, corporate bond markets in Asia are small relative to government
bond markets with the notable exception of those in the Malaysia and the Republic of
Korea. Finally, the seventh finding is that secondary markets remain illiquid. Possible
remedies to these factors are discussed below.
What determines the evolution of capital markets?
Aside from being positively related to the size of the economy (figure 1),4 the
size and evolution of capital markets depend on a number of factors spanning
macroeconomic conditions, legal frameworks and the state of economy’s financial
infrastructure. Empirical research recently reviewed in Laeven (2014) has identified
a number of critical relationships.
Figure 1: Stock market capitalization vs. per capita GDP, 2011
Stock market capitalization (% of GDP)
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Natural logarithm of per capita GDP
Source:
Author’s calculations based on data from ESCAP (2014a).
4
The grey dots in the figure refer to the set of economies represented in table 2 and to the year 2011.
Hong Kong, China was taken out as its stock market capitalization is an outlier. The black dots represent
(from top to bottom) the United States, United Kingdom and Germany as representing advanced Western
economies. One would be hard put to conclude from this comparison that the Asia-Pacific economies in
the graph and the three advanced economies are significantly different.
9
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Macroeconomic instability is detrimental for the development of domestic
capital markets. High and variable inflation tends to be associated with supressed
local currency bond markets as investors and issuers both seek the relative certainty
of foreign currency-denominated instruments even though that entails exposure to
currency mismatches. Cross-country experiences indicate that equity market
development is similarly held back by volatile inflation and economic growth.
With respect to institutional and legal frameworks, the literature suggests that
strong property rights protection, such as enforcement of securities laws and debt
contracts, and strong corporate governance, are beneficial for capital market
development.
Financial infrastructure refers to both the organization of trading activities and
the regulations that govern trading. A well-functioning infrastructure is essential for
trades to be executed rapidly and, thereby contributing to the liquidity of the market.
It also contributes to building confidence among issuers and investors in the integrity
and fairness of the process of price discovery, elements that are necessary for their
participation in the market.
As Laeven (2014) points out, governments have an important role to play in
each of the three areas mentioned through: providing a stable macroeconomic
environment; introducing and maintaining a strong legal framework supportive of the
enforcement of financial contracts; and encouraging the creation of robust trading
platforms and practices. In addition, measures that increase the size of the investor
base and facilitate the participation of a wider group of borrowers could effectively
increase the breadth and liquidity of the market, contributing to its growth and
contribution to economic activity. Measures that make it easier for pension funds and
other institutional investors to participate in the domestic capital market and that
encourage the introduction of innovative investment vehicles should be explored.
Opening the domestic market to foreign investors may also be considered.
The potential benefits and risks associated with such strategies are discussed in
section VI.
III. THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
The participation of institutional investors in Asian markets
Data on the size of holdings of Asian assets by institutional investors are
fragmentary. ESCAP (2014b) presents revealing data on the size of Asian institutional
investors from a global perspective. These data show that the assets of private sector
asset managers in the Asia-Pacific region amounted to 9.7 per cent of the assets of
10
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
asset managers globally. Asia-Pacific pension funds accounted for 26.3 per cent of
the world total, with the pension fund of the Government of Japan occupying the
number one position among the world’s pension funds by size. Asia-Pacific sovereign
wealth funds held 44.8 per cent of the assets of such funds globally with the China
Investment Corporation occupying fourth place and the fifth place taken by SAFE
Investment Company. The assets of the three types of institutional investors together
accounted for 14.9 per cent of the world total.5 When this figure is compared with the
size of Asia-Pacific economies’ combined GDP, which is approximately one quarter of
world GDP, it can be concluded that institutional investors in Asia and the Pacific have
room to grow as financial deepening in the region proceeds.
Didier and Schmukler (2014) also contains information on the size of asset
holdings of institutional investors, which corroborates that contained in the ESCAP
study and provides some additional insights. Three generalizations can be made: first,
institutional investors are significantly larger in advanced countries than in emerging
markets measured by the size of their assets; second, institutional investors play
a larger role in Asia than in other emerging markets, except for the pension funds that
have a large presence in Latin America; third, insurance companies are the largest
institutional investors in the Asian markets, but mutual funds seem to be growing
rapidly and may soon catch up.
While comprehensive data on the country allocation and the allocation by asset
classes of the institutional investors’ portfolios are not available, Didier and Schmukler
report, albeit based on patchy data, that most of the assets of the institutional
investors in Asia, as in emerging markets in general, are in the form of government
bonds and bank deposits. Corporates appear not to be attracting funding from
institutional investors at present, either in the form of bonds or equity financing. This
suggests both a limitation of the capital markets and an opportunity: the limited size
and liquidity of the markets as well as institutional constraints may be a reason for the
lack of interest among institutional investors, but, if this is the case, there is hope that
growth of the markets and institutional reforms will make them more attractive for this
class of investors.
Measures that may be considered to increase the attractiveness of capital
markets to institutional investors comprise those mentioned in the previous section in
the discussion of the study by Laeven. Apart from safeguarding macroeconomic
5
The figures refer to December 2012 for asset managers and pension funds and to December 2014
for sovereign wealth funds. The total for the three types of institutional investors was thus obtained by
adding information for different time periods. This should not have a critical influence on the final result as
sovereign wealth funds account for only about 20 per cent of total institutional assets holdings in the AsiaPacific region and only 7 per cent in the world as a whole.
11
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
stability, measures to strengthen corporate governance and legal frameworks with
respect to property rights protection and enforcement of securities laws have been
shown to be supportive of market development in general, and that there is every
reason to believe that those measures would be viewed favourably by institutional
investors.
Integrating the domestic market with the global financial markets or with
a regional grouping could also be considered as it would increase its effective size
(this is discussed at more length in section VI). It is also pointed out, however, that
such integration involves a potential trade-off between the benefits of participating in
a larger financial area versus the potential costs associated with being subject to the
vagaries of volatile international capital flows.
The attractiveness of the domestic capital market to institutional investors may
also be boosted by improving financial infrastructure through increasing the speed
and safety of the execution and settlements of trades. Such measures may also
increase the liquidity of the domestic market. Liquidity may furthermore be increased
by modifying restrictions on institutional investors’ portfolio allocation strategies.
Allowing pension funds to invest in a wider variety of asset classes than in the
traditional government bonds and bank deposits could make it attractive for them to
trade more actively. Liquidity may also be increased by allowing foreign institutional
investors to enter and exit the domestic market without restrictions on holding
periods. Note, however, that this would potentially lead to greater volatility of capital
flows.
In this context, one may ask whether foreign institutional investors are more or
less likely to invest in domestic infrastructure and other socially beneficial projects
than domestic institutional investors. On the one hand, foreign investors typically hold
investments in a larger universe of assets than domestic investors. Therefore, they
may view domestic (foreign for them) infrastructure projects as a convenient way to
diversify risk. Domestic investors are more likely to be heavily exposed to domestic
economic risks, which would make them less likely to take on further risks of a similar,
or correlated, nature. On the other hand, domestic investors can be assumed to have
more in-depth knowledge of economic conditions in their own country, and have
greater access to public bailout funds should a project underperform. This would
make them more willing to accept the risk associated with domestic investments. On
balance, it is not clear which type of investor is more likely to view domestic socially
beneficial projects more favourably. A policymaker would be well advised to treat both
equally.
12
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
The potential benefits of a greater presence of institutional investors
Pension funds and insurance companies carry liabilities with long terms to
maturity. To hedge against the risk associated with maturity mismatches, they can
hold assets with a similarly long return horizon. This is fundamentally why institutional
investors are viewed as long-term investors, although there are some concerns that
their asset allocation strategies have become increasingly “short-termist” (Della
Croce, Stewart and Yermo, 2011, p. 2).
Long-term investments typically benefit from assuming liquidity risk and
avoiding fees associated with frequent trading and portfolio rebalancing. As such,
they can be expected to earn a superior return compared to short-term investments.
Investors with a long-investment horizon are also believed to have a stabilizing
influence on asset price movements. In downturns, they are not as constrained as
some asset managers who may have to liquidate positions, and thereby contribute to
reinforcing the downswing when they face redemption requests by their clients. In
periods of excessive market optimism, they can afford to “see through the cycle”, as
their funds under management tend not to be as sensitive as those of many hedge
funds to short-term market movements.
It has even been suggested that institutional investors should actively seek to
act in a counter-cyclical fashion by taking advantage of market downturns to add
riskier assets and selling overvalued assets in upswings (Della Croce, Stewart and
Yermo, 2011, p. 2). This, however, assumes that institutional investors are able to
predict market movements more accurately than other investors in the market, an
assumption that does not have empirical support.
It has also been suggested that institutional investors should take
environmental and sustainable economic development objectives into account in their
asset allocation decisions. This is uncontroversial to the extent that these objectives
have a direct impact on the returns and risks associated with the asset allocations. If
it means that institutional investors should incorporate the spillover effects of the
projects they invest in, the situation is different.6 The case for making individuals,
such as pensioners who are dependent on institutional investors’ performances for
their livelihood, suffer a loss of financial return for the common good of greater
environmental protection is weak. Such protection should be paid for by society as
a whole.
6
See the next section for a brief discussion of the importance of spill-over effects (externalities) in
discussions about infrastructure, environmental, and sustainable development projects.
13
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Measures to support the growth of institutional investments.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
recently published G20/OECD High-level Principles of Long-term Investment
Financing by Institutional Investors (OECD, 2011) with the objective to
“...assist OECD, G20 and any other interested countries to facilitate and
promote long-term investment by institutional investors, particularly
among those institutions, such as pension funds, insurers and sovereign
wealth funds, that typically have long duration liabilities and
consequently can consider investments over a long period provided
these are prudent and capable of producing a reasonable risk-adjusted
return.” (OECD, 2011, p. 3)
The document contains eight principles; some of them are intended to guide
government policy and others are meant to serve as recommendations for the
industry itself. Principle 1, “Preconditions for long-term investments”, points to
factors, such as stable macroeconomic conditions, a predictable regulatory
framework and effective enforcement of the rule of law and tax neutrality, that are
important elements to encourage long term investments by institutional investments.
Recall that these are some of the same factors that have been identified as being
useful for the development of capital markets in general.
Principle 6, “Investment restrictions”, advises governments to
“...avoid introducing or maintaining unnecessarily barriers to
international investment – inward and outward – by institutional
investors, especially when targeted to long-term investment. They
should cooperate to remove, whenever possible, any related
international impediments.” (OECD, 2011, p. 10)
While such removals of barriers to international flows of capital would be
beneficial in terms of diversification gains, efficiency and competition, they also may
lead to increased risk of financial instability brought about by volatility of such flows,
as discussed briefly below.
The OECD document also contains recommendations regarding: the
governance of institutional investors; the need for robust regulatory frameworks;
information-sharing; and financial education/consumer protection.
For the purpose of this paper, principle 5, “Financing vehicles and support for
long-term investment and collaboration among institutional investors”, is interesting. It
suggests that “[g]overnments may consider providing risk mitigation to long-term
14
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
investment projects” (p. 9). These would include “credit and revenue guarantees,
first-loss provisions, public subsidies, and the provision of bridge finance via
direct loans” (p. 9). Each of these would reduce the risk borne by the investor in
infrastructure or environmental protection projects. Credit and revenue guarantees
would protect the investor from failure of the project to generate enough revenue to
pay the investor the contractual return. First-loss provisions would provide financial
support to a financing vehicle so as to increase the credit rating of the securities it
issues to finance the infrastructure project. Similarly, public subsidies and provision of
bridge finance at below-market interest rates would reduce the cost for the investor.
It is important to emphasize that in each of these examples, there is a potential
call on public funds to “bail out” the private investor. The budgetary consequences of
this must be considered carefully in the cost-benefit calculus involved in using these
measures to attract private-sector institutional investors. The justification for such
support makes reference to the socioeconomic and environmental impacts of the
investments, in other words to consequences beyond the narrow scope of an
individual project. The implications of such spillover effects are taken up in the next
section.
IV. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
Externalities and the case for policy intervention
Infrastructure and sustainable development projects have characteristics that
pose challenges for public policy. Projects in these areas typically involve spillovers or
externalities to use the technical economic term. What this refers to is that the
benefits and costs do not accrue only to their direct users, but also to others. For
example, a new railroad line from a suburb to the city centre will benefit users of the
train service by reducing commuting time, but it may also benefit those who continue
to commute by automobile or bus because it may reduce congestion on the road
connection. Furthermore, to the extent that the suburb is now more accessible, land
and house prices may increase benefiting existing owners. Restaurants and other
service providers in the suburb may also benefit from clients in the city centre who
now find that the shorter commute makes their services more readily available.
Similarly, promoters of development projects may not take sustainability
concerns into account because the full benefits and costs of the project do not
accrue only to the immediate users but also to what we may call innocent bystanders.
Clearing rainforests to make room for agricultural production will have benefits for the
producers and consumers of the produce grown, but to the extent that carbon
15
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
dioxide (CO2) absorption by the now smaller rainforest is lost, it may have implications
for climate change affecting people long distances away.
The presence of positive or negative externalities means that unfettered free
enterprise will not in general guarantee that an optimal amount of resources will be
devoted to the corresponding projects. In cases in which the spillovers are
predominantly positive, the projects tend to be underfunded and vice versa in cases
in which negative externalities predominate. In both cases, some kind of policy
intervention could lead to superior outcomes.
Regulations and taxes
To deal with externalities, policymakers typically make use of regulations, taxes
or subsidies. Regulations may take the form of prohibiting or limiting activities that
entail severe negative spillovers on bystanders. Examples include restrictions on
activities that result in environmental pollution or prohibitions on smoking in public
places. Taxes can in some cases be designed to have similar effects as outright
prohibitions, albeit being less far-reaching, such as imposing taxes on CO2 emissions
or on cigarettes.
While regulations and taxes typically are designed to restrict activities that
create negative spillovers, subsidies are meant to encourage those with positive
external effects. Tax concessions for installing solar panels in homes or factories and
subsidies to users of public transport services in congested cities are examples of
this.
Properly designed regulations, taxes and subsidies may go a long way to limit
activities that cause negative spillovers and encourage those with positive ones.
However, difficulties of enforcement may in some situations limit their effectiveness
and fiscal costs may reduce their feasibility. Seeking to incentivise financial markets
to steer funds into preferred activities may constitute a useful complement.
Incentives through financial markets and instruments
Financial markets driven purely by private risk-reward considerations do not
take into account external effects in intermediating funds. Incentives need to be
provided in order to align private and social benefits and costs. Regulations, taxes
and subsidies may be used to this end. For example, restrictions on the ability of
foreign investors to participate in the local financial markets are used in some
jurisdictions to limit the perceived dangers associated with capital inflows. Section VI
contains a discussion on the costs and benefits for such capital flow management
restrictions in more detail.
16
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Subsidies to encourage funds to flow to favoured sectors are also used.
Government subsidies to mortgage insurance is an example of this. More subtle
forms of subsidies have also been designed. Consider the case of financing privatesector investments in transport infrastructure, such as toll roads, railroads, or airports.
Such investments come about only if the investor can earn a return from road tolls,
railroad tickets, and airport user charges. The returns must accrue over a relatively
long period of time for the project to be profitable. However, as the road, train, and
airport charges are often subject to government approval because of their political
sensitivity, there is potentially a great deal of uncertainty about their permanency.
There is a time-consistency problem at work. To induce the private sector to invest in
a toll road project, the government must promise to keep road charges at a profitable
level for a certain number of years. Once the road is built, however, there is
a temptation to reduce charges to gain political support by easing the financial burden
on users. To offset the inherent risk to the private investor, some guarantee is
required. One way of doing so would be to securitize the expected future returns from
the road charges and provide a guaranteed rate of return on the security. Any
difference between the actual return from the toll road and the guaranteed return on
the security would be borne by the government.7
Sustainable development projects, such as wind farms, face similar concerns.
The initial costs need to be recouped over a relatively long period, and uncertainty
about the evolution of electricity tariffs may make investors unwilling to provide
finance. If the tariffs are determined in a competitive market, the uncertainty about
their evolution is not different from the price uncertainty facing any business decision,
but to the extent that electricity tariffs are determined in part by government electricity
boards subject to political pressure, the time consistency problem discussed above is
present, potentially leading to underinvestment in the industry.8
Private-public sector partnerships
In addition to regulations, taxes and incentives through financial markets and
instruments, concluding public-private sector partnerships has been proposed as
a means to support long-term investment, particularly in infrastructure. In this sector,
there is a large gap between the needs of many developing and emerging markets
7
ESCAP (2014b) contains a further discussion including references to specific examples of measures
introduced in Asian economies.
8
As explained above, irrespective of issues related to price uncertainty, the positive externality
associated with wind farms implies that private enterprise will tend to underinvest in them. Hence, the
case for some public policy involvement.
17
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
and the financing available through government budgets and external assistance.
Similar to the publication for long-term investments by the institutional investors,
OECD has published guidelines in the form of principles for private sector
participation in infrastructure (OECD, 2007). Twenty-four principles are offered to
serve as a guide for policymakers. Among the most relevant for the purposes of this
paper are those that call for (a) careful cost-benefit analysis of alternative methods to
provide infrastructure capital; (b) proper allocation of risk between the public and
private sector participants; (c) authorities to be watchful for the potential fiscal costs
of alternative support mechanisms for private-sector involvement; and (d) access to
the financial market, including the removal of restrictions on international capital
movements. The reader can recognize these from discussions earlier in this section.
In the final section of the paper, these principles are put in a fuller context.
V. THE GROWTH OF THE IMPACT INVESTMENT
In previous sections, it has been argued that expanding the scope of capital
markets is key to developing the region’s financial infrastructure. An important
component of capital markets expansion is the increased participation of institutional
investors. The previous section contains a discussion on a number of means by which
this can be promoted. Beyond mere participation, however, is there a way to
encourage institutional investors to participate in development more broadly? These
types of investors typically have fiduciary responsibilities that emphasize financial
returns first and foremost. Is there a way to incentivize them to think of returns in
broader terms, as inclusive of social and environmental returns, thus fulfilling the twin
goals of financial as well as economic, social and environmental development?
In fact, many institutional investors already do take social and environmental
factors into account in their investment decisions. Such considerations can take the
form of negative screening (eliminating certain sectors or companies from the
manager’s investment universe based on specific environmental, social and
governance (ESG) criteria), positive screening (investment in sectors or companies
with best-in-class ESG performance), and integration of ESG criteria into the
investment valuation process. Such “socially responsible” or “sustainable”
investment, however, does not generally lead to an increase in the aggregate amount
of investment, but rather to a reallocation of the existing volume. More pertinent
would be the rise in themed investments related to sustainability, such as clean
technology or green energy funds, in which capital is supplied to sectors and
companies because of their specific activities, though the positive impact of those
activities is still considered an externality rather than being explicitly measured.
Finally, there is the emerging asset class of impact investment, which is generally
18
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
defined as the provision of capital that is expected to generate both a financial return,
usually in line with the market but not necessarily, as well as a social or environmental
return. The latter should be both intentional and measurable. In order to encourage
truly sustainable development, policymakers may consider focusing on growing the
impact investment market.
The term impact investment was coined in 2007 at a conference organized by
the Rockefeller Foundation (E.T. Jackson & Associates, 2012), and impact investment
as a separate asset class has gained increasing prominence with the publication of
reports and policy papers by JPMorgan, the Monitor Institute, OECD, the G8
sponsored Social Impact Investment Taskforce (headed by Sir Ronald Cohen,
founding father of the United Kingdom venture capital industry), and the World
Economic Forum, among others. The concept has developed in line with several
factors.
On the one hand, social and economic issues are presenting both the
international community and individual countries with immense challenges. These
challenges are increasingly beyond the fiscal reach of governments and philanthropic
organizations, which are thus seeking innovative modes of financing.
On the other, there is growing investor demand for responsible investment
options, which had been tempered by the impression that taking into account social
and environmental impact necessarily meant foregoing financial returns. One estimate
values the potential market over the next ten years as ranging from $400 billion to
nearly $1 trillion (O’Donohoe, Leijonhufvud and Saltuk, 2010). In this context,
policymakers should think of impact investment as a tool with the potential, ideally, to
harness the efficiency and range of the private sector to meet and scale solutions to
public needs.
As an emerging concept, impact investment is facing a number of development
challenges. Key among these are insufficient intermediation, lack of supporting
infrastructure, and a shortage of absorptive capacity for capital. Intermediation allows
investors to connect efficiently with investment opportunities. To develop this
function, a number of solutions have been proposed, such as establishing landmark
funds focused on ESG issues, including venture capital or “catalytic” finance type
structures, building investment banking expertise, fostering the growth of impactdriven fund managers and designing financial products to facilitate access. By
definition, institutional investors play a crucial role in these efforts. In terms of
infrastructure, certain features are considered to be fundamental to a functional
market, such as standardized impact and risk measurement criteria and tools, widely
available benchmarking data, and a formal network of institutions engaging in
information-sharing, marketing, lobbying and other activities supporting the industry.
19
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Finally, recent surveys have shown that the lack of investment opportunities is one of
the crucial factors holding back industry expansion. Possible remedies cited include
supporting management skill training for potential entrepreneurs and developing
scalable ESG-driven business models. (Freireich and Fulton, 2009; Saltuk and others,
2014).
While the private sector can and should take the lead on many of these
proposals, government also has a key role to play in furthering the development of the
impact investment field, thereby facilitating institutional investor involvement and
furthering national and regional development goals (Freireich and Fulton, 2009; IIPC,
2014; Wilson, 2014; Wilson, Silva and Ricardson, 2015). Public sector involvement
can extend from general framework conditions, ranging from legislative and regulatory
actions to direct investment, to simply displaying goodwill. On a general scale,
conditions allowing for robust financial markets, such as a fully convertible exchange
rate, unrestricted capital flows and streamlined regulatory requirements for
investment, are obviously more likely to promote investment, including impact-driven
investment. Specific supportive measures might include tax relief for impact
investment products. Eventually, public authorities could promote standardization by
requiring certification of impact investments, which could evolve into a rating system.9
Government can also help establish intermediaries, such as exchanges (trading
platforms) or wholesale banks. More direct forms of participation could take the form
of guarantees, subsidies, and the outright provision of capital by establishing or
co-investing in landmark funds, including in the form of subordinated capital
(remaining cautious of the crowding-out effect). Another form of support could be to
use the public sector’s clout as a major procurer to secure demand for impact-driven
enterprises or simply to provide technical assistance. In addition, public-private
partnerships can easily be impact-driven, in the form of outcome-based finance or
pay-for-success structures, such as social impact bonds. Note that one should be
mindful of contextual specificities, taking into account country and regions’
sociopolitical and cultural environments, structural development, and policy goals;
there is no one-size-fits-all model.
Several of these policies are already being implemented in various countries
around the world. Among others, social impact bonds have been rolled out in the
United States of America and in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, for example. The United Kingdom has also introduced tax relief initiatives and
the European Union is putting in place a fund labelling system (O’Donohoe,
9
What institutional arrangement could provide such ratings is an open question. Existing rating
agencies may not have the expertise to undertake ratings of environmental, social, and infrastructure
investments that involve extensive externalities. The issues involved in doing so are worthy of a separate
study.
20
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Leijonhufvud and Saltuk, 2010). Most impact investors are in developed countries in
the West. Investors from this group have taken the lead in promoting impact
investment. A majority of impact investments are made in developing countries,
however, and aside from these outside investments, developing countries have been
increasingly active in the sector. In Asia, the focus of interest for this paper, a number
of initiatives are under way. The 2014 Asia Sustainable Investment Review notes the
following projects, plans and proposals, among many others (ASrIA, 2014). In China,
authorities are considering policies, regulations and standards that would promote
green bonds, such as incorporating environmental risk into credit ratings, making
lenders and investors liable for environmental pollution, and implementing
environmental metrics to foster disclosure and facilitate the creation of indices and
benchmarks in public equities markets. In 2012, the government of Hong Kong, China
set up the Social Innovation and Entrepreneurship Development Fund, with an initial
commitment of HK$500 million (US$64 million), to help foster new ways of tackling
poverty and social exclusion. On a smaller scale, the Government of Indonesia
established the Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund (ICCTF) in 2009 to bring
together funds from the public and private sectors and international donors to finance
the country’s climate change programmes. The fund, though small – $21.01 million
pledged and $11.21 million deposited as of June 201510 has created a framework for
enhanced public-private collaboration. Another notable endeavour is the Singaporebased Impact Investment Exchange Asia (IIX), which was established to help channel
return-seeking capital to impact-driven enterprises. While most sustainable
investment in Asia still takes the form of negative screening (inherent to sukuk bonds,
for example), integration of ESG criteria in traditional investing has become more
prevalent, which could eventually help pave the way for the deeper commitment
required by impact investing.
So is there a way to attract institutional investors not just to invest but to invest
responsibly and sustainably and in a way that will actively support the social and
environmental development of host countries and regions? As shown above, there is.
By promoting themselves as destinations for impact investing, governments can tap
into a deep vein of demand for investments that actively “do good” without giving up
financial benefits. However, it is not only a question of marketing. Governments also
need to provide supportive environments in the form of sound micro and
macroeconomic policies and take measures to enhance the attractiveness of local
capital markets as discussed in section I. Absence of corruption and a clean record
on human rights and similar high-profile areas are also critical. No investor who wants
to be seen as “doing good” wants to risk his reputation by being seen investing in
a country that has issues with corruption, human-right violations and the like.
10
www.climatefundsupdate.org/data (accessed 19 October 2015).
21
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
VI. FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT VERSUS FINANCIAL
OPENNESS: IS THERE CONFLICT?
One of the recurring recommendations in proposals to increase the size and
scope of the domestic capital market is that restrictions to international movements of
capital should be lifted. Among the expected benefits would be greater participation
of foreign investors in the domestic market, thereby expanding the investor base,
leading to greater competition and liquidity in the market. In addition, the opportunity
of domestic borrowers to seek funds in foreign markets would be a source of
competition in the local market.
Openness to external financial markets can, however, be a double-edged
sword. A potential counterbalance to the benefits from the presence of foreign
investors is the exposure to the volatility of capital flows and hence to financial
instability imported from abroad. This potential trade-off between the benefits and
costs of free international capital mobility explored in recent literature has concluded
that a fully open capital account may not be fully optimal when the potential financial
stability risks associated with volatile capital flows is taken into account (see, for
example, Korinek, 2011).
Pursuing capital account openness on a regional level has been offered as
a way to modify the terms of the trade-off between efficiency and stability. While
foregoing full integration with global financial markets would constitute a cost, this
would be more than compensated for, the argument goes, by having a larger regional
capital market that would be better able to absorb swings in international investor
sentiment. The threat of financial stability would be reduced.
A number of conceptual questions arise from this argument. One is with what
constitutes the optimal domain of the regional financial integration. In other words,
which countries should be included and which should not? Another question is
whether regional financial integration should mainly be viewed as a step towards full
integration with global markets or as a final arrangement.
At a concrete level, a number of initiatives have been launched in the AsiaPacific region to develop regional capital markets, in particular debt markets. In their
review of these initiatives, Goswami and Sharma (2011) identify the principal
objectives of the initiatives are to create trading platforms that would facilitate
intraregional trading, establish clearing and settlement systems, and strengthen
regional rating agencies.
22
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
VII. KEY POLICY OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
The topics covered in this paper point to a number of opportunities and
challenges that policymakers will have to wrestle with in order to support the
development of capital markets in their jurisdictions, promote the participation of
long-term institutional investors in their markets, and take advantage of new
investment trends.
For the development of capital markets, macroeconomic stability, strong
property rights and enforcement of securities laws have been identified as particularly
important considerations together with building of a state of the arts financial
infrastructure, including trading platforms, clearing and settlement systems, and
transparent information-sharing arrangements. Increasing the size of the investor
base by opening domestic markets to foreign investors has also been suggested as
a way to promote domestic financial market development.
While the benefits of such an opening is well understood, it must also be
recognized that greater international financial integration of the domestic economy
will also expose it to risks associated with volatility of international capital flows.
Regional financial integration initiatives may serve to limit this risk by spreading the
capital flows over a larger market while at the same time expanding the investor base
to also include those from the regional partners. Whether such regional financial
integration can be a substitute for full integration in global financial markets is,
however, an open question.
Institutional investors tend to have long investment horizons and as such
contribute to the stability of the local market. It may therefore be appropriate to
explore ways to increase their presence in the domestic bond and equity markets.
One way to do this is to promote savings through national pension funds and
insurance companies. In view of the long-term orientation of institutional investors’
investment portfolios, it is particularly important for authorities to provide predictable
macroeconomic and regulatory frameworks as well as effective enforcement of the
rule of law and absence of corruption.
Authorities may also consider measures for long-term investors that would
offset political risks associated with changes in regulatory frameworks that are
introduced after a project has already been financed and which impact its profitability.
Public-private partnerships may have a role to play in this regard, as would credit and
revenue guarantees, first-loss provisions, public subsidies, and the provision of bridge
finance through direct loans, but as with other risk mitigating measures, careful costbenefit analysis needs to be conducted and safeguards must be included so as to
23
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
limit potential moral hazard problems. The potential budgetary implications of such
schemes should also be factored in.
Promoting the participation of institutional investors in the domestic market
may also be pursued through enhanced access for foreign institutional investors,
again being mindful of the risks to domestic financial stability associated with greater
openness to international capital flows.
Finally, policymakers should explore ways to take advantage of the emerging
field of impact investment for the support of funding for projects with environmental,
social, and infrastructure content, being mindful that doing so should not involve
a “race to the bottom” in terms of tax concessions or regulatory leniency or a “race
to the top” in terms of providing risk-reducing inducements. Some degree of
international coordination and adherence to generally accepted principles in these
regards need to be implemented.
24
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
REFERENCES
Arcand, Jean-Louis, Enrico Berkes, and Ugo Panizza (2012). Too much finance? Working Paper, WP/
12/161. Washington, D.C.: IMF.
Association for Sustainable & Responsible Investment in Asia (ASrIA) (2015). 2014 Asia Sustainable
Investment Review. Hong Kong. Available from http://asria.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/
12/2014-Asia-Sustainable-Investment-Review1.pdf.
Cecchetti, Stephen G., and Enisse Kharroubi (2015). Why does financial sector growth crowd out real
economic growth? Working Papers, No. 490 (February). Basel, Switzerland: Bank for
International Settlements.
Della Croce, Raffaele, Fiona Stewart, and Juan Yermo (2011). Promoting longer-term investment by
institutional investors: selected issues and policies. OECD Journal: Financial Market
Trends, vol. 2011, No. 1, pp. 1-20.
Didier, Tatiana, and Sergio Schmukler (2014). Debt markets in emerging economies: major trends.
Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 56, pp. 200-228.
Freireich, J., and K. Fulton (2009). Investing for Social and Environmental Impact: A Design for
Catalysing an Emerging Industry. New York: Monitor Institute.
Goswami, Mangal, and Sunil Sharma (2011). The development of local debt markets in Asia. Working
Paper, WP/11/132. Washington, D.C.: IMF.
Impact Investing Policy Collaborative (IIPC) (2014). Impact investing policy in 2014: a snapshot of
global activity. Available from http://hausercenter.org/iri/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/
2014-IIPC.v7_FINAL.pdf.
E.T. Jackson & Associates (2012). Accelerating Impact: Achievements, Challenges and What’s Next in
the Impact Investing Industry. New York: The Rockefeller Foundation.
Korinek, Anton (2011). The new economics of prudential capital controls. IMF Economic Review,
vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 523-561.
Laeven, Luc (2014). The development of local capital markets: rationale and challenges. Working
Paper, WP/14/234. Washington, D.C.: IMF.
O’Donohoe, N., C. Leijonhufvud, and Y. Saltuk (2010). Impact investments: an emerging asset class.
J.P. Morgan Securities plc, GIIN and Rockefeller Foundation. November.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2007). OECD Principles for
Private Sector Participation in Infrastructure. Available from www.oecd.org/daf/inv/
investment-policy/38309896.pdf.
(2011). G20/OECD high-level principles of long-term investment financing by institutional
investors. Available from www.oecd.org/finance/private-pensions/G20-OECD-PrinciplesLTI-Financing.pdf.
Saltuk, Y., and others (2014). Spotlight on the market: the impact investor survey. Global Social
Finance, May. London: J.P. Morgan and the Global Impact Investing Network.
United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) (2014a).
Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 2014. Available from www.unescap.org/
resources/statistical-yearbook-asia-and-pacific-2014.
25
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
(2014b). Sustainable development financing: perspectives from Asia and the Pacific.
Available from www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/UNESCAP-SDF-Paper-1July2014share.pdf.
Wilson, Karen E., Filipe Silva, and Dominic Ricardson (2015). Social Impact Investment: Building the
Evidence Base. Available from www.oecd.org/sti/ind/social-impact-investment.pdf .
Wilson, K.E. (2014). New investment approaches for addressing social and economic challenges.
Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, No. 15. Paris: OECD.
26
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING, PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS AND DEVELOPMENT IN
THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
Gilberto M. Llanto, Adoracion M. Navarro and Ma. Kristina P. Ortiz*
Several studies have shown the significant interlinkage between
infrastructure and development among various economies in the
Asia-Pacific region. Recognizing the central role of infrastructure in
contributing to the improvement of human welfare and achieving the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the present paper looks into
the following key areas: (1) status of infrastructure in Asia-Pacific
economies and infrastructure financing; (2) evidence linking infrastructure
and development; (3) public-private partnership (PPP) as an emerging
infrastructure financing scheme for developing economies; and
(4) the creation of new financial institutions for infrastructure financing in
the region. Overall, the Asia-Pacific region’s large and expanding
infrastructure needs may be addressed through various forms of
financing. While tax revenues and borrowing will continue to be significant
sources of financing for most economies in the region, PPPs and other
emerging sources could play a major role in addressing infrastructure
gaps.
JEL classification: H540, O180, O190.
Keywords: Infrastructure, sustainable development, official development assistance,
public-private partnership, financial institutions, infrastructure financing.
I. INTRODUCTION
A cursory review of the state of infrastructure in Asia-Pacific economies shows
the critical need to improve quality and accessibility to help foster more inclusive
* Gilberto M. Llanto, President (e-mail: [email protected]), Adoracion M. Navarro, Senior
Research Fellow (e-mail: [email protected]), and Ma. Kristina P. Ortiz, Research Analyst (e-mail:
[email protected]) are from the Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
27
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
growth, especially in the developing economies of the region.1 Infrastructure plays
a key role in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, as it had done in
achieving the Millennium Development Goals.
The present paper discusses infrastructure financing with emphasis on the
public-private partnership (PPP) mode of financing, and financial institutions recently
created for infrastructure financing. Data from 2005 onward are presented as most
economies only began to report data on infrastructure and financing indicators in
2005. The exceptions are data for electrification and official development assistance
(ODA). The paper presents some evidence linking infrastructure and development,
and discusses PPP as an emerging infrastructure financing scheme for developing
economies. It also reports on the establishment of new financial institutions for
infrastructure financing. The final section gives concluding remarks.
II. STATUS OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND FINANCING MODALITIES
Infrastructure development in the region can be evaluated by looking at
connectivity, access and quality indicators. Connectivity of citizens and firms within
domestic economies can be gauged through domestic transport and information and
communications technology (ICT) indicators while connectivity of domestic
economies to the rest of the world is suggested by global transport indicators. The
extent of access to basic infrastructure services is indicated by transport, ICT, water
supply and electricity access indicators. Service level indicators using information
from quality perception surveys measure infrastructure quality.2 This section looks at
infrastructure financing, basically ODA flows, which have supported infrastructure
development in the region.
Status of infrastructure in the region
Data used in this section are the averages of experts’ responses to the survey
question “How would you assess general infrastructure, such as transport, telephony,
and energy, in your country?” in the 2014 Global Competitiveness Report. Figure 1
depicts a summary of the overall perception on the quality of infrastructure in the
region. The average score for the region is 4.3. The scores of sixteen developing
economies and the Russian Federation are below this average.
1
The economies of the Asia-Pacific region are those listed in the ESCAP Statistical Yearbook for Asia
and the Pacific.
2
Such as those conducted by the World Economic Forum for its annual Global Competitiveness
Report.
28
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Figure 1. Quality of overall infrastructure in Asia and the Pacific
Singapore
Japan
Malaysia
Republic of Korea
New Zealand
Turkey
Australia
Sri Lanka
Azerbaijan
Bhutan
Georgia
Armenia
Kazakhstan
China
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Indonesia
Russian Federation
Thailand
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
India
Philippines
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Cambodia
Viet Nam
Pakistan
Mongolia
Nepal
Timor-Leste
Bangladesh
Myanmar
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
Source:
World Economic Forum (2014).
Note:
1 = extremely underdeveloped or among the worst in the world; 7 = extensive and efficient or among the
best in the world.
29
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Transportation3
Developing economies commonly have low road density. This is also the case
for developed economies with large land areas, such as Australia and the Russian
Federation. Information on road density does not adequately describe the
population’s level of access to roads. A more revealing indicator of this may be the
availability of motor vehicles for the population. The average number of motor
vehicles per 1,000 people for the region in 2011 was 220.67. Poor countries, such as
Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Nepal, had less than 30 motor vehicles per 1,000 people.
In developed economies that fell below this average, highly developed mass transport
systems were substitutes for motor vehicle transport. Some economies, such as
Brunei Darussalam and New Zealand, exhibited a negative rate of motorization during
the period 2005-2011. Afghanistan, Bhutan, China and Kazakhstan had the highest
growth of motorization.
During the period 2005-2011, vehicles per kilometer of road grew the most in
China (16 per cent growth) and Kazakhstan (14 per cent growth) while in Japan they
declined. Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia and Myanmar had the lowest vehicle
density in the region (table 1).
In 2011, the region had an average paved road ratio of 71 per cent. Countries
that fell below this average were Australia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, China, India, Indonesia
and Myanmar. The low paved road ratio in Australia and New Zealand may be
explained by low population density in their respective rural areas (figure 2).
The quality of road transport infrastructure had an average score of 3.8, with 17
economies in the region falling below that score (figure 3).
The average score for quality of port infrastructure was 3.8. The scores of 14
developing economies was below the average (figure 4).
The average quality of air transport infrastructure was 4.3. The scores of 17
economies were below that average (figure 5). With respect to quality of rail transport
infrastructure, 13 developing economies were below the average score of 3.5
(figure 6).
The liner shipping connectivity index shows wide disparity among Asia-Pacific
economies (figure 7). This index (maximum value in 2004 = 100) indicates how well
countries are connected to global shipping networks. In 2014, China had the highest
index at 165 and the Federated States of Micronesia had the lowest.
3
For transportation and the other infrastructure sectors, only those economies where data are
available are included in determining the patterns and calculating averages.
30
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Table 1. Transportation infrastructure indicators
Country/territory
Afghanistan
Armenia
Road
density
AAGR
(%)
Motor
vehicles
per
1 000
people,
2011
AAGR
(%)
Vehicles
per km
of road
AAGR
(%)
..
..
29.29
13.70
..
..
26.06
0.51
..
..
..
..
Australia
10.63
0.23 a
702.82
1.01
19.06
2.17 a
Azerbaijan
21.92
0.17
111.94
7.73
54.08
9.16
Bhutan
21.79
11.34
69.64
12.82
6.15
3.26
Brunei Darussalam
54.20
-1.51
355.22
-4.24
46.11
-0.95
China
42.77
3.48
68.94
19.49
22.57
16.06
Georgia
27.05
-1.25
165.65
7.37 b
39.41
9.43 b
Hong Kong, China
191.03
1.09
80.01
2.10
271.25
1.63
India
142.68
3.53
..
..
..
..
26.10
4.11
69.17
9.62
33.75
6.47
Indonesia
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
13.13
4.89
..
..
..
..
Japan
89.70
0.90
587.95
0.02
221.66
-0.86
13.78
Kazakhstan
3.57
1.13
245.57
13.36
41.85
17.33
3.25
..
..
..
..
1 485.71
2.06
170.47
1.90
227.73
2.26
Malaysia
46.99
10.15
377.70
4.86
70.13
-3.19
Myanmar
5.58
3.92
7.25
4.02
9.27
0.81
..
..
7.12
8.06 a
35.19
0.19
708.28
32.98
0.28
20.20
7.78
13.60
9.44
106.04
0.54
370.38
2.48
174.05
2.45
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Macao, China
Nepal
New Zealand
Pakistan
Republic of Korea
Russian Federation
Singapore
Thailand
Turkey
-0.13
..
..
33.12
0.75
6.40
4.13
..
..
..
..
480.56
0.63
151.07
0.77
229.51
3.17
..
..
171.59
6.27
..
..
47.26
0.98
163.80
4.80
32.58
5.13
Source:
World Bank, World Development Indicators 2005-2011. Available from http://data.worldbank.org/datacatalog/world-development-indicators.
Notes:
Road density is the number of kilometers of road per 100 square kilometer of land area. The road
network consists of motorways, highways, main or national roads, secondary or regional roads, and
other urban and rural roads.
Motor vehicles include cars, buses, and freight vehicles, but do not include two-wheelers. Population
refers to mid-year population in the year for which data are available.
a
Covered period 2007-2011.
b
Covered period 2006-2011.
AAGR – average annual growth rate from 2005 to 2011.
31
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Figure 2. Paved roads as per cent of total roads in 2011
Singapore
Macao, China
Hong Kong, China
Kazakhstan
Brunei Darussalam
Malaysia
Republic of Korea
Philippines
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Pakistan
New Zealand
China
Indonesia
Azerbaijan
India
Myanmar
Australia
Bhutan
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Source:
World Bank, World Development Indicators 2011. Available from http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/
world-development-indicators.
Note:
Paved road ratio is defined as paved roads (those surfaced with crushed stone (macadam), hydrocarbon
binder or bituminized agents, concrete or cobblestones) as a percentage of total roads, measured in
kilometers. For the Philippines, government data are used.
32
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Figure 3. Quality of road transport infrastructure in Asia and the Pacific
Singapore
Japan
Republic of Korea
Kiribati
Malaysia
Sri Lanka
New Zealand
Turkey
Australia
China
Thailand
Bhutan
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Georgia
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Azerbaijan
Indonesia
Pakistan
India
Armenia
Philippines
Cambodia
Viet Nam
Tajikistan
Kazakhstan
Nepal
Micronesia (Federated States of)
Bangladesh
Kyrgyzstan
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Russian Federation
Mongolia
Maldives
Myanmar
Marshall Islands
Timor-Leste
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
Source:
World Economic Forum (2014).
Note:
Quality of roads: 1 = extremely underdeveloped or among the worst in the world; 7 = extensive and
efficient or among the best in the world.
33
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Figure 4. Quality of port infrastructure in Asia and the Pacific
Singapore
New Zealand
Malaysia
Republic of Korea
Japan
Australia
China
Thailand
Turkey
Pakistan
Azerbaijan
Sri Lanka
Georgia
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Indonesia
India
Russian Federation
Viet Nam
Bangladesh
Cambodia
Philippines
Kazakhstan
Myanmar
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Armenia
Timor-Leste
Nepal
Tajikistan
Bhutan
Mongolia
Kyrgyzstan
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
Source:
World Economic Forum (2014).
Note:
Quality of port infrastructure: 1 = extremely underdeveloped or among the worst in the world;
7 = extensive and efficient or among the best in the world.
34
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Figure 5. Quality of air transport infrastructure in Asia and the Pacific
Singapore
New Zealand
Malaysia
Japan
Australia
Republic of Korea
Turkey
Thailand
Azerbaijan
Sri Lanka
China
Indonesia
India
Armenia
Russian Federation
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Viet Nam
Tajikistan
Pakistan
Cambodia
Philippines
Bhutan
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Kyrgyzstan
Mongolia
Bangladesh
Nepal
Myanmar
Timor-Leste
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
Source:
World Economic Forum (2014).
Note:
Quality of air transport infrastructure: 1 = extremely underdeveloped or among the worst in the world;
7 = extensive and efficient or among the best in the world.
35
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Figure 6. Quality of rail transport infrastructure in Asia and the Pacific
Japan
Republic of Korea
Malaysia
China
Russian Federation
India
Kazakhstan
Australia
Georgia
Azerbaijan
New Zealand
Indonesia
Sri Lanka
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Turkey
Viet Nam
Tajikistan
Kyrgyzstan
Armenia
Mongolia
Pakistan
Thailand
Bangladesh
Philippines
Myanmar
Cambodia
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
Source:
World Economic Forum (2014).
Note:
Quality of railroad infrastructure: 1 = extremely underdeveloped or among the worst in the world;
7 = extensive and efficient or among the best in the world.
36
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Figure 7. Liner shipping connectivity index in Asia and the Pacific
China
Hong Kong, China
Singapore
Republic of Korea
Malaysia
Japan
Sri Lanka
Turkey
Viet Nam
India
Thailand
Russian Federation
Australia
Indonesia
Pakistan
New Zealand
Philippines
French Polynesia
New Caledonia
Fiji
Papua New Guinea
Bangladesh
Guam
Maldives
Solomon Islands
Vanuatu
Myanmar
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Georgia
Cambodia
Samoa
American Samoa
Brunei Darussalam
Northern Mariana Islands
Tonga
Marshall Islands
Kiribati
Palau
Micronesia (Federated States of)
0
50
100
150
200
Source:
World Bank, World Development Indicators 2014. Available from http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/
world-development-indicators.
Note:
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development computes the index based on five
components of the maritime transport sector: number of ships; their container-carrying capacity;
maximum vessel size; number of services; and number of companies that deploy container ships in
a country’s ports.
37
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Information and communications technology
Data show a wide digital divide among the population with many developing
economies below the average of the access indicators. Those economies are in a
catch-up mode (table 2).
Table 2. Information and communications technology indicators
in Asia and the Pacific
AAGR
(%)
0.31
102.85 a
70.66
39.86
5.90
American Samoa
18.13
0.38
..
..
..
..
Armenia
19.43
-0.18
112.42
34.42
46.30
31.26
Australia
44.34
-1.32
106.84
2.20
83.00
3.51
Azerbaijan
18.67
4.86
107.61
19.33
58.70
28.23
Country/territory
Afghanistan
Mobile cellular
subscriptions
per 100 people
Fixed
broadband
Internet
subscribers
per 100 people
Telephone
lines per 100
people
AAGR
(%)
AAGR
(%)
21.72
Bangladesh
0.69
-0.98
74.43
36.19
6.50
50.91
Bhutan
3.51
-4.49
72.20
37.86
29.90
29.22
13.58
-6.28
112.21
7.41
64.50
7.39
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
China
Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea
Fiji
2.78
35.35
133.89
42.33
6.00
44.40
19.27
-3.94
88.71
14.59
45.80
23.39
4.74
1.52
9.72
141.84 a
..
..
20.31
7.97
-6.53
105.60
19.78
37.10
French Polynesia
19.87
-0.66
85.58
7.76
56.80
12.88
Georgia
27.65
10.17
115.03
20.29
43.10
27.74
Guam
40.58
-0.24
..
..
65.40
6.83
Hong Kong, China
63.11
1.74
237.35
8.47
74.20
3.37
2.32
-7.83
70.78
31.33
15.10
25.93
Indonesia
12.30
9.34
125.36
25.10
15.82
20.32
Iran (Islamic
Republic of)
38.33
3.55
84.25
27.41
31.40
18.46
Japan
47.99
0.61
117.63
5.61
86.25
3.22
Kazakhstan
26.71
5.08
184.69
22.75
54.00
43.75
Kiribati
8.79
8.31
16.61
48.08
11.50
14.11
Kyrgyzstan
8.31
-0.61
121.45
35.41
23.40
10.49
India
38
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Table 2. (continued)
AAGR
(%)
Fixed
broadband
Internet
subscribers
per 100 people
AAGR
(%)
68.14
25.10
12.50
39.93
-3.52
304.08
13.07
65.80
8.26
15.26
-1.26
144.69
8.45
66.97
4.08
6.54
-6.14
181.19
12.94
44.10
26.16
Telephone
lines per 100
people
AAGR
(%)
Lao People’s
Democratic Republic
10.37
26.63
Macao, China
27.97
Malaysia
Maldives
Country/territory
Marshall Islands
Mobile cellular
subscriptions
per 100 people
..
..
..
..
11.70
14.80
Micronesia
(Federated States of)
9.70
-2.34
30.32
10.88
27.80
11.21
Mongolia
6.19
0.02
124.18
24.11
17.70
11.93 c
Myanmar
1.00
0.00
12.83
63.08
1.20
43.91
Nepal
2.98
5.69
76.85
74.38
13.30
41.52
New Caledonia
33.14
4.02
93.76
6.03
66.00
9.32
New Zealand
41.06
-0.23
105.78
2.71
82.78
3.53
Northern Mariana
Islands
42.71
2.09
..
..
..
..
7.02
Pakistan
3.50
0.69
70.13
31.00
10.90
34.72
-1.78
85.79
13.85
..
..
Papua New Guinea
1.91
7.84
40.98
54.99
6.50
18.11
Philippines
3.20
-2.52
104.50
12.57
37.00
27.20
Republic of Korea
61.57
2.43
111.00
3.93
84.77
1.80
Russian Federation
28.34
0.21
152.84
7.87
61.40
19.04
20.90
Palau
Samoa
..
..
..
..
15.30
36.35
-1.50
155.92
6.04
73.00
2.27
1.36
-1.87
57.57
60.95
8.00
32.46
Sri Lanka
12.72
9.33
95.50
24.21
21.90
36.74
Tajikistan
5.18
2.91
91.83
48.45
16.00
64.48
Thailand
9.04
-2.12
140.05
14.79
28.94
8.54
Timor-Leste
0.26
1.54
57.38
42.78
1.10
35.11
Tonga
29.43
10.12
54.59
7.96
35.00
27.83
Turkey
18.09
-5.32
92.96
4.70
46.25
14.68
Turkmenistan
11.49
4.01
116.89
64.21
9.60
32.72
Tuvalu
14.68
6.04
34.43
12.51
37.00
24.37 c
6.91
0.05
74.31
50.90
38.20
35.59
Singapore
Solomon Islands
Uzbekistan
39
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Table 2. (continued)
Telephone
lines per 100
people
AAGR
(%)
Vanuatu
2.17
-5.17
Viet Nam
10.13
Country/territory
0.20 b
AAGR
(%)
Fixed
broadband
Internet
subscribers
per 100 people
50.34
30.29
11.30
10.50
130.89
35.84
43.90
16.72
Mobile cellular
subscriptions
per 100 people
AAGR
(%)
Source:
World Bank, World Development Indicators 2013. Available from http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/
world-development-indicators.
Notes:
Telephone lines are fixed telephone lines that connect a subscriber’s terminal equipment to the public
switched telephone network and have a port on a telephone exchange. Integrated services digital
network channels and fixed wireless subscribers are included in this category. Mobile cellular telephone
subscriptions are subscriptions to a public mobile telephone service using cellular technology, which
provides access to the public switched telephone network. Post-paid and prepaid subscriptions are
included.
Fixed broadband Internet subscribers are the number of broadband subscribers with a digital subscriber
line, cable modem or other high-speed technology.
a
Covered period 2009-2013.
b
Covered period, 2006-2013.
c
Covered period 2007-2013.
AAGR – average annual growth rate from 2005 to 2013.
Regarding telephone density, 31 economies were below the regional average of
17.69 telephone lines per 100 people in 2013. From 2005 to 2013, Cambodia and the
Lao People’s Democratic Republic exhibited high average annual growth rates of
35 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively. The region had an average of 100.25 mobile
cellular subscriptions per 100 people in 2013, with twenty-six economies falling below
this average. The mobile density growth of many developed economies was low
because their high mobile cellular density was already high to begin with. Most
developing economies had experienced high mobile cellular density growth.
The average fixed broadband Internet subscription for the region was 36.4
subscriptions per 100 people in 2013; 26 economies were below this average. Most
economies had experienced high broadband growth.
Electricity
Per capita electric power consumption in the region was 3,286.25 kWh in 2011,
with 22 economies having consumption levels below this average. The economies
with the highest average annual consumption growth, such as Cambodia, 16 per cent
40
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
and China, 11 per cent, also experienced high economic growth in the period
considered (table 3).
Seven economies had low access to electricity (75 per cent of households) in
2012. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had the lowest electrification rate in
the region.
Table 3. Energy infrastructure indicators in Asia and the Pacific
Electric power
consumption
(kWh per capita),
2011
AAGR
(%)
Armenia
1 754.65
2.60
..
Australia
10 712.18
0.40
..
1 705.42
-5.46
..
258.62
7.13
60.0
8 506.51
0.21
100.0
164.39
16.33
34.0
3 297.97
10.78
100.0
739.34
-1.51
26.0
1 917.99
1.88
..
India
684.11
6.80
75.0
Indonesia
679.70
5.11
76.0
Country
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
China
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Georgia
Electricity
access (% of
population),
2012
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
2 648.84
4.21
..
Japan
7 847.80
-0.75
..
Kazakhstan
4 892.91
3.36
..
Kyrgyzstan
1 641.64
1.07
..
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
..
..
78.0
Malaysia
4 246.47
6.83
100.0
Mongolia
1 576.86
3.42
90.0
Myanmar
110.24
7.11
32.0
76.0
Nepal
New Zealand
Pakistan
Philippines
Republic of Korea
105.50
5.06
9 398.67
-0.48
..
449.25
-0.02
69.0
646.96
1.85
70.0
10 161.95
4.50
..
41
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Table 3. (continued)
Electric power
consumption
(kWh per capita),
2011
AAGR
(%)
Russian Federation
6 485.96
1.92
..
Singapore
Country
Electricity
access (% of
population),
2012
8 404.23
-0.20
100.0
Sri Lanka
490.25
3.53
89.0
Tajikistan
1 713.79
-3.67
..
Thailand
2 315.99
3.26
99.0
Turkey
2 709.26
5.03
..
Turkmenistan
2 443.86
2.93
..
Uzbekistan
1 625.97
-0.85
..
Viet Nam
1 073.28
10.80
96.0
Sources: Electric power consumption extracted from World Bank, World Development Indicators 2011. Available
from http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators; and Electricity access data
from International Energy Agency (2014).
Notes:
Electric power consumption measures the production of power plants and combined heat and power
plants less transmission, distribution, and transformation losses and own use by heat and power plants.
Access to electricity is the percentage of population with access to electricity.
AAGR – average annual growth rate, 2005 to 2011.
On the quality of electricity supply, in 2014, the average reliability score for the
region was 4.5. Thirteen economies scored below this average, with Nepal recording
the lowest score (figure 8).
Water and sanitation
In 2012, access to improved water sources in eight economies remained very
low, with three or more people for every ten people without access. The worst case
was Papua New Guinea, where six of ten people did not have access to an improved
water source (table 4). In 2012, twenty economies had very low access (three or four
people) to improved sanitation facilities. Only 18.7 per cent of the population of Papua
New Guinea had access to improved sanitation facilities (table 4).
42
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Figure 8. Quality of electricity supply in Asia and the Pacific
Singapore
Japan
Australia
New Zealand
Bhutan
Malaysia
Republic of Korea
China
Georgia
Thailand
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Armenia
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Azerbaijan
Turkey
Russian Federation
Sri Lanka
Kazakhstan
Indonesia
Philippines
Viet Nam
Mongolia
India
Timor-Leste
Cambodia
Kyrgyzstan
Myanmar
Tajikistan
Bangladesh
Pakistan
Nepal
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
Source:
World Economic Forum (2014).
Note:
Quality of electricity supply: 1 = not reliable at all; 7 = extremely reliable.
5.0
6.0
7.0
43
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Table 4. Water and sanitation infrastructure indicators in Asia and the Pacific
Country
Afghanistan
Improved water
source (% of
population with
access)
Improved sanitation
facilities (% of
population with
access)
64.2
29.0
100.0
62.5
Armenia
99.8
90.5
Australia
100.0
100.0
80.2
82.0
American Samoa
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
84.8
57.0
Bhutan
98.1
46.9
Cambodia
71.3
36.8
China
91.9
65.3
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
98.1
81.8
Fiji
96.3
87.2
100.0
97.1
98.7
93.3
French Polynesia
Georgia
Guam
99.5
89.8
India
92.6
36.0
Indonesia
84.9
58.8
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Japan
95.9
89.4
100.0
100.0
Kazakhstan
93.1
97.5
Kiribati
66.8
39.7
Kyrgyzstan
87.6
91.8
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
71.5
64.6
Malaysia
99.6
95.7
Maldives
98.6
98.7
Marshall Islands
94.5
76.2
Micronesia (Federated States of)
89.0
57.2
Mongolia
84.6
56.2
Myanmar
85.7
77.4
Nepal
88.1
36.7
98.5
100.0
100.0
79.7
New Caledonia
New Zealand
44
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Table 4. (continued)
Improved water
source (% of
population with
access)
Improved sanitation
facilities (% of
population with
access)
97.5
47.6
Pakistan
91.4
100.0
Papua New Guinea
39.7
18.7
Philippines
91.8
74.3
Republic of Korea
97.8
100.0
Russian Federation
97.0
70.5
Country
Northern Mariana Islands
Samoa
98.5
91.6
100.0
100.0
Solomon Islands
80.5
28.8
Sri Lanka
93.8
92.3
Tajikistan
71.7
94.4
Thailand
95.8
93.4
Singapore
Timor-Leste
70.5
38.9
Tonga
99.3
91.3
Turkey
99.7
91.2
Turkmenistan
71.1
99.1
Tuvalu
97.7
83.3
Uzbekistan
87.3
100.0
Vanuatu
90.7
57.9
Viet Nam
95.0
75.0
Source:
World Bank, World Development Indicators 2012. Available from http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/
world-development-indicators.
Notes:
Access to an improved water source refers to the percentage of the population using an improved
drinking water source. The improved drinking water source includes piped water on premises (piped
household water connection located inside the user’s dwelling, plot or yard), and other improved drinking
water sources (public taps or standpipes, tube wells or boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs
and rainwater collection).
Access to improved sanitation facilities refers to the percentage of the population using improved
sanitation facilities. The improved sanitation facilities include flush/pour flush (to piped sewer system,
septic tank or pit latrine), ventilated improved pit latrine, pit latrine with slab, and composting toilet.
45
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Overseas development aid for infrastructure financing in the region
This section covers only overseas development aid (ODA) financing because of
severe data limitations. Domestic public resources used for infrastructure are not
covered in this discussion due to very limited data for many ESCAP economies.
Overseas development aid is defined4 as grants or loans undertaken by the
official sector with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main
objective and at concessional financial terms (if in the form of a loan, having a grant
element of at least 25 per cent). This definition does not include grants, loans and
credits for military purposes and transfer payments to private individuals, such as
pensions, reparations, or insurance payments.
The share of ODA directed to infrastructure to total ODA was about 23 per cent
during the period 2005-2013. Annual shares ranged between 19 and 29 per cent
(figure 9). Over the period 2005-2013, ODA to infrastructure with an average annual
Figure 9. Total overseas development aid and overseas development aid
to infrastructure
US$ million (2012 constant prices)
60 000
50 000
40 000
30 000
20 000
10 000
0
2005
2006
2007
Total ODA
Source:
4
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Total ODA to infastructure
OECD (2005-2013).
The definition is from the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD).
46
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
growth rate of 9 per cent outpaced overall ODA average annual growth rate of 6 per
cent. ODA directed to the water and sanitation sector grew rapidly during this period
(table 5).
Global commitments to meet the Millennium Development Goals helped
channel more ODA to water and sanitation. ODA to the communications sector
declined during the period 2005-2013 because of extensive private funds flow to the
sector, fueled by rising demand, rapid technological advancements and privatization.
Table 5. Growth of overseas development aid to
infrastructure in Asia and the Pacific
Average annual growth,
2005-2013
Water and sanitation
10%
Transport and storage
9%
Communications
-3%
Energy
8%
Total
Source:
9%
OECD (2005-2013).
The composition of ODA flows to infrastructure was stable with the transport
and storage sector experiencing the highest annual share of 47 per cent during the
period of 2005-2013, followed by energy (29 per cent), and water and sanitation
(21 per cent). Figure 10 shows the ODA flows directed to infrastructure, while
figure 11 shows the yearly sectoral composition in 2005-2013.
Most ODA flows are coursed to the public sector but some are channeled to
PPPs, albeit in relatively small amounts (0.1 per cent). The annual growth rate of ODA
flows to PPPs was high, at 14 per cent, during the period 2006 to 2013. ODA flows
directed to PPPs initially were mostly for water and sanitation, but subsequently, other
sectors were also covered (figures 12 and 13). This implies collaboration among
donors, governments and the private sector in addressing infrastructure needs in the
region.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has served as a major source of finance
for infrastructure. In 2013, about 66 per cent of ADB loans were for infrastructure, with
loans for transport and ICT the largest, at 34.9 per cent of the total, followed by loans
for energy, at 21.7 per cent, and loans for water and others, at 8.7 per cent.
47
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Figure 10. ODA flows to infrastrucure, 2005-2013
US$ millions (2012 constant prices)
14 000
12 000
10 000
8 000
6 000
4 000
2 000
0
2005
2006
2007
Water and sanitation
Source:
2008
2010
2009
Transport and storage
2011
2013
2012
Energy
Communications
OECD (2005-2013).
Figure 11. Sectoral composition of overseas development aid
flows to infrastructure
Per cent
100
90
26%
29%
80
4%
70
32%
34%
2%
3%
45%
43%
26%
29%
2%
2%
45%
45%
25%
33%
1%
3%
3%
30%
2%
60
50
46%
53%
40
49%
54%
44%
30
20
10
22%
18%
24%
23%
22%
20%
20%
21%
20%
0
2005
2006
2007
Water and sanitation
Source:
48
OECD (2005-2013).
2008
2009
2010
Transport and storage
2011
2012
Communications
2013
Energy
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Figure 12. Overseas development aid flows to public-private partners
in Asia and the Pacific
US$ millions (2012 constant prices)
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2006
2007
2008
Water and sanitation
Source:
2009
2010
Transport and storage
2011
2012
2013
Communications
Energy
OECD (2005-2013).
Figure 13. Sectoral composition of overseas development aid flows to public
private partnerships in Asia and the Pacific
Per cent
100
5%
12%
90
17%
80
39%
70
21%
57%
1%
60
23%
31%
19%
2%
100%
50
34%
95%
88%
40
4%
30
62%
59%
20
58%
38%
34%
10
0
2006
2007
2008
Water and sanitation
Source:
2009
2010
Transport and storage
2011
2012
Communications
2013
Energy
OECD (2005-2013).
49
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
During the period 2005-2013, India was very successful in attracting private
investments in infrastructure, followed by the Russian Federation and Turkey while
PPP investments in infrastructure in most developing economies were insignificant
(figure 14, table 7).
Figure 14. Infrastructure investments with private participation in Asia and
the Pacific, 2005-2013
India
Russian Federation
Turkey
China
Indonesia
Pakistan
Thailand
Malaysia
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Bangladesh
Viet Nam
Kazakhstan
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Sri Lanka
Cambodia
Georgia
Uzbekistan
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Tajikistan
Afghanistan
Myanmar
Nepal
Maldives
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Kyrgyzstan
Fiji
Tuvalu
Turkmenistan
Bhutan
Philippines
Papua New Guinea
Mongolia
Vanuatu
100 000
200 000
US$ million
Source:
50
World Bank (2005-2013).
300 000
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Table 7. Trends in infrastructure investments with private participation
in Asia and the Pacific
Country
India
2005-2009
2010-2013
Total
118 279
159 542
277 821
Russian Federation
59 401
58 399
117 800
Turkey
35 248
44 666
79 914
China
36 375
15 869
52 244
Indonesia
18 136
15 411
33 547
Pakistan
19 637
4 466
24 103
Thailand
8 458
9 567
18 025
Malaysia
7 176
8 052
15 228
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
3 337
4 813
8 150
Bangladesh
4 535
3 457
7 992
Viet Nam
3 630
4 313
7 943
Kazakhstan
3 940
3 051
6 991
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
2 014
1 596
3 610
Sri Lanka
1 626
1 756
3 382
Cambodia
1 432
1 893
3 325
Georgia
2 468
685
3 153
Uzbekistan
1 520
1 589
3 109
Armenia
1 741
480
2 221
Azerbaijan
1 407
319
1 726
Tajikistan
1 080
320
1 400
Afghanistan
1 211
176
1 387
Myanmar
556
170
726
Nepal
289
412
701
563
Maldives
49
514
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
427
47
474
Kyrgyzstan
138
135
273
Fiji
173
72
245
Bhutan
219
..
219
Turkmenistan
158
61
219
Tuvalu
158
61
219
Papua New Guinea
150
..
150
Philippines
150
..
150
Mongolia
..
120
120
Vanuatu
41
..
41
Source:
World Bank (2005-2013).
51
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
III. DEVELOPMENT, INFRASTRUCTURE AND
FINANCING MODALITIES
Infrastructure, growth and poverty reduction
The literature confirms the close link between infrastructure development,
growth, and poverty reduction. Sahoo, Dash and Nataraj (2010) found unidirectional
causality from infrastructure development to output growth from 1975 to 2007.
Infrastructure has substantial impacts on growth that may vary across countries, time,
and within infrastructure subsectors (Dissou and Didic, 2013, p. 42; Estachea and
Garsous, 2012, among others). Infrastructure positively affects growth by increasing
labour productivity and reducing transaction costs, while investments in roads and
irrigation infrastructure contribute positively to economic growth and poverty
reduction (figure 15).
Figure 15. Links between infrastructure and poverty reduction
Infrastructure investment
Irrigation
Roads
Non-agricultural
employment
Agricultural
productivity
Rural economic growth
Electricity
Areas of
intervention
Non-agricultural
productivity
Areas of
influence
Wages and employment
of the poor
Direct
channel
Supply and price
of basic goods
Real income
consumption of the poor
Areas of
concern
Poverty reduction
Source:
52
Ali and Pernia (2003).
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
A long-term positive impact on growth may be obtained from investments in
power and telecommunications (Egert, Kozluk and Sutherland, 2009). In China,
sustained high economic growth is largely attributed to the massive investments in
physical infrastructure starting in the early 1990s. Llanto (2013) shows the positive
impacts of infrastructure on Philippine agricultural productivity. The Philippine regions
with higher infrastructure investments have experienced higher economic growth.
Studies indicate that quality infrastructure serves as the backbone of a strong
economy and a significant factor for reducing poverty. Jones (2004) found compelling
evidence that investments in water, sanitation and roads were critical to growth and
have benefited the poor in East Asia and the Pacific. Lack of essential infrastructure,
such as water, transportation, housing, and energy, hinders inclusive growth and
poverty reduction (Geest and Nunez-Ferrer, 2011). Figure 16 illustrates how
infrastructure development leads to poverty reduction.5
Figure 16. Framework on infrastructure for inclusive growth and
poverty reduction
Infrastructure development
PPP
Rules and
regulations
Creating jobs
and
economic
activities
Reducing
production
cost
Expanding
production
capacity
Connecting
markets and
economic
activities
Improving
access to
key
facilities
Poverty
reduction
5
Source:
ADB (2012c).
Note:
PPP = public-private partnership.
In this framework, PPPs are included as a mechanism to provide infrastructure.
53
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Infrastructure needs in the Asia-Pacific region
Infrastructure development in Asia has greatly contributed to a decrease in the
number of poor people from 903.4 million in 2005 to 754 million in 2008,6 and the
rapid increase in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita from $2,490 in 2000 to
$5,489 in 2009 (ADB, 2012b). Infrastructure investments have resulted in substantial
improvement in human development in the region.
The Asian Development Bank has noted that Asia needs to raise approximately
$8 trillion in overall national infrastructure funding for the period 2010 to 2020 (table 8)
or $730 billion per year (68 per cent for new capacity and 32 per cent for maintaining
and replacing existing infrastructure) (Das and James, 2013).
Table 8. Infrastructure needs in the Asia-Pacific region, by sector,
2010-2020 ($ million)
Sector/subsector
Energy (electricity)
New capacity
Replacement
Total
3 176 437
912 202
4 088 639
Telecommunications
325 353
730 304
1 055 657
Mobile phones
181 763
509 151
690 914
Landlines
143 590
221 153
364 743
1 761 666
704 457
2 466 123
Transport
Airports
6 533
4 728
11 261
50 275
25 416
75 691
2 692
35 947
38 639
1 702 166
638 366
2 340 532
Water and sanitation
155 493
225 797
381 290
Sanitation
107 925
119 573
227 498
47 568
106 224
153 792
5 418 949
2 572 760
7 991 709
Ports
Railways
Roads
Water
Total
Source:
ADB and ADBI (2009).
As traditional financing from taxes and borrowings will not be sufficient in
addressing infrastructure gaps, the private sector should be tapped for infrastructure
financing. Properly structured and managed PPPs could significantly contribute such
financing based on the experiences of some Asia-Pacific economies. An enabling
legal and regulatory environment, and appropriate and clear procurement rules and
6
54
Based on a $1.25 per day poverty line.
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
processes, at the minimum, are necessary to make PPPs a significant financing
mechanism.
Procurement of infrastructure and public-private partnerships
Procurement methods for infrastructure differ across countries in the region.
The procurement of goods and services in Armenia accounted for 4.5 per cent of
GDP and 16.8 per cent of total budget in 2010 (ADB, 2011a). The Law on
Procurement, adopted in 2010, changed procurement from a semi-centralized to
a centralized system. Instead of using PPP, Armenia selects private constructors
based on tenders for procurement of infrastructure services. However, Armenia has
turned to PPPs as a means to finance infrastructure (TRACECA, n.d.).
In Pakistan, procurement follows the traditional and non-traditional
procurement methods. Under the non-traditional method, the build-operate-owntransfer scheme was once used for a hydropower project. In general, the scheme is
the most commonly used procurement method (Khalfan and others, 2013). In the
Philippines, the Government is the single largest procuring entity (ADB, 2011c). Most
of infrastructure investment targets for the period 2013-2016 are to be provided by
the Government (70 per cent), but a sizeable share will be extended by the private
sector7 (figure 17).
Figure 17. Investment targets by funding source, 2013-2016
Private sector
27.4%
LGU 0.4%
GOCC/GFI
2.4%
7
NG (including ODA
loans and grants)
69.8%
Source:
Philippines, National Economic and Development Authority (2014).
Notes:
ODA = official development assistance; LGU = local government unit; GOCC =
government-owned and controlled corporation; GFI = government financial
institutions; NG = national government.
Public Investment Program 2011-2016.
55
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
In China, government procurement rose from 3.1 billion Chinese yuan (RMB)
($470 million) in 1998 to 842.2 billion RMB in 2010 (ADB, 2011b), with physical
infrastructure comprising the bulk of the procurement in 2010 (453.7 billion RMB);
followed by goods (317.6 billion RMB), and services (70.9 billion RMB). Central
government procurement excludes those made by State enterprises. For example,
the Beijing-Shanghai High Speed Railway system was procured by State-owned
enterprises. The Government Procurement Law allows the following procurement
methods: (1) public tender; (2) private tender or tender by invitation; (3) competitive
negotiation; (4) single-source procurement; (5) inquiry; and (6) other methods
approved by the State Council regulatory authority for government procurement
(Zhang, 2010). This law requires that public procurement comes from domestic
sources except in certain instances. Infrastructure financing is sourced from fiscal
resources, such as central, provincial, and local-level financing and off-budget fees,
borrowing and market-based financing (Sahoo, Dash and Nataraj, 2010).
Public procurement in Viet Nam mostly covers expenditures for education,
health care and infrastructure. The Tender Law, issued in 2013, allows the following
procurement methods: (1) open competitive bidding, without restriction on the
number of participants; (2) designated competitive bidding, which requires a direct
invitation to at least five candidates; (3) appointed bidding, used in special
circumstances; and (4) other methods subject to the prime minister’s approval, if none
of the aforementioned methods are viable (Hai and Watanabe, 2014).
Infrastructure financing remains largely dependent on traditional sources, such
as tax revenues, external and domestic borrowings and ODA (ESCAP, 2013).
Procurement of infrastructure has traditionally been the domain of the public sector,
but some economies have tapped PPP to provide infrastructure. Infrastructure, such
as toll roads, power plants and mass rail transport are amenable to PPP schemes.
These schemes have freed public resources for other societal expenditures. PPP
holds promise for developing economies that are unable to muster the resources, and
managerial and technical expertise for the provision of infrastructure.
Public-private partnerships became popular in the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and in the United States of America in the 1980s because
of their potential for reducing public spending through the delegation of certain
responsibilities to the private for-profit sector, and voluntary collaboration for the
provision of public goods (Mitchell-Weaver and Manning, 1992). Since then, various
PPP schemes have been adopted in different countries, depending on agreements on
risk allocation, financing, operation and maintenance (figure 18). PPP schemes are
now widely used in financing infrastructure, such as power, railways and roads
(Felsinger, 2011).
56
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Figure 18. Types of public-private partnership agreements
Public owns
and operates assets
Utility
restructuring,
corporatization
decentralization
Civil works
Service
contracts
Public private partnership
Management
and
operating
contracts
Concessions
Leases/
Affermage
BOT projects
DBOs
Private sector owns
and operates assets
Joint venture/
partial
divestiture
of public
assets
Full
divestiture
High
Low
Extent of private sector participation
Source:
PPPIRC (2015).
Notes:
BOT = build-operate-transfer; DBO = design-build-operate.
Rationale for using public-private partnerships
ESCAP (2013) points out some reasons for using PPPs, namely: (a) access to
private sector capital; (b) better risk allocation; and (c) efficiency gains. Increased
access to private sector financing frees significant amounts to finance other important
development projects. PPP schemes enable the involved parties to have better risk
allocation depending on their relative comparative advantage and the project
characteristics. The government is more efficient in handling regulatory risks while the
private sector can better manage construction and operational risks. If structured
carefully, PPPs lead to efficiency gains on the back of greater attention being focused
on outputs rather than inputs to projects.
The World Bank Institute (2014) listed the following as advantages of PPPs as
an infrastructure financing mechanism: (1) whole-of-life costing allows a single party
to design, build, operate, and maintain the project, creating an incentive to complete
the project at the least cost; (2) risk transfer and allocation; (3) focus on service
delivery; (4) innovation; (5) asset utilization; (6) mobilization of additional funding,
and; (7) accountability.
Public-private partnerships and sustainable infrastructure
Public-private partnerships may be useful in developing sustainable
infrastructure. In a review of PPP cases, Colverson and Perera (2011) found that PPPs
57
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
provide timely and less costly infrastructure. For a large desalination project in
Victoria, Australia, private proponents demonstrated how a PPP could efficiently
integrate environmental considerations in large infrastructure projects. Project risks,
such as those arising from meeting timeframes, obtaining necessary permits and
getting community acceptance, are more efficiently allocated between the public and
private sectors.
A successful PPP is the Nam Theun 2 Project, the largest hydropower project
in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, which cost about $1.2 billion (approximately
one third of the country’s GDP). The Nam Theun 2 Power Company (NTPC), the
operator of the project, is owned by the Électricité de France (35 per cent), the
Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (25 per cent), the Electricity
Generating Public Company of Thailand (25 per cent), and Italian-Thai Development
Corporation (15 per cent). ADB provided $20 million in the form of a public sector
loan, a $50-million private sector loan to NTPC, and a $50-million political risk
guarantee to NTPC (ADB, 2012c). During the 25-year concession period, the Lao
People’s Democratic Republic expects to receive $2 billion of revenues from royalties,
dividends, and taxes to be used for poverty reduction.
A case study on build-transfer-operate projects for ports (Kim, Kim and Choi,
2011) revealed the following: (1) from 1994 to 2008, transport volumes at ports
increased by 4.9 per cent annually on average, with a steady rise in annual public
investments; and (2) private investments to expand port facilities peaked in 2009 and
then declined gradually until 2015. The study estimated savings of $580 million from
the use of a public-private partnership instead of relying on turnkey-based
government projects; and savings of $310 billion from using a public-private
partnership instead of government bidding methods. A major issue was the difficulty
of predicting cargo throughput, which is highly sensitive to market conditions. The
study found the PPP scheme to be a viable and profitable alternative to public sector
infrastructure provision.
Marins (2009), conducting an assessment based on information from more
than 65 PPPs for urban water utilities serving a total population of about 100 million,
found that private operators have the potential to improve project quality and
efficiency in operations. One important concern is the incorporation of social goals in
PPP water projects. The following recommendations were made: (1) make projects
pro-poor; (2) account for the cost of social goals in the design of PPP projects;
(3) subsidize access by the poor; (4) separate customer tariffs from the remuneration
of the operator; (5) address the impact of PPPs on labour; and (6) maintain
transparency in regulations. Some successful PPP projects on urban water utilities
have been in implemented in Western and Central Africa, namely the Cote d’Ivoire
Hybrid Affermage/Concession and Semegal Affermage (Fall and others, 2009).
58
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Case studies of the Cartagena Water Supply, Sewage, and Environmental
Management project in Colombia and the Vancouver Landfill Project in Canada
showed that PPPs play an important role in providing sustainable infrastructure
(Hamilton and Holcomb, 2013). The Cartagana Water Supply PPP provided significant
management expertise that improved operational efficiency and effectiveness.
Substantial social and economic benefits, such as greater water reliability, increased
access to about 35,000 additional households, most of which were poor, significant
reduction in water leaks, and employment of local social workers, community
relations specialists and construction workers, which strengthened companycommunity relationship, were realized.
As for the Vancouver Landfill Project, private sector expertise and technology
transformed waste into commercial energy; three hundred persons were employed,
and the annual revenues of $300,000 covered most of the operating costs (Hamilton
and Holcomb, 2013). The project (1) reduced gas emissions by 200,000 tons per year
of carbon dioxide equivalents, which translates to the emissions volume of 40,000
automobiles, (2) captured about 500,000 gigjoules (GJ) of energy a year, the energy
requirement for 3,000 to 4,000 households and (3) reduced the annual natural gas use
of CanAgro8 by about 20 per cent.
PEMSEA (2009) assessed the Sabang Sewerage Collection and Treatment
System in Puerto Galera, Mindoro, the Philippines and found that PPP serves as an
alternative delivery mechanism, especially when the government has limited technical,
financial and management capability.
The importance of PPP is seen in efforts to include it in development strategies
for the infrastructure sector. Indonesia established the PPP Center to handle project
preparations and auctions.9 Indonesia has two PPP projects as of October 2014:
(a) Central Java Power Plant in Batang; and (b) Mine South Power Plant in South
Sumatera (PPP center, 2014). Priority infrastructure investment needs is estimated to
be about 5,452 trillion Indonesian rupiah (Rp) ($477 billion). PPPs represent an
innovative way for government-private sector collaboration in providing high-quality
public services and helping to close infrastructure funding gaps. The following are
critical factors in achieving PPP success: (1) credibility of developers and equity
financier supported by adequate local, technical, and financial resources; and
(2) long-term funding and expertise (Indra, 2014).
8
A private company that has the facilities to generate electricity and power through landfill gases.
9
This initiative is a fulfilment of the commitment made by the Ministry of Finance during an APEC
meeting held in Bali, Indonesia on 4 and 5 October 2013.
59
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
On 4 April 2013, the new PPP Act in Thailand, which replaced the Public
Participation in State Undertaking Act B.E. 2535 (1992) enabled the approval process
of projects through the PPP Policy Committee, headed by the Prime Minister of
Thailand, to be streamlined. The State Enterprise Policy Office, the PPP secretariat,
drafts a PPP strategic plan, assesses the feasibility of projects and provides
a database on PPP schemes. The new PPP Act requires the host government agency
to hire consultants to conduct feasibility studies of proposed infrastructure projects.
A Private Investment Promotion Fund was created to give seed money for
new investment projects. The Act provides the following (Larkin, 2014): (a) a
comprehensive institutional and regulatory framework; (b) methodology for risk
allocation and project evaluation; (c) value for money analysis; (d) contract
management; and (e) a central agency to monitor investments. The government
recognizes PPPs’ role in infrastructure financing and efficient execution and
management of projects. Rojanavanich (2014) estimated the total value of PPP
projects in Thailand at about 1.7 trillion Thai baht ($57 billion) during the period
2014-2019.
Lessons from public-private partnership experiences
Experiences with PPPs in several countries have yielded valuable lessons for
future implementation. PPP schemes are complex by nature, requiring a high level of
managerial and technical expertise for project preparation, financing, and
implementation. There are certain concerns associated with PPPs. Private borrowing
costs for PPP projects are higher than government borrowing rates; this may lead to
more costly projects in the long run while accountability and transparency issues arise
because the private sector tends to be more stringent in releasing proprietary and
confidential information on profits, costs, and other information (Colverson and
Perera, 2011). Notwithstanding the success of PPPs in India, Verougstraete and Kang
(2014) found that investment in detailed project preparation in India was significantly
lower than in other countries. They attributed this to limited access to debt and equity
financing, legal disputes, land acquisitions and related environment clearance issues.
In another review on PPPs, Ogunlana and Abednego (2009), using data from
a perception survey of stakeholders of Yen Lenh Bridge BOT project in Viet Nam,
reported serious issues of fairness, transparency, accountability, sustainability,
effectiveness, and efficiency. On fairness, it found that government officials who had
the authority over the concession company did overly optimistic feasibility studies to
increase the chance of project approval. Biased information was used in project
design and planning work. On transparency, the lack of transparent information
resulted in varying and conflicting approaches to project risk mitigation. On
accountability, an overly optimistic forecast of future growth and demand was made
but actual revenue fell very short of projected revenue. On sustainability, lack of
60
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
coordination between government and the private sector put at risk the sustainability
of the infrastructure development plan while corruption resulted in inefficient and poor
quality construction, which created risks for the sustainability of the bridge. On
effectiveness and efficiency, proper documentation of the project’s risk profile for
better risk management and administration was not done.
Box 1. Critical factors for successful public-private partnerships
•
An adequate legal and regulatory framework: The UNCITRAL Legislative
Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects provides basic guidelines
for PPPs.
•
A consistent policy orientation: Firm policies could help ensure continuity
in contracts and project implementation despite changes in government
administration.
•
Long-term relationship with the private sector. Governments need to learn
about long-term relationship management.
•
Need to build capacity. Central and local governments, especially the
latter where projects are located, need to develop capacity to manage
PPPs.
•
Financial support measures. Support measures, such as a viability gap
fund, direct government payments, availability payments for projects that
cannot charge user charges, state guarantees, and project development
fund to support project preparation, are needed to encourage PPPs.
Source:
ESCAP (2013).
Several economies in the region have limited capacity to formulate PPP
structures. Box 1 summarizes critical factors for creating successful PPPs.
IV. NEW INSTITUTIONS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING
The development finance landscape continues to change. New financial
institutions have recently emerged10 as alternative or complementary financing
sources.
10
There is a dearth of data on these institutions but it is important to mention them here because of
their large potential in addressing the infrastructure gap in the Asia-Pacific region.
61
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank11
Twenty-one countries12 launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank on
24 October 2014 in Beijing to augment infrastructure financing. China provided initial
capital of $40 billion, (80 per cent of the authorized capital of $50 billion). As the
single biggest shareholder, China can control voting rights and bank decisions.
China declared that any country committed to regional and global development
may join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). As of 20 March 2015, there
are 34 prospective founding members.13 Negotiations on the Articles of Agreement
are ongoing with the target to sign and ratify it, and start operations within 2016.
Silk Road Infrastructure Fund14
China established the Silk Road Infrastructure Fund in November 2014 with
capitalization of $40 billion (40 per cent of the authorized capital of $100 billion), using
foreign exchange reserves and contributions from China Investment Corporation, the
Export-Import Bank of China, and China Development Bank. It aims to finance
infrastructure linking markets across Asian and Eurasian territories.
It began operations on 16 February 2015, focusing on roads, railways, ports,
and other forms of infrastructure across Central Asia and South Asia (Jianxin and
Wong, 2015). Plans include the development of a pilot economic zone in Taiwan
Province of China, a new port city and highway in Sri Lanka and port facilities in
Oman.
China views the Fund as an investment facility similar to a private equity fund
and not a State-owned sovereign fund. Asian and non-Asian investors are welcome to
invest in the Fund. An outstanding issue is the Fund’s unclear allocation system (Bin,
2015).
11
Sources: Shaohui (2014); Current Affairs (2014); Asian (2015a; 2015b); Philippines, Department of
Finance (2015).
12
Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, India, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar,
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam.
13
The additional members are: France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Italy; Jordan;
Luxembourg; Maldives; New Zealand; Saudi Arabia; Tajikistan; the United Kingdom; and Switzerland.
14
62
China (2014; 2015), CMS HK (2015).
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
New Development Bank
Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) established
the New Development Bank (NDB) on 15 July 2014 during the Sixth BRICS Annual
Summit (Preuss, 2014) to provide long-term financing for infrastructure and
sustainable development projects (Griffith-Jones, 2014).
The bank is headquartered in China and its first president is India. NDB has
initial capital of $50 billion, contributed equally by the BRICS members, of which $10
billion will serve as paid-in capital. A Contingent Reserve Arrangement, an emergency
reserve fund of $100 billion will address short-term liquidity and global financial safety
needs. With an annual lending limit of $34 billion, the bank is expected to start
lending by the end-2015 (Watson, 2014).15
Some view the creation of NDB is the result of the frustration BRICS had with
existing multilateral institutions; others see it as a new infrastructure finance bank
(Khanna, 2014), with the following features (Griffith-Jones, 2014): (a) it is for financing
infrastructure and sustainable development projects; (b) BRICS and developing
countries accepted as members could provide additional contributions to paid-in
capital; (c) loans are for BRICS and member developing countries, with priority to
low-income countries which may receive subsidies; and (d) NDB will foster
complementary financing with other banks.
ASEAN Infrastructure Fund
Incorporated in April 2012 in Malaysia to finance infrastructure and
environmentally sustainable and socially inclusive projects, the ASEAN Infrastructure
Fund (AIF) became operational in 2013 (ADB, n.d.). The ASEAN economies and ADB
made initial equity contributions of $485.3 million. Malaysia provided the largest
contribution of $150 million. The ASEAN economies and ADB have committed to led
funds amounting to $4 billion and $9 million, respectively. (ADB, 2012a; Sim, 2013).
AIF will issue bonds starting in 2017 (ADB, n.d.).
The first project involving AIF was in December 2013 for the 500 kV Power
Transmission Crossing Project between Java and Bali, Indonesia. AIF contributed
$25 million, ADB, $224 million, and the Government of Indonesia, $161 million
(ASEAN, 2013). AIF targets six infrastructure projects annually to be selected based
on economic and financial criteria and impacts on poverty reduction.
15
Other sources are Jia (2015); Asian (2015a).
63
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The infrastructure needs of Asia and the Pacific are massive and growing
because of population growth and rapid urbanization. Tax revenues and borrowing
continue to be significant sources of infrastructure financing for most economies.
Only about 19 to 29 per cent of ODA has been used to finance infrastructure.
Although relatively small and declining, ODA could serve as a strategic financing
instrument for regional public goods, such as climate change and, public health, that
resource-constrained developing economies could not ordinarily finance.
As public sector resources and ODA cannot fully cover infrastructure needs,
PPPs have the potential to play a significant role in financing infrastructure. PPPs are
a novel and important instrument as regional experience attests. PPPs are a complex
type of financing instrument that would require, among other things, the right policy
and regulatory frameworks, institutional capacity, effective risk mitigation and credit
enhancement. Efficient risk allocations require a good understanding of such risks
and appropriate risk mitigation instruments. In a few large countries, a substantial
amount of infrastructure is financed through PPPs. However, PPPs have yet to
become a significant infrastructure financing instrument for smaller developing
economies. Those countries need to learn how to use that instrument for addressing
infrastructure gaps.
New international finance institutions have emerged as alternative or
complementary sources of infrastructure financing. Those new institutions, which are
being bankrolled by China, have the financial muscle to finance large infrastructure
projects. They could be the main sources of infrastructure financing in the future,
given the large stock of foreign reserves held by China and the country’s
determination to have a greater influence in the region. China has used ODA to
access food and raw materials in Africa and Asia.
In the absence of information, it is hard to say whether the Chinese-financed
institutions will be complementary infrastructure financing sources, or operate
independently and serve as a substitute for existing multilateral institutions.
Collaboration, complementation and cooperation in infrastructure financing are the
rational pathway to solve infrastructure gaps in the region. The challenge is to learn
how to effectively deal with China, the rising economic and political power in the
Asia-Pacific region.
64
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
REFERENCES
Ali, I., and E. Pernia (2003). Infrastructure and poverty reduction: What is the connection? Economics
and Research Department Policy Brief Series, No. 13. Manila: Asian Development Bank.
ASEAN Infrastructure Fund grants first US$25 million loan to Indonesia (2013). ASEAN Briefing,
10 December. Available from www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2013/12/10/aseaninfrastructure-fund-grants-first-us25-million-loan-indonesia.html. Accessed 4 February
2015.
Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2011a). Armenia: case study on e-government procurement
development. Available from http://adbprocurementforum.net/wp-content/uploads/
Armenia-eGP-case-study-June2011.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2015.
(2011b). Development of electronic government procurement in China. Available from
http://adbprocurementforum.net/wp-content/uploads/PRC-eGP-Case-Study-October2011.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2015.
(2011c). Philippines: case study on the Philippine government electronic government
procurement (PhilGEPS). Available from www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-document/
61348/43149-012-reg-tacr-01.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2015.
(2012a). Facts and data about ASEAN infrastructure. Available from www.adb.org/features/
fast-facts-asean-infrastructure-fund. Accessed 15 February 2016.
(2012b). Infrastructure for Supporting Inclusive Growth and Poverty Reduction in Asia.
Manila. Available from www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/29823/infrastructuresupporting-inclusive-growth.pdf. Accessed 13 April 2015.
(2012c). Public-private Partnership Operational Plan 2012-2020: Realizing the Vision for
Strategy 2020 – the Transformational Role of Public-private Partnerships in Asian
Development Bank Operations. Manila. Available from www.adb.org/sites/default/files/
institutional-document/33671/ppp-operational-plan-2012-2020.pdf. Accessed 13 April
2015.
(n.d.). Overview of the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund. Available from www.adb.org/site/aif/
overview. Accessed 4 February 2015.
Asian Infrastructure Development Bank to be operational by year-end (2015a). The Economic Times,
2 January. Available from http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-01-02/news/
57611692_1_aiib-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-brics-development-bank.
Accessed 17 March 2015.
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s first loan (2015b). China-US Focus, 14 January. Accessed
17 March 2015.
Bin, Y. (2015). China-Russia relations: Russia’s pride and China’s power. Comparative Connections,
January. Available from http://csis.org/files/publication/1403qchina_russia.pdf. Accessed
15 March 2015.
The BRICS bank: an acronym with capital (2014). The Economist, 19 July. Available from
www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21607851-setting-up-rivals-imf-andworld-bank-easier-running-them-acronym. Accessed 18 March 2015.
China Merchants Securities (CMS HK) (2015). Where will the funds come from for the Belt and Road
strategy? Capital sources for the ‘Belt and Road’ strategy, 16 January. CMS (HK) Equity
Research Macro Report. Available from www.iichina.com/arfy/uploads/soft/150119/
32320_0914112781.pdf. Accessed 15 March 2015.
65
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
China launches $40 billion Silk Road Infrastructure Fund (2015). The Economic Times, 16 February.
Available from http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-02-16/news/
59196963_1_china-development-bank-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-aiib.
Accessed 15 March 2015.
China’s Xi pledges $40 billion for Silk Road Infrastructure Fund (2014). Bloomberg News,
8 November. Available from www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-11-08/china-s-xi-pledges40-billion-for-silk-road-infrastructure-fund.html. Accessed 15 March 2015.
Colverson, S., and O. Perera (2011). Sustainable development: is there a role for public-private
partnerships? A summary of an IISD preliminary investigation. Policy Brief, October.
Manitoba, Canada: International Institute for Sustainable Development. Available from
www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/sust_markets_PB_PPP.pdf.
Current Affairs (2014). Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 28 November. Available from
www.currentaffairsedu.com/asian-infrastucture-investment-bank/. Accessed 18 March
2015.
Das, S., and C. James (2013). Addressing infrastructure financing in Asia. Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies perspective, No. 27. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing. Available from
www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2013_27.pdf. Accessed 15 February
2016.
Dissou, Yazid, and S. Didic (2013). Infrastructure and growth. In Infrastructure and Economic Growth
in Asia, Economic Studies in Inequality, Social Exclusion and Well-Being, J. Cockburn and
others, eds. New York: Springer.
Egert, B., T. Kozluk, and D. Sutherland (2009). Infrastructure and growth: empirical evidence. William
Davidson Institute Working Paper, No. 957. Michigan: University of Michigan. Available
from http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/64356/wp95?sequence=1.
Accessed 11 April 2015.
Estache, A., and G. Garsous (2012). The impact of infrastructure on growth in developing countries.
IFC Economics Notes, Note 1. Washington, D.C.: International Finance Corporation.
Available from www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/054be8804db753a6843aa4ab7d7326c0/
INR+Note+1+-+The+Impact+of+Infrastructure+on+Growth.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. Accessed
11 April 2015.
Fall, M., and others (2009). Reforming urban water utilities in Western and Central Africa: experiences
with public-private partnerships, vol. 1: impact and lessons learned. Water Sector Board
Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 13. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
Felsinger, K. (2011). Public-Private Partnership Handbook. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Available
from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/06/14326196/public-privatepartnership-handbook. Accessed 14 February 2015.
Geest, W., and J. Nunez-Ferrer (2011). Appropriate financial instruments for public-private
partnership to boost cross-border infrastructure development-EU experience. Working
Paper Series, No. 281. Tokyo: ADBI. Available from www.adbi.org/files 2011.05.13.wp281.
financial.instruments.ppp.infrastructural.dev.eu.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2015.
Griffith-Jones, S. (2014). A BRICS development bank: a dream coming true? Discussion Paper,
No. 215. Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Available from
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/osgdp20141_en.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2015.
66
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Hai, N., and T. Watanabe (2014). The status quo and perspective for improvement of public works
procurement performance in Vietnam. Kochi, Japan: Graduate School of Engineering,
Kochi University of Technology. Available from http://pbsrg.com/app/wp-content/uploads/
2015/01/The-status-quo-and-perspective-for-improvement-of-public-works-procurementperformance-in-Vietnam.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2015.
Hamilton, G., and V. Holcomb (2013). Public-Private Partnerships for Sustainable Development.
Geneva: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.
Indra, B. (2014). Growth strategies for Indonesia infrastructure development. Presentation by the
Director of Public Private Partnership Development Unit during EKONID/BMWi Business
Conference in Indonesia, Jakarta, 3 November. Available from www.foundry-planet.com/
fileadmin/redakteur/pdf-dateien/25-11-14-Five%20year%20outlook%20 Construction%
20industry%20in%20Indonesia.pdf. Accessed 21 March 2015.
International Energy Agency (2014). World Energy Outlook 2014. Paris. Available from
www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energydevelopment/energyaccessdatabase/.
Accessed 1 March 2015.
Jia, C. (2015). Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to start operations this year. China Daily, 5 March.
Available from www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-03/05/content_19723410.htm.
Accessed 17 March 2015.
Jianxin, L., and S. Wong (2015). China’s $40 billion Silk Road fund starts work along PE lines: central
bank. Reuters, 16 February. Available from http://in.reuters.com/article/.2015/02/16/uschina-silkroad-idINKBN0LK03720150216. Accessed 14 March 2015.
Jones, S. (2004). Contribution of infrastructure to growth and poverty reduction in East Asia and the
Pacific. Background paper. Oxford, UK: Oxford Policy Management. Available from
www.opml.co.uk/sites/default/files/ADB_Final_Report_2_0.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2015.
Khalfan, M., and others (2013). Perception of procurement on successful infrastructure project
outcomes in Pakistan. Paper presented during the CIB World Building Congress 2013:
Construction and Society in Proceedings of the 19th Triennial CIB World Building Congress.
Brisbane, Australia, 5-9 May. Available from www.conference.net.au/cibwbc13/papers/
cibwbc2013_submission_424.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2015.
Khanna, P. (2014). New BRICS bank a building block of alternative world order. Available from
www.huffingtonpost.com/parag-khanna/new-brics-bank_b_5600027.html. Accessed
4 February 2015.
Kim, J., J.H. Kim, and S. Choi (2011). Public-private partnership infrastructure projects: case studies
from the Republic of Korea, volume 2: cases of build-transfer-operate projects for port and
build-transfer-lease projects for educational facilities. Mandaluyong City: ADB. Available
from www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/29032/ppp-kor-v2.pdf. Accessed
2 February 2015.
Larkin, S. (2014). Partnering with the Thai government – the new PPP Act. Advance, March. Available
from https://issuu.com/austcham/docs/advance_march_2014_final/1?e=2062779/
7094434. Accessed 15 February 2016.
Llanto, G. (2013). Prouductivity growth in Philippine agriculture: the impact of infrastructure on
agricultural productivity. Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and
Research in Agriculture (SEARCA), Department of Agriculture-Bureau of Agricultural
Research (DA-BAR), and Philippine Rice Research Institute (PhilRice).
67
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Marin, P. (2009). Public-private partnerships for urban water utilities – a review of experiences for
urban water utilities. Trends and Policy Options, No. 8. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Mitchell-Weaver, C., and B. Manning (1992). Public-private partnerships in third world development:
a conceptual overview. Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 26, No. 4,
pp. 45-67.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2005-2013). Creditor Reporting
System: Aid Activities. OECD International Development Statistics database. Available from
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en. Accessed 1 February 2015.
Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA) (2009). Public-private
partnership in sustainable development: the case of Puerto Galera. Case Study, vol. 1,
No. 3 (November). Available from www.pemsea.org/sites/default/files/casestudy-v1n3puertogalera.pdf. Accessed 5 March 2015.
Philippines, Department of Finance (2014). Philippines signs MOU on establishing Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank in China. Available from www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-5036/phl-embassies-and-consulates/4717-philippines-signs-mou-on-establishing-asianinfrastructure-investment-bank-in-china. Accessed 17 March 2015.
Philippines, National Economic and Development Authority (2014). Philippine Development Plan
2011-2016: Revalidated Public Investment Program. Pasig City. Available from
www.neda.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/updated_rev_pip-final_proof.pdf.
Accessed 23 February 2016.
PPP center effective from January 2015 (2014). Investor Daily, 27 October. Available from
www.indii.co.id/index.php/en/news-publication/weekly-infrastructure-news/ppp-centereffective-from-january-2015. Accessed 25 February 2016.
Preuss, H. (2014). BRICS score in Brazil, create New Development Bank. The BRICS Post, 15 July.
Available from http://thebricspost.com/brics-score-in-brazil-create-new-developmentbank/#.VsKMaLR97IV. Accessed 15 February 2016.
Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure Resource Center (PPPIRC) (2015). PPP arrangements:
types of private-public partnership arrangements. Available from http://ppp.worldbank.org/
public-privatepartnership/agreements. Accessed 25 August 2015.
Rojanavanich, S. (2014). Thailand’s infrastructure investment plans. Paper presented during Thailand
Focus 2014: Competencies & Growth Potential Conference. 27 August.
Sahoo, P., R. Dash, and G. Nataraj (2010). Infrastructure development and economic growth in China.
Discussion Paper, No. 261. Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies.
Shaohui, T. (2014). Indonesia becomes 22nd founding member of AIIB. Xinhua News Agency,
27 November. Available from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2014-11/27/
c_133818862.htm. Accessed 18 March 2015.
Sim, E. (2013). The ASEAN Infrastructure Fund’s first loan. The Establishment Post, 24 December.
Available from www.establishmentpost.com/asean-infrastructure-funds-first-loan/.
Accessed 15 February 2016.
TRACECA (n.d.). Country report on infrastructure and finance Armenia. Baku, Azerbaijan: Transport
Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia. Available from www.traceca-org.org/fileadmin/fm-dam/
Investment_Forum/110506_ARM%20country%20report.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2015.
68
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) (2013). Financing
transport infrastructure. In Review of Development in Transport in Asia and the Pacific:
Transport as a Key to Sustainable Development and Regional Integration. Bangkok.
Available from www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/TransportReview_2013_Overview.pdf.
Accessed 10 April 2015.
Verougstraete, M., and H. Kang (2014). Mobilizing private funding: the case of the national highways
of India. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
Public-Private Partnerships Case Study. Bangkok: ESCAP.
Watson, K. (2014). Brics nations to create US$100bn development bank. BBC News, 15 July.
Available from www.bbc.com/news/business-28317555. Accessed 4 February 2014.
World Bank (2005-2013). Private Participation in Infrastructure Database. Available from http://
ppi.worldbank.org/customquery. Accessed 3 February 2015.
World Bank Institute (2014). Public-private partnerships: reference guide version 2.0. Washington,
D.C. Available from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/01/20182310/publicprivate-partnerships-reference-guide-version-20. Accessed 3 April 2015.
World Economic Forum (2014). The Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015. Geneva. Available
from www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2014-15.pdf.
Accessed 29 March 2015.
Zhang, L. (2010). Government procurement law and policy: China. The Law Library of Congress.
Available from www.loc.gov/law/help/govt-procurement-law/china.php. Accessed 11 April
2015.
69
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
CLIMATE FINANCE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION:
TRENDS AND INNOVATIVE APPROACHES
Ilaria Carrozza*
Asia and the Pacific1 is one of the most disaster-prone regions and the
possibility that climate change may exacerbate the frequency and severity
of extreme weather events is a real threat to progress made towards
achieving sustainable development. To secure sustainable development
gains and build resilience in the region, there is an urgent need to
undertake climate mitigation and adaptation action. Despite an estimated
$391 billion in climate finance flows internationally in 2014, the gap
between available climate finance and the financing required to limit
global warming to two degrees Celsius and adapt to unavoidable impacts
of climate change is growing. The present paper offers an overview of the
climate finance landscape with a focus on the Asia-Pacific region, and of
finance flows from international climate funds, multilateral development
banks and subregional and national climate finance initiatives. The
ultimate goal of the discussion is to provide policymakers in the region
with an understanding of the state of climate finance and
recommendations on approaches for mobilizing climate finance in the
light of global efforts, regional trends and successful initiatives.
JEL classification: F39, Q01, Q54, Q56, R11.
Keywords: Asia-Pacific, climate change, climate finance, mitigation, adaptation.
* Ilaria Carrozza, PhD candidate in International Relations, The London School of Economics and
Political Science (LSE), United Kingdom. The author would like to acknowledge the ESCAP Environment
and Development Division (Rae Kwon Chung, Aneta Nikolova, Riccardo Mesiano, Hala Razian, and with
support from Yohan Hong). A peer review was conducted by the Climate Policy Initiative (Mia Fitri and
Leela Raina).
1
This article considers the 62 member and associate members of ESCAP as far as data are available.
See www.unescap.org/about/member-states.
71
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
I. INTRODUCTION
While climate change is a global phenomenon, some geographic regions are
being affected by it to a greater extent than others. Asia and the Pacific is one such
region. It is home to the largest number of poor people in the world who are also the
most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. In the past decade, about three
million people were affected by disasters and almost 900,000 lost their lives. A person
living in Asia and the Pacific is almost twice as likely to be affected by a natural
disaster than a person living in Africa; almost six times more likely than someone in
Latin America and the Caribbean, and almost 30 times more likely than a person living
in North America or Europe (ESCAP, 2012a). All regions of the world are projected to
experience varying impacts because of climate change. In Asia and the Pacific,
increases in flooding, heat-related mortality, and drought-related water and food
shortages have been identified as the main risks. If current climate change and
development patterns continue, by 2100, hundreds of millions of people, most of
them in the coastal areas of East, South-East and South Asia, may be displaced
unless adaptation measures are put in place. Each degree of warming is projected to
decrease renewable water resources by at least 20 per cent for an additional 7 per
cent of the global population, adding to the risk faced by millions of vulnerable people
(IPCC, 2014). It is evident that climate change impacts, if not effectively managed,
may breach ecological tipping points, which would then have magnifying effects on
interrelated socioeconomic and environmental systems, with a reach far beyond
national borders (IPCC, 2012).
At the same time, the economic damage caused by disasters has grown. The
financial impact on cities in the region will be significant. According to recent data,
costs from major flood events will likely be counted in the billions of dollars with
potential serious impacts on national GDP (World Bank, 2010), as well as on the lives
of poorer and marginalized communities, in particular. The international community,
multilateral development banks and United Nations funds and programmes are
working to support delivery of and direct access to existing and pledged international
climate finance. However, international flows alone will not be sufficient to meet the
growing demand for climate mitigation and adaptation finance. Filling the growing
“climate financing gap” not only requires identifying alternative and innovative
sources of funds from both the public and private sectors, but also developing
appropriate institutional arrangements and policy landscapes to redirect existing
financial flows towards climate mitigation and adaptation activities that also deliver on
sustainable development priorities.2
2
ESCAP defines Green Growth as economic progress that fosters environmentally sustainable, lowcarbon and socially inclusive development.
72
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
In the light of this, the present paper first touches on the evolution of the
climate finance landscape and outlines the current state of play of global sources of
climate finance. In the absence of an internationally acknowledged definition of
climate finance, in this paper, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) definition is used, which is “local, national or transnational
financing, which may be drawn from public, private and alternative sources of
financing” (UNFCCC, 2014a) and which target low-carbon and climate-resilient
development. The discussion covers a variety of international and national actors,
including development finance institutions, international climate funds, governments
and relevant government agencies. Data regarding global finance flows are mostly
drawn from the Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) reports as they represent the most
comprehensive source of such flows to date. Second, the paper focuses on the
regional landscape of climate finance in the Asia-Pacific region, with particular
attention given to active climate funds, multilateral development banks, the
distribution of climate finance across countries, and national-level initiatives.
Mitigation, adaptation and reduction of emissions from deforestation and degradation
plus conservation (REDD+) initiatives across a variety of sectors are outlined by
examining data available through the Climate Funds Update (CFU). As the analysis of
regional trends undertaken is affected by the lack of coherent data, this paper focuses
on selected regional experiences with the aim to shed light on relevant programmes
across the region.3 Finally, the paper provides recommendations for policymakers on
how to effectively address identified challenges and mobilize additional resources for
climate finance across Asia and the Pacific.
II. SETTING THE CONTEXT: THE CURRENT STATE OF
CLIMATE FINANCE AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL
The complexity of the current global landscape of climate finance (see figure 1)
poses serious challenges to both policymakers and potential investors. Significant
knowledge and data gaps that complicate understanding of the issue and hinder the
ability to adequately address investments in climate change-related activities exist. In
addition, “the cumulative gap between the level of finance needed and finance
actually delivered is growing” (Buchner and others, 2014, p. 5).
The Climate Policy Initiative has been tracking and consolidating the most
comprehensive estimates for climate finance, represented in the figure 2 below by the
now well-known CPI spaghetti diagram. Even though the spaghetti diagram has its
3
The choice of countries and sectors is dictated by the availability of data and existing literature.
73
Source:
74
Available from www.climatefundsupdate.org/about-climate-fund/global-finance-architecture.
Figure 1. The complexity of the current global landscape of climate finance
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Source:
Buchner and others (2015).
Figure 2. Climate Policy Initiative climate finance landscape
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
75
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
limitations (Buchner and others, 2015),4 including data availability of certain climate
flows, this paper primarily uses the CPI 2015 Climate Policy Landscape to provide an
overview of key elements of the current state of global climate finance. The present
study is not intended to provide a comprehensive overview, but instead report on key
figures to provide a broad view of the current situation.
According to latest reports issued by CPI, in 2014, annual global climate
finance was $391 billion. Despite still lagging far below the levels needed to limit
warming to two degrees Celsius, 5 climate finance flows have increased when
compared to the 2013 level of $331 billion. In 2013, climate finance flows were
directed almost equally to developed (OECD) and developing (non-OECD) countries,
with each group receiving $164 billion and $165 billion, respectively (Buchner and
others, 2014). North-South flows accounted for $34 billion in 2012 (Buchner and
others, 2014). Developing countries invested $2 billion in developed countries and
$10 billion in South-South cooperation (Buchner and others, 2014). However,
approximately three fourths of total flows, particularly those from the private sector,
were invested in their country of origin (Buchner and others, 2014).6 The 2015 report
confirms these trends: about 74 per cent of total finance and 92 per cent of private
investments were raised and spent within the same country. East Asia and the Pacific
was the largest destination of climate finance flows accounting for $119 billion, while
Western Europe was the second main destination with $93 billion (Buchner and
others, 2015).
In 2014, the public sector contributed $148 billion, an 8 per cent and a 10 per
cent increase from 2013 and 2012 levels, respectively (Buchner and others, 2015),7
while the private sector provided $243 billion, a record raise from 2013 levels, when
4
The Climate Policy Landscape tracks incremental (including grants) rather than total investment costs,
and includes public framework expenditures for, among other, capacity-building, strategies and plans,
MRV systems and demonstration projects, but excludes policy-induced revenues for such sources as
taxes, feed-in tariffs, subsidies and concessional loans. Significant data gaps impede a full report of
climate flows, including for example private sector investments in energy efficiency, including transport,
land use, and adaptation. The 2015 report also does not capture “the value of public budgets dedicated
to domestic climate action beyond some national DFIs commitments and financing”, nor “the level of
climate finance that governments contribute as shareholders of companies.” (Buchner and others, 2015,
p. 6)
5
It is estimated that despite investments totalling $1.095 trillion between 2011 and 2014, as much as
$16.5 trillion will be needed over the next 15 years to limit the global temperature increase to two degrees
Celsius (IEA, 2015).
6
It is important to note that data limitations restrict the ability to identify private sector flows in
developing countries systematically and concretely.
7
It is estimated that public actors in emerging and developing economies alone invested $544 billion in
2012 on fossil fuel subsidies alone.
76
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
private investments accounted for $193 billion, as elaborated in table 1 below
(Buchner and others, 2015).8 It is estimated that three fourths of climate finance flows
were invested with the expectation of earning commercial returns (Buchner and
others, 2014).
Table 1. Summary of public and private total finance flows
Total
($ billion)
% change
%
total
Mitigation
% total
Adaptation
% total
Mixed
(mitigation/
adaptation)
% total
Public
148
+8
38
93
6
1
Private
243
+26
62
Source
Source:
Based on Buchner and others (2015).
Note:
There is no reliable data source of project level private sector adaptation interventions.
With regard to public finance flows, direct foreign investments (DFIs)
accounted for the majority investments by public actors and have contributed $131
billion, or 33 per cent of total flows in 2014. Other public actors included multilateral
and national climate funds that approved about $2 billion for projects with mitigation
and adaptation benefits. CPI further tracked $15 billion on average of direct public
contributions from government agencies and ministries in 2014 (Buchner and others,
2015). However, limited data on domestic public budgets and expenditures for
climate change make it hard to capture the latter trends.
In September 2014, six multilateral development banks reaffirmed their shared
commitment to take the lead in further developing climate financing.9 ,10 They pledged
to maintain a strong focus on climate change. In particular, this included leveraging
additional private sector investments and continuing to innovate and promote more
8
Private investment figures need to be explored critically as drops in private sector investments can be
attributed to changing cost structures. For example, investments in solar decreased by $19 billion,
however, installed capacity increased by 5 GW, indicating that the investment decrease is largely
associated with improving costs necessitating less financial investment.
9
Joint Report on MDB Climate Finance 2013, A report by a group of Multilateral Development Banks
(MDBs) comprising the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and World Bank
(WB) from the World Bank Group (WBG), September 2014. Available from www.eib.org/projects/
documents/joint-report-on-mdb-climate-finance-2013.htm.
10
ADB (2014).
77
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
robust and transparent climate finance tracking and reporting. Those six multilateral
development banks began to jointly track climate finance flows in 2011 (table 2) and
since then have delivered $75 billion in financing assistance to developing countries
to support responses to climate change challenges. About 80 per cent ($18.9 billion)
of this lending has supported mitigation activities, while 20 per cent ($4.8 billion) has
supported adaptation measures (Buchner and others, 2014). Of the total
commitments, 9 per cent, or $2.2 billion, came from external resources, such as
bilateral or multilateral donors, including the Global Environment Facility and the
Climate Investment Funds.
Table 2. Multilateral development banks climate finance commitments
to adaptation ($ million)
Multilateral development bank
Adaptation 2013
Mitigation 2013
African Development Bank
473
768
Asian Development Bank
980
2 272
European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development
187
3 242
European Investment Bank
166
5 058
Inter-American Development Bank
121
1 097
International Finance Corporation
8
2 662
World Bank
2 927
3 830
Total
4 826
18 928
Source:
UNFCCC (2014b).
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) Trust Fund is the primary source of
grants extended to developing countries through the financial mechanism. During this
GEF 5 (2010-2014) cycle, GEF had funded 787 projects on climate change mitigation
for a total volume of $4.5 billion. Funding to support adaptation by GEF is now
delivered directly through the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF). As at 30 June 2014, about $1.3 billion overall
has been programmed by GEF for adaptation. The contributions from donor countries
for LDCF and SCCF are voluntary and have experienced a substantial increase during
the past years. Cumulative pledges to LDCF reached $900 million in 2014 while those
to SCCF were $344 million.
Meanwhile, private sector investments have accounted for the majority of
climate finance, which is highlighted in table 3. It is estimated that private climate
finance flows to developing countries are between $27 billion and 123 billion, based
78
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
on data from 2008 to 2011 from a variety of sources — with the caveat that private
climate finance flows to developing countries are not systematically tracked, so their
magnitude is highly uncertain (UNFCCC, 2014b). In 2014, “project developers”11
(Buchner and others, 2014, p. 5) invested the most, with a contribution of $92 billion.
Corporate actors invested $58 billion of total private finance, while households
(including family-level economic entities, high net worth individuals and their
intermediaries) invested $43 billion. Commercial financial institutions contributed
$46 billion (19 per cent of private investments). Private equity, venture capital, and
infrastructure funds intermediated $1.7 billion. Institutional investors spent about
$0.9 billion on renewable energy projects. The majority of these sources are being
provided through a variety of instruments, namely grants, low-cost debts (including
concessional loans), and capital instruments at commercial terms, such as projectlevel market rate debt, project-level equity, and balance sheet financing, as
elaborated in table 4 (Buchner and others, 2014).
Table 3. Breakdown of investments by type of public and private actor, 2014
Public actors
Governments and
government agencies
Total
($ billion)
%
Share
Private actors
Total
%
($ billion) Share
15
10
Project developers
92
38
2
1.3
Corporate actors &
manufacturers
58
24
131
88.5
Households
43
18
National DFIs
66
~51
Commercial financial
institutions
46
19
Multilateral
47
36
Private equity, venture
capital, infrastructure funds
1.7
<1
Bilateral
17
~13
Institutional investors
0.9
<1
National and multilateral
climate funds
DFI
Total
Source:
~$148
Total
~$243
Based on Buchner and others (2015).
11
Project developers refer to “dedicated energy project developers, engineering, procurement and
construction (EPC) contractors, utilities and independent power producers.”
79
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Table 4. Climate finance flows by instruments, 2014
Instruments
Total ($ billion)
% Share of total climate finance
Grants
14
4
Low-cost debt
69
18
Balance sheet financing
178
46
Project level market rate debt
102
26
25
6
Project level equity
Total
388 *
100
Source:
Based on Buchner and others (2015).
Note:
*Due to data limitations, there are no details on instruments for about $0.5 billion.
Compared to 2013, in 2014 mitigation finance has increased by $59 billion,
totalling $361 billion, and accounting for 93 per cent of total investments; adaptation
finance has instead decreased, totalling $25 billion (Buchner and others, 2014;
2015).12 Given that more than 40 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions are caused
by energy production and use, the majority of mitigation finance projects are aimed at
promoting renewable energy sources (Halimanjaya and others, 2014). In particular,
public mitigation finance targeted three main sectors, namely renewable energy
generation (33 per cent of the total), energy efficiency (18 per cent) and sustainable
transport (14 per cent). The remainder of mitigation flows were directed towards
non-energy GHG reduction, low-carbon technologies, agriculture, forestry, and land
use, transmission and distribution systems, and waste and wastewater management
(Buchner and others, 2015). Current levels of funding are, however, deemed to be
insufficient to enhance mitigation measures and CPI envisions that mitigation
measures will require between $200 billion-210 billion per annum in 2030 (Buchner
and others, 2013).13
Adaptation funding reached $25 billion in 2014, of which 25 per cent was
invested in water and wastewater management (Buchner and others, 2015). Table 5
depicts the most active funds in delivering climate adaptation finance for the period
2003-2014. However, these contributions remain low and adaptation unfortunately
remains underfunded at the global level (Caravani and others, 2014). Additional
investments needed are estimated to amount to several billion dollars, with at least an
12
Adaptation finance recorded is only from public sources, as there is no reliable data source for
project-level private adaptation interventions, and Buchner and others (2014) also do not take into
account data on domestic public budgets.
13
80
Figures must be seen as indicative only.
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Table 5. Finance from Funds that primarily support adaptation,
in millions of dollars, 2003-2014
Adaptation finance from “Funds”
Pledge
Deposit
Approval
Disbursement
Adaptation Fund (AF)
323.05
186.48
166.36
29.14
Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)
536.65
435.46
286.73
126.63
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)
Pilot Program for Climate Resilience
(PPCR)
Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA)
Source:
241.61
196.40
147.25
100.23
1 119.00
804.80
317.48
8.00
385.36
365.36
296.81
130.99
Based on Schalatek and others (2012).
additional $28 billion-67 billion of estimated required flows to developing countries
(Buchner and others, 2013).
To this end, the Green Climate Fund has recently committed to devote 50 per
cent of its funding to adaptation measures, starting from 2015, with half of it going to
small island developing States, least developed countries and African States, to help
address the problem of insufficient funding for adaptation. In addition to mitigation
and adaptation finance, since 2008, $2.81 billion has been pledged to five multilateral
climate funds to support REDD+.14 However, the future of those mechanisms still
remains highly uncertain. Encouragingly, pledges were made at the United Nations
Climate Summit in 2014 for additional REDD+ finance and as 2014 80 per cent of the
total funding pledged has been deposited.
On the one hand, climate funds, such as GEF, LDCF and SCCF, as well as the
Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) of the World Bank,15 successfully dispensed funds
for climate finance by promoting projects that have the potential to reduce emissions
and increase resilience to climate change. Thus, for example, mitigation finance has
targeted middle-income countries where emissions are already high and growing;
poor and vulnerable countries have also been specifically targeted by climate funds
that provide support for responsible ministries in investment planning and financial-
14
REDD-plus activities are located in developing countries and are funded by a combination of
domestic and developed country finance.
15
The Climate Investment Funds include four key programmes that held 63 developing countries pilot
low-emissions and climate resilient development including the $5.3-billion Clean Technology Fund (CTF),
the $1.2-billion Pilot Program Climate Resilience (PPCR), the-$785 million Forest Investment Program
(FIP) and the $796 million Scaling Up Renewable Energy in Low Income Countries Program (SREP).
Available from www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/.
81
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
management decisions. On the other hand, however, these funds have not always
been dispersed efficiently, mostly because some programmes were not carefully
designed to target national circumstances. Therefore, it is clear that “a focus on the
underlying policy, regulatory and enabling environment in developing interventions is
needed alongside efforts to make large investments” (Nakhooda and others, 2014,
p. 72).
III. THE STATE OF CLIMATE FINANCE IN THE
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
Asia and the Pacific is increasingly responsible for rising levels of greenhouse
gas emissions despite the extensive socioeconomic impacts climate change has on
the region. While per capita emissions are still low in most countries, the economic
and population growth in major Asian economies has led to an increasing need for
energy, especially from cheap and readily available fossil fuels. Estimates suggest that
the Asia-Pacific region, with a 6 per cent annual growth rate, has the potential to
account for 44 per cent of total global GDP by 2035 (ADB, 2013a). In this “Asian
Century” scenario, the region’s share of world energy consumption is projected to rise
rapidly from about 33 per cent in 2010 (one third of world consumption), to up to
56 per cent by 2035 (ADB, 2013a). In 2035, China and India alone will account for
70 per cent of total electricity generated. Demand for coal in Asia and the Pacific is
projected to increase by 52.8 per cent from 2010 to 2035, to reaching 3.5 billion tons
of oil equivalents (Mtoe) (ADB, 2013b). As demand for coal, oil and other resources
increases rapidly, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are projected to increase from
13.4 billion tons of CO2 in 2010 to 22.1 billion tons of CO2 in 2035, growing at an
annual rate of 2.0 per cent, under business as usual scenarios (ADB, 2013b).
The region’s prospect for pursuing higher, inclusive and sustained growth, as
well as reducing poverty and addressing inequalities, critically depends on its
capacity to adapt its development patterns to those that are low carbon, resource
efficient and that sustainably manage natural resources while delivering on inclusive
growth necessary for poverty eradication. As rising and increasingly volatile
commodity prices are becoming the “new normal” (ESCAP, 2013), the region cannot
sustain its resource intensive growth pattern that currently uses three times more
resources than world average per unit of GDP (ESCAP, 2012b).
One of the key challenges in undertaking this transformation is availability and
access to climate finance. A report from UNFCCC estimates that additional
investments and financial flows needed in order to address climate change in 2030
would amount to 0.3-0.5 per cent of global GDP and 1.1-1.7 per cent of global
investment (UNFCCC, 2008). It is estimated that the energy sector alone will require
82
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
new investments of about $19.9 trillion under an alternative approach to business-asusual scenarios (ADB, 2013a).
Obtaining a comprehensive picture of the state of climate finance in the
Asia-Pacific region is complicated by the fact that most governments have their own
climate change plan as well as different institutional arrangements to coordinate
climate change actions (Haites, 2014). Some countries also have independent
mechanisms to fund adaptation and mitigation measures. In addition, private climate
finance flows to developing countries are not systematically tracked, so their
magnitude is highly uncertain (UNFCCC, 2014b). Furthermore, some countries devote
significant domestic resources to climate change, while others rely almost entirely on
bilateral and multilateral finance (UNFCCC, 2014b). The landscape presented below
seeks to highlight some of the key flows that have been tracked in the region to date,
as well as key country-level initiatives to mobilize climate finance.
Finance flows from international climate funds
Currently, twenty-two climate funds and initiatives are active in the region,
which have approved a total of $3.35 billion for projects, with $1.25 billion approved
for new projects in 2013 alone (Barnard and others, 2014). Despite concerted efforts
from a variety of funds and initiatives, the distribution of climate finance flows within
the region has been uneven. Over two thirds of the climate finance directed to Asia
and the Pacific since 2003 has supported mitigation initiatives, while the remaining
funding supported adaptation activities, REDD+ and multiple focuses programmes
(Buchner and others, 2013). The most recent data from CFU show that 32 countries16
in the region have received more than a quarter of total public climate finance from
dedicated climate funds. China, India and Indonesia alone have received almost half,
approximately 46 per cent of total mitigation and adaptation funding approved by
dedicated climate funds for the region since 2003.
The Asia-Pacific region received 31.1 per cent of total mitigation funding from
climate funds active in the region, with Indonesia being the largest recipient,
accepting $382.86 million approved for mitigation activities (Halimanjaya and others,
2014). China, India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand together received 82 per
cent, or $1.7 billion, of the total amount approved for mitigation in the region. CTF,
16
In this case, Climate Funds Update follows the World Bank classification of countries in East Asia and
the Pacific and South-Asia, which includes: American Samoa, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Indonesia, Kiribati,
Democratic Republic of Republic of Korea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Marshall Islands,
Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Myanmar, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa,
Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, Tonga, Vanuatu, Viet Nam; and Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
83
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Figure 3. Top 10 recipient countries in the Asia-Pacific region
by amount of funding approved ($ million)
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
Source:
oa
m
a
Sa
C
am
N
bo
ep
di
al
nd
ai
la
sh
Th
la
ng
Ba
ilip
pi
de
ne
s
am
Ph
In
Vi
e
tN
hi
C
do
In
ne
di
si
a
a
na
0
Based on CFU. See www.climatefundsupdate.org/regions/asia-pacific (accessed
November 2015).
Figure 4. Focus areas in East Asia and the Pacific and in South Asia
Focus areas in East Asia and the Pacific
Focus areas in South Asia
6%
9%
23%
12%
2%
28%
61%
59%
Source:
84
Adaptation
Mitigation – general
Mitigation – REDD+
Multiple focuses
Based on CFU. See www.climatefundsupdate.org/regions/asia-pacific
(accessed November 2015).
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Figure 5. Top active funds by data available for East Asia and
the Pacific and for South Asia ($ million)
Top funds supporting East Asia and the Pacific by amount approved
1 000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
GCTF
GICI
GEF4
LDCF
GEF5
AIFCI
PPCR
SCCF GCCA
AF
Top funds supporting South Asia by amount approved
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
GCTF
Source:
PPCR
GEF4
GEF5
UKICF SREP
GICI
LDCF
AF
ASAP
Based on CFU. See www.climatefundsupdate.org/regions/asia-pacific (accessed
November 2015).
85
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
under the World Bank CIFs, has provided the majority, or $706 million, of newly
approved mitigation finance.
Sixty-two per cent of total climate finance from funds extended to the AsiaPacific region since 2003 has supported mitigation activities (Barnard and others,
2015). On average, most of mitigation finance is being directed towards countries with
higher CO2 intensity, larger carbon sinks, lower per capita GDP and good governance
(Haites, 2014, p. 34). Most mitigation funding supports large-scale renewable energy,
energy efficiency and transport projects. SREP is an exception to this as it is
supporting decentralized renewable energy and energy access programmes in Nepal,
Maldives and Vanuatu for a total approved amount of almost $63 million (Barnard and
others, 2014).
During the period 2003-2015, the Asia-Pacific region received 17 per cent of
total adaptation finance (Canales Trujillo and others, 2015) The $346 million in
adaptation finance approved in 2013 represents only 28 per cent of the total increase
of financing for the whole region. Since its establishment in 2008, CTF has approved
more than $1.20 billion for twenty projects across the region, mostly through
concessional loans (Barnard and others, 2015).17 As for adaptation, the largest
amounts are being provided by PPCR,18 which has approved $857 billion to support
adaptation projects, of which 17 per cent was invested in East Asia and the Pacific,
and 14 per cent in South Asia (Canales Trujillo and others, 2015). Adaptation finance
flows tend to go to more vulnerable countries. However, vulnerability alone does not
explain the allocation of those funds. Nonetheless, approved finance for projects in
vulnerable countries, particularly the small Pacific island States, has arguably been
modest. The Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated
States of), Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu altogether
have received only 4.6 per cent ($155 million) of the total amount approved for the
Asia-Pacific region, primarily for adaptation activities (Normand and others, 2014).
The Asia-Pacific region has only received 7 per cent of the total amount of REDD+
finance approved between 2008 and 2015, with Indonesia being the largest recipient
in the region, mostly through bilateral relationships with Norway and Australia
(Norman and others, 2015).
17
Further information on such projects can also be found here: www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/
node/2.
18
More information on the PPCR can be found here www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/
Pilot_Program_for_Climate_Resilience.
86
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Table 6. Funds active in East Asia and the Pacific and in South Asia
Fund
Year of
initiation
South Asia –
amount
approved
(in $ million)
East Asia
and Pacific –
amount
approved
(in $ million)
2009
24.1
43.6
2009
–
53.5
2010
–
9.5
Adaptation Fund Board (UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol)
Adaptation Fund (AF)
Brazilian Development Bank
Amazon Fund
Indonesia’s National Development Planning Agency
Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund (ICCTF)
UNDP
Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund
2006
5.0
20.0
UN-REDD Programme
2008
6.3
24.4
Clean Technology Fund (CTF)
2008
375.0
888.7
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)
2008
3.6
11.5
Forest Investment Program (FIP)
2009
–
19.3
Scaling Up Renewable Energy in Low
Income Countries Program (SREP)
2009
66.1
0.6
Pilot Program for Climate and Resilience (PPCR)
2008
170.0
168.4
World Bank
The Global Environment Facility (GEF)
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)
2001
–
70.1
Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)
2002
77.6
143.2
3.1
Strategic Priority on Adaptation (SPA) (from GEF4)
2004
6.9
GEF4
2006
137.7
–
–
297.5
Global Environmental Facility (GEF4)
Global Environment Facility (GEF5)
90.0
–
GEF 5
2010
–
268.6
Global Environmental Facility (GEF6)
–
9.8
The European Commission
Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
Fund (GEEREF)
2006
–
85.3
Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA)
2007
375.0
84.8
2012
30.0
27.0
The International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD)
Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme
(ASAP)
Source:
Based on CFU. Available from www.climatefundsupdate.org/regions/asia-pacific.
87
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Finance from multilateral development banks
Table 7 provides figures for multilateral development banks climate finance
delivered to East Asia and the Pacific, non-European Union and Central Asia and
South Asia in 2013 (in US$ million).
Table 7. Climate Finance delivered by multilateral development banks
to East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia,a and non-European Union
and Central Asian countriesb
Multilateral development
bank resources
Public
Total
Policybased
instruments
Investments and
technical assistance
Region
External resources
Private
Investments and
technical
assistance
Public
Policybased
instruments
Private
multilateral
development
bank climate
finance
per region
Total
multilateral
development
bank finance
per region
M
A
M
A
M
A
M
A
M
A
M
A
East Asia
and the
Pacific
1 438
978
798
0
35
35
644
60
276
0
1
0
4 308
19 016
South
1 399
847
514
0
50
50
120 110
30
0
1
0
3 120
16 600
2 403
214
2 218
46
10
0
105
0
0
0
5 117
224 463
12 545
260 079
Asia
NonEuropean
Union
and
Central
Asia
Total
70
42
Source:
Adapted from Joint Report on MDB Climate Finance 2013. Available from www.eib.org/attachments/
documents/joint_report_on_mdb_climate_finance_2013.pdf.
Note:
M = Mitigation, A = Adaptation.
a
Similar to CFU, EIB also follows the World Bank classification of countries in East Asia and the Pacific
and in South Asia. Available from www.eib.org/attachments/documents/joint_report_on_mdb_
climate_finance_2013.pdf.
b
According to EIB, countries considered as part of non-European Union and Central Asia countries are:
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Kosovo, Montenegro, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Turkey, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Available from www.eib.org/
attachments/documents/joint_report_on_mdb_climate_finance_2013.pdf.
88
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Of the total adaptation finance provided by multilateral development banks in
2013, East Asia and the Pacific received $1.072 billion and South Asia received
$1.008 billion. As for the multilateral development banks mitigation finance,
$3.236 billion was disbursed to East Asia and the Pacific and $2.113 to South Asia
(MDBs, 2013). Among multilateral banks, ADB is the Asian regional development
bank; it is supporting climate change mitigation and adaptation initiatives throughout
Asia and the Pacific through a variety of initiatives, including, among them: the ADB
internal Climate Change Fund; trust funds managed by ADB, which receive
contributions from developed countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, Spain,
Sweden and the United Kingdom); the Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute;
and climate funds that are externally managed but can be accessed by ADB. As of
the end of 2013, the total amount of externally managed climate funds that ADB has
managed and/or has had access to amounts to $1.5 billion (Haites, 2014, p. 38).
Subregional climate finance initiatives
Subregional organizations are increasingly leveraging the benefits of
cooperation to address the large gaps in finance and action in the region on mitigation
and adaptation. Through the creation of subregional frameworks for action on climate
change, subregional bodies are setting the stage for concerted action at the national
level towards climate change mitigation and adaptation. Subregional frameworks also
offer a key opportunity to facilitate partnership building and engagement on
strengthening the science-policy interface through scientific partnerships, capacitybuilding, information and even technology exchange among subregional
organizations. With support from subregional and regional partners comprehensive,
multisectoral and strategic road maps for action can be developed and jointly
implemented. With these strong policy signals from the subregion, climate finance
can be directed to appropriate investments for low-carbon development. Also,
importantly, subregional consensus can ensure that important issues of concern are
raised effectively at global negotiations. In addition, G20 leaders are poised to make a
significant contribution to climate change finance, thanks to their influential position,
by engaging in a meaningful discussion on climate change. During the twenty-first
Conference of the Parties (COP21), held in Paris from 30 November to 11 December
2015, they reached an agreement on the reduction of climate change (the Paris
Agreement), which will become legally binding only if signed by at least 55 countries
over the next two years.19 One of the most pressing questions that leaders also need
to keep address is where will the money come from and where it will be spent
(Jorgensen, 2013). In another forum, which was held in Brussels on 4 and 5 June
19
See www.cop21.gouv.fr/en/ for more information.
89
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
2014, G7 leaders committed, from their side, to take concrete action to address
climate change by pursuing low-carbon economies and taking the lead in collecting
resources to meet the target of mobilizing $100 billion per year by 2020.20
One example21 of such initiatives is being undertaken by the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has been active in addressing climate
change, including by issuing declarations/statements related to climate change in
2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2014 that express the subregion’s common
understanding and aspirations towards climate change and their resolve to achieve an
ASEAN community resilient to climate change through national and regional actions,
including by technology transfer, capacity-building and financial assistance from
developed countries to support nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) and
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). The statements highlight the
importance of climate change mitigation and adaptation actions that are consistent
with broader sustainable development goals. The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
(ASCC) Blueprint 2009-2015 strategic objectives are to “enhance regional and
international cooperation to address the issue of climate change and its impacts on
socioeconomic development, health and the environment, in ASEAN member States
through implementation of mitigation and adaptation measures...”. The ASEAN MultiSectoral Framework on Climate Change: Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry towards
Food Security (AFCC) was endorsed by the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings on
Agriculture and Forestry (AMAF) in November 2009. The overall aim of AFCC is to
contribute to food security through sustainable, efficient and effective use of land,
forest, water and aquatic resources by minimizing the risks and impacts of and the
contributions to climate change. The ASEAN Working Group on Climate Change
(AWGCC) was established in 2009 and the Action Plan on Joint Response to Climate
Change was developed in 2012. Key actions include: encourage an ASEAN common
understanding to engage in joint efforts; develop an ASEAN climate change initiative
(ACCI); facilitate information/knowledge exchange, including transfer of technology;
engage with the international community; develop regional strategies to enhance
capacity for low carbon economies; enhance collaboration to address climate related
hazards; develop observation systems and conduct policy and scientific studies;
20
The Brussels G7 Summit Declaration. Available from www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/
_Anlagen/G8_G20/G7-2014-06-05-abschlusseklaerung-eng.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.
21
Other similar initiatives are the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (http://
saarc-sec.org/areaofcooperation/cat-detail.php?cat_id=54); the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat (PIFS)
(www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/strategic-partnerships-coordination/climate-change/?printerfriendly=true)
and the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) (www.sprep.org/
attachments/Publications/PIFACC-ref.pdf); and www.pacificclimatechange.net/index.php/component/
content/article/400-announcements/7529-call-rtsm.
90
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
promote public awareness and advocacy for increased stakeholder engagement; and
promote a win-win synergy between climate change and economic development.22
National climate finance flows
The local dimension of climate finance is of great importance, not only because
of the intrinsically local nature of climate change effects, but also on account of the
crucial role of local policymakers and practitioners in achieving results on the ground.
Country systems were devised during the Global Forum on Using Country Systems to
Manage Climate Change Finance, which was held in Incheon, Republic of Korea, on 2
and 3 December 2013, as a way to manage climate finance at the national level
(UNDP, 2013). They combine a variety of instruments to address climate finance,
including: national and local systems for planning; policy coordination and
implementation; budgeting and financial management; procurement; and monitoring
and evaluation. In this regard, country systems may prove to be essential resources
for national governments to manage climate finance at the local level while actively
engaging the private sector, non-governmental organizations and households.
Given the importance of mobilizing domestic resources according to national
circumstances, climate finance needs to be defined according to country-led
definitions of climate expenditures. Therefore, countries in the Asia-Pacific region
have started to produce their own Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional
Reviews (CPEIRs), which are aimed at helping ministries of finance, environment and
planning assess how to configure national budgets in order to respond to climate
change. Five countries have initiated pilot CPEIRs, namely Bangladesh (Bangladesh,
2012), Cambodia (ODI, 2012a), Nepal (Nepal, National Planning Commission, 2011),
Samoa (ODI, 2012b) and Thailand (ODI, 2012c), which altogether signal that across
the region, countries are becoming aware of the need to bring climate finance into
national agendas as a key issue to be addressed in both the short and the long term.
Establishing a national climate fund (NCF) is another effective way to tailor
coordination and strengthen national ownership of climate finance. Such
mechanisms, which are already being pursued in some countries in the Asia-Pacific
region, extend support in directing finance towards climate change programmes
(Flynn, 2011). NCFs can help national governments focus on country-driven climate
change priorities based on national realities by addressing four main goals: collecting
and distributing funds to climate change-related activities that target national
circumstances; facilitating the blending of public, private, multilateral and bilateral
22
http://environment.asean.org/asean-working-group-on-climate-change/; www.asean-cn.org/Item/
981.aspx; and http://environment.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ASEAN-Joint-Statement-onClimate-Change-2014.pdf.
91
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
sources of finance; coordinating country-wide climate change programmes; and
strengthening national institutions and financial management, for example through the
creation of National Implementing Entities (NIEs), to deliver climate change projects. If
aligned with existing national institutions and objectives, NCFs have the potential to
create an effective system to translate financial opportunities into real achievements.
Some countries that have set up NCFs are Indonesia (Flynn, 2011, p. 48); 23
Bangladesh (Flynn, 2011, p. 49);24 and China (Flynn, 2011, p. 50).25
Furthermore, there has been increasing interest in using NAMAs as a tool for
countries to promote climate change mitigation actions in the context of national
sustainable development strategies. The concept of NAMA was introduced in the Bali
Action Plan, which was set at the thirteenth Conference of Parties (COP13) in 2007 in
Bali, Indonesia. Paragraph 1(b)(ii) calls for “(n)ationally appropriate mitigation actions
by developing country Parties in the context of sustainable development, supported
and enabled by technology, financing, and capacity-building, in a measurable,
reportable and verifiable manner” (UNFCCC, 2007a). NAMAs include any action that
is aimed to reduce emissions in developing countries and should be part of a national
governmental initiative. They may include policies directed at transformational change
within an economic sector or actions across a variety of sectors with a broader
national focus. NAMAs are defined at two levels: (a) at the national level, as a formal
submission by parties declaring their intent to curb greenhouse gas emissions in
accordance with their capacity and in line with their national development goals; and
(b) at the individual action level, as actions designed to help Parties meet their
national mitigation objectives.26
Nationally appropriate mitigation actions can be a key instrument for
implementing low-carbon sustainable development strategies, as well as for specific
sectorial policies and strategies, and can help leverage financing, technology and
capacity-building. Since 2010, 48 NAMA proposals have been submitted by
developing countries for inclusion in appendix II of the Copenhagen Accord,27 many
23
See also www.icctf.or.id. As of 2012, ICCTF is being funded by: DFID ($9.5 million); AusAID ($1.4);
Swedish International Development Cooperation ($332,000) and United Nations Development
Programme ($88,000). Exact breakdowns can be found at www.icctf.or.id/finance-and-performance/
read/29/funding-status-2012.
24
See also www.bccrf-bd.org.
25
The main sources of the Chinese fund are national revenues from Chinese CDM projects and interest
earned from its operation. See www.cdmfund.org/eng/index.aspx and The Case of China CDM Fund.
Available from http://adaptasiapacific.org/events/regional-clinic-design-and-management-nationalclimate-funds; and China Clean Development Mechanism Fund (2011).
26
See http://unfccc.int/focus/mitigation/items/7172.php.
27
See http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_accord/items/5265.php.
92
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
of which are indicated as conditional on receiving appropriate support. Of these, 17
were submitted by Asia-Pacific countries.28 The content of those NAMAs are diverse,
ranging from targets and goals for reducing carbon emissions to specific sectorbased actions that lead to carbon reductions, such as in energy, energy efficiency,
agriculture, forestry, construction and transport sectors. The ESCAP Low Carbon
Green Growth Roadmap for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP, 2012b) highlights lowcarbon development strategies and NAMAs as key tools for green growth and
provides practical examples of potential NAMAs. Although each country has different
priorities in terms of the sectors and technologies needed to achieve the target, many
Asian countries have now set their own target for greenhouse gas emissions or
relevant indicators, including emissions intensity or energy efficiency, and are using
their developed NAMAs as a first step and a key input into developing Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). INDCs not only serve as a
demonstration of national and political commitment, but they also offer the
opportunity to identify and realize non-climate multiple benefits to climate mitigation
and adaptation action. Such strong signals and clear communication of objectives
from countries on their intended actions to climate mitigation and adaptation can
stimulate climate relevant investments, technological innovation and participation by
non-government stakeholders.
Finally, national development banks are considered key players in climate
finance, given their capacity to leverage international funding and increase its impact
and effectiveness, thanks to their field knowledge, expertise and innovative financing
schemes. Furthermore, their capacity to access and coordinate international climate
finance represents a key element for enhancing developing countries’ effectiveness in
combating climate change. Thus, collaboration with local financial institutions and
finance ministries has become an essential precondition to ensure that climate
finance is used efficiently to catalyse both public and private climate finance
investments and promote low-carbon green economies.29 Public financial institutions,
such as national development banks and central banks, can serve as effective change
agents in advancing environmental sustainability solutions that can help overcome the
dilemma of pursuing green policies without sacrificing economic growth in developing
28
Afghanistan, Armenia, Bhutan, China, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Mongolia,
Papua New Guinea, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Tajikistan and Thailand are countries that have set
NAMAs, according to the UNFCCC web page. While there may be additional NAMAs this report takes the
UNFCCC page as the final count. Available from http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_accord/
items/5265.php. Viet Nam and Malaysia also made pledges at Copenhagen (2009). Available from
www.adbi.org/files/2013.06.28.book.low.carbon.green.growth.asia.pdf.
29
See, for example, information pertaining to the meeting entitled “The Role of National Development
Banks in Mobilizing International Climate Finance”, which was held in Washington, D.C. on 18 and 19
April 2012. Available from http://events.iadb.org/calendar/eventDetail.aspx?lang=En&id=3472.
93
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
countries. Thus, both national development banks and central banks should not miss
the opportunity to focus on priority change programmes regarding three pillars,
namely monetary policy, which entails encouraging innovation and adoption of green
technologies; banking supervision, which concerns the exploration of both costs and
opportunities arising from climate change for financial institutions; and payment
systems, which point at ensuring eco-friendly products for payment systems (Lim,
2010). Within the Asia-Pacific region, several countries have been active in pursuing
policies to promote green banking. Among them are Bangladesh, China, Indonesia
and the Republic of Korea (ESCAP, 2014).
IV. THE WAY FORWARD FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
The extent of public and private climate finance needed in the Asia-Pacific
region is not known because of lack of reliable data, however, it is clear that
substantial gaps for financing climate mitigation and adaptation action exist. Given
the impact climate change is expected to have on the region, mobilizing adequate
financing is a priority for the region. In the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the need for transformations
in economic, social, technological, and political decisions and actions to enable
climate-resilient pathways for sustainable development was emphasized (IPCC, 2014,
pp. 1-32). The analysis of relevant country-level initiatives suggests that some key
strategies can be identified for the Asia-Pacific region with regard to climate finance,
are further elaborated below.
Aligning climate finance and financing for sustainable development
While countries in the region urgently need to mobilize the necessary climate
finance in order to limit warming to two degrees Celsius and adapt to the impacts of
unavoidable climate change, the region also faces a myriad of sustainable
development challenges that must be equally prioritized. This includes not only
international-level commitments, such as those proposed by the Open Working Group
on Sustainable Development, and the outcomes of negotiations for the United
Nations 2030 Agenda or Sustainable Development, which was adopted on 25
September 2015, but importantly, national and regional sustainable development
priorities.
Aligning climate finance and sustainable development finance is, therefore, key
to effectively addressing both concerns, particularly as a number of benefits can be
derived in terms of sustainable development from climate mitigation and adaptation
actions, and vice-versa. This alignment is considered to have positive effects on the
region as “it results in a more efficient use of financial and human resources than if
94
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
climate change and development projects are designed and implemented separately”
(Haites, 2014, p. 43). Sustainable development projects have the potential of being
adapted to climate change, while at the same time mitigation and adaptation
measures can be conceived in a way that yields sustainable development benefits.
Pursuing a national sustainable development strategy that is focused on low-carbon
development is one such way to overcome the perceived trade-offs between
investing in climate finance and investments in sustainable development (Haites,
2014). In the Asia-Pacific region, low-carbon green growth has been identified as one
such strategy that aligns climate and sustainable development objectives.
Redirecting national public finance towards climate change and sustainable
development through low-carbon development strategies
Acknowledgement of the need to align sustainable development and climate
finance will prompt the question of how to invest additional resources in order to
achieve both ends. Governments are emerging as key players in climate financing —
facilitating frameworks for climate action and investment through development of
appropriate national policy and institutional frameworks, redirecting investments
towards climate mitigation and adaptation, and incentivising low-carbon investments
in infrastructure and industry through national development and finance institutions.
In order to cover additional investments, appropriate policies and incentives
should be pursued at the national level to leverage the significant financial resources
that are available to the region. Public financial institutions should facilitate a
transition to low-carbon and greener economies based on national policy frameworks
through developing new incentives and reorienting existing public resources to
greener activities.
A successful policy framework together with government incentives and shared
initiatives could prove fundamental in the region’s transition to a sustainable lowcarbon green economy. It is estimated that more than $7 trillion in foreign exchange
reserves and more than $2.5 trillion in sovereign wealth funds are available to the
Asia-Pacific region. Overall, countries in Asia and the Pacific have among the highest
savings in the world. As a result, there is great potential to use the region’s savings,
which is currently largely invested outside the region.30 Making only some of those
resources available for development in the region would go a long way towards
attaining climate and sustainable development objectives: using 5 per cent of the
currently available Asia-Pacific regional public savings could generate more than $350
30
Most of the region’s reserves, for instance, are invested in low-yielding securities in advanced
economies, particularly in United States dollar treasury securities.
95
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
billion of additional resources. National development banks are beginning to establish
specialized climate finance facilities to address mitigation and adaptation measures.
Particularly, climate bonds are expected to become a growing trend (Buchner and
others, 2013; USAID, 2013).
Mobilizing national private sector and non-government climate finance flows
Despite the key role of public institutions, it is clear that the public sector alone
will not be able to mobilize the financial flows required to achieve mitigation and
adaptation objectives. An ADB study in 2009 estimated an investment need of
$8 trillion for infrastructure alone (ADB and ADBI, 2009). Other estimates for
investments to provide a robust system of social protection range between 5 and
8 per cent of GDP (ESCAP, 2013). Though national development banks are emerging
as leaders in climate finance mobilization, equal attention must be directed to
facilitating and incentivizing private sector finance flows for mitigation and adaptation
efforts. Non-government sources are most likely to contribute an increasing share of
both sustainable development and climate finance.
Domestic capital may be mobilized from different sources, such as private
investors, commercial banks and public capital markets. The actual capacity of
capital markets is to a large extent determined by the level of economic development
of a country, and the national institutional and policy incentives that direct
investments towards climate change mitigation and adaptation projects. The main
challenge to be addressed in this sector is to shift these investments to low-carbon
alternatives. There is also a growing need for governments to provide incentives and
mitigate risks for private equity funds to invest more robustly in climate friendly lowcarbon development initiatives. To this end, policy certainty becomes crucial
(UNFCCC, 2007b). Barriers specific to green investments have been identified, and
include: market, institutional and policy failures that make green investments
unattractive (price-gap); high risks perceptions on green markets that have long
payback period, mainly due to uncertainties and lack of information (time-gap);
absence of policy and/or regulatory measures to internalize climate change-related
externalities (knowledge gap); low access to finance in developing countries and least
developed countries in particular; and the instability of the financial systems in those
countries (UNEP, 2012). Addressing this “time gap”, “price-gap”, “knowledge gap”
and other challenges between short-term costs and long-term benefits of green
investments requires collaborative action between governments and the private
sector to overcome the present financial barriers and risks that restrict capital flows
into green projects for climate change, thereby leading to increased investment.
While there is no one-size-fits-all policy prescription that applies to all parts of
the world, common key areas to be addressed include the development of effective
96
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
policies to create investment-grade environments or to compensate for market
failures, and securing predictability and policy-certainty for investors (Maheshwari,
Miller and Patel, 2013).
Regional and subregional cooperation and support from the international
community
Financing for sustainable development is important in Asia and the Pacific in
the light of the region’s vast population, persistent high levels of poverty and the
adverse environmental impacts associated with its rapid development. Greater efforts
must be made to invest existing resources within the region. However, it will also be
critical to raise additional resources, as outlined above. South-South cooperation,
triangular cooperation and regional cooperation will form further critical
complementary elements of a financial strategy in support of sustainable
development in Asia and the Pacific.
The Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific is leading the
way for improved regional integration and cooperation. In that regard, in the Bangkok
Declaration on Regional Cooperation and Integration in Asia and the Pacific31 it was
emphasized that “fostering trade, investment, economic and development
cooperation among countries in Asia and the Pacific can create opportunities not only
for supporting economic growth but also for achieving wider developmental
objectives”.32 The Commission, in the resolution, resolved to work together to pursue
enhanced regional economic cooperation and integration in the following four areas:
(a) moving towards the formation of an integrated market; (b) the development of
seamless connectivity across the region; (c) enhancing financial cooperation for,
among other things, closing infrastructure gaps across countries in the region and
exploring the possibility of providing liquidity support; and (d) increasing economic
and technical cooperation to address shared vulnerabilities and risks. The Working
Group on Shared Vulnerabilities and Risks subsequently launched proposed key
streams of action, which included, among them, the strengthening science-policypractice interface and the leveraging of economic opportunities that could arise from
addressing sources of risk and vulnerabilities for including climate change adaptation
efforts.
In addition, ESCAP has been working with countries in the region to develop
and integrate low-carbon and sustainable development strategies into national
frameworks and to enhance regional cooperation to deliver on sustainability
31
E/ESCAP/RES/70/1.
32
Ibid.
97
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
objectives. Low Carbon Green Growth approaches to policy development can help
countries to strategize appropriate development pathways across key sectors, such
as urban development, transportation, water and energy. Low Carbon Green Growth
entails instituting key budget and system reforms that, despite minimal technology
and financial support, can help place developing countries on a leapfrogging path
towards achieving sustainable development and reaching their climate targets.
Subregional organizations are increasingly leveraging the benefits of
cooperation to address the large gaps in finance and action in the region on mitigation
and adaptation. Subregional frameworks for action on climate change can provide
a unified vision for countries of similar circumstance and geographic proximity to
identify key priorities in line with national development strategies, develop win-win
partnerships, and take action collectively to maximize impact and learning. By
articulating a unified policy vision on climate change for the subregion, international
and other climate finance actors can strategically channel resources to tackle priority
issues. This includes financing from national public, private and other nongovernment actors. A subregional strategic vision can support improved trade and
knowledge exchange, help to open up sustainable and climate investment
opportunities across markets, and minimize “first-mover” risk. Also, importantly,
subregional consensus can ensure that important issues of concern are raised
effectively at the global negotiations.
V. CONCLUSIONS
There is a widening gap in the Asia-Pacific region between the amount of
climate finance directed towards adaptation and mitigation of climate change and the
amount of finance necessary to address these and sustainable development issues.
Despite concerted efforts at the international level, climate finance mobilized by
international public sources will never reach the levels required to meet investment
costs to transform economies in the region to resource-efficient, low-carbon models.
However, countries in the Asia-Pacific region have at their disposal a number of tools
that can be utilized in addition to international finance and capacity support delivered
by the international community and United Nations organizations to meet this growing
demand for climate finance. The present paper has offered an overview of both the
global and the Asia-Pacific climate finance landscape, thus highlighting how countries
in the region are already leveraging the force of national low-carbon and climate
resilient development policies to mobilize and redirect national public climate finance,
as well as to incentivize private and other non-government financial flows towards
low-carbon development.
98
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Aligning climate and sustainable development national strategies, including
through national low-carbon green growth sustainable development strategies, can
transform the deficit of climate finance from a burden to a potential opportunity to
facilitate a transformation in the region to ensure poverty reduction and economic
growth. Aligned national strategies and supporting policy frameworks and
interventions can help to incentivize action from a wide range of public and private
stakeholders and mobilize adequate investments in climate and sustainable
development in the region.
As the world began moving towards a binding global agreement on climate
change at the UNFCCC COP 21 in Paris in December 2015, the Asia-Pacific region
has emerged as a key driver for mitigation and innovator for adaptation. Subregional
and regional frameworks can help to coordinate national actions, facilitate information
and capacity exchanges, and strategically orient climate finance towards priority
areas for mitigation and adaptation. In addition, regional cooperation can provide the
common frameworks to facilitate information, low-carbon market and trade network
development, and technology exchanges among countries in the Asia-Pacific region
as they work towards the common goal of limiting global warming.
99
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
REFERENCES
Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2012). Green Urbanization in Asia: Key Indicators for Asia and the
Pacific 2012. Manila
(2013a). Asian Development Outlook 2013 Highlights. Manila. Available from www.adb.org/
sites/default/files/publication/30205/ado2013-highlights_0.pdf.
(2013b). Energy Outlook for Asia and the Pacific. Manila. Available from www.adb.org/
publications/energy-outlook-asia-and-pacific-2013.
(2014). Multilateral development banks agree to reinforce climate financing in advance of
UN Summit. Available from www.adb.org/news/multilateral-development-banks-agreereinforce-climate-financing-advance-un-summit.
Asian Development Bank (ADB), and Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) (2009). Infrastructure
for a Seamless Asia. Tokyo: ADBI. Available from www.adbi.org/files/2009.08.31.book.
infrastructure.seamless.asia.pdf.
Bangladesh (2012). Bangladesh Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review. Dhaka: Ministry
of Planning. Available from http://climatefinance-developmenteffectiveness.org/
publications.
Barnard, Sam, and others (2014). Climate finance regional briefing: Asia and the Pacific. Climate
Finance Fundamentals, No. 8 (November). London: Overseas Development Institute.
(2015). Climate finance regional briefing: Asia. Climate Finance Fundamentals, No. 8
(December). London, Overseas Development Institute.
Buchner, Barbara, and others (2013). Global landscape of climate finance 2013. Climate Policy
Initiative. Available from http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/global-landscape-ofclimate-finance-2013/.
(2014). Global landscape of climate finance 2014. Climate Policy Initiative. Available from
http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/global-landscape-of-climate-finance-2014/.
(2015). Global landscape of climate finance 2015. Climate Policy Initiative. Available from
http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/global-landscape-of-climate-finance-2015/.
Canales Trujillo, Nella, and others (2015). Climate finance thematic briefing: adaptation finance.
Climate Finance Fundamentals, No. 3 (December). London: Overseas Development
Institute.
Caravani, Alice, and others (2014). Climate finance thematic briefing: adaptation finance. Climate
Finance Fundamentals, No. 3 (December). London: Overseas Development Institute.
China Clean Development Mechanism Fund (2011). China CDM Fund Annual Report 2011. Beijing.
Flynn, Cassie (2011). Blending Climate Finance Through National Climate Funds: A Guidebook for
the Design and Establishment of National Funds to Achieve Climate Change Priorities.
New York: UNDP.
Haites, Erik (2014). Aligning climate finance and development finance for Asia and the Pacific:
potential and prospects. Sustainable Development Working Paper Series, No. 33. Manila:
ADB.
Halimanjaya, Aidy, and others (2014). Climate finance thematic briefing: mitigation finance. Climate
Finance Fundamentals, No. 4 (November). London: Overseas Development Institute.
100
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2012). Managing the Risks of Extreme Events
and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation: Special Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, C.B. Field and others, eds. Cambridge and
New York: Cambridge University Press.
(2014). Summary for policymakers. In Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and
Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, C.B. Field and
others, eds. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2015). World Energy Outlook Special Report. Energy and Climate
Change. Paris. Available from www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/weo2015-special-report-energy-climate-change.html.
Jorgensen, Hugh (2013). The G20, climate financing and the UNFCCC COP21 meeting in Paris.
Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy. Available from www.lowyinstitute.org/files/
jorgensen_the_g20_climate_financing_and_the_unfccc_cop21_meeting_in_paris.pdf.
Lim, C.S. Vincent (2010). Greener central banks: exploring possibilities. Staff Paper, No. 76. Malaysia:
the South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) Research and Training Centre.
Maheshwari, Aditi, Alan Miller, and Shilpa Patel (2013). Mobilizing Public and Private Funds for
Inclusive Green Growth Investment in Developing Countries: A Stocktaking Report
Prepared for the G20 Development Working Group. Washington, D.C.: International
Finance Corporation.
Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) (2014). Joint Report on MDB Climate Finance 2013. Available
from www.eib.org/projects/documents/joint-report-on-mdb-climate-finance-2013.htm.
Nakhooda, S., and others (2014), Climate Finance: Is It Making a Difference? A Review of the
Effectiveness of Multilateral Climate Funds. London: Overseas Development Institute.
Available from www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/
9359.pdf.
Nepal, National Planning Commission (2011). Nepal Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional
Review (CPEIR). Kathmandu. Available from http://climatefinance-development
effectiveness.org/sites/default/files/documents/03_02_15/Nepal_CPEIR_Report_2011.pdf.
Norman, Marigold, and others (2014). Climate finance thematic briefing: REDD+ finance. Climate
Finance Fundamentals, No. 5 (December). London: Overseas Development Institute.
Available from www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/
9330.pdf.
(2015). Climate finance thematic briefing: REDD+ finance. Climate Finance Fundamentals,
No. 5 (December). London: Overseas Development Institute. Available from hwww.odi.org/
sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/10054.pdf.
Overseas Development Institute (ODI) (2012a). Cambodia Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional
Review. Bangkok: UNDP Regional Centre for Asia-Pacific. Available from www.climate
finance-developmenteffectiveness.org/sites/default/files/documents/25_02_58/Cambodia_
CPEIR.pdf.
(2012b). Samoa Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review. Bangkok: UNDP
Regional Centre for Asia-Pacific. Available from www.climatefinance-development
effectiveness.org/sites/default/files/documents/03_02_15/cpeir%20samoa%20 content_
for%20web.pdf.
(2012c). Thailand. Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review. Available from
www.climatefinance-developmenteffectiveness.org/sites/default/files/documents/
03_02_15/thailand%20cpeir%20report_final_24%20june.pdf.
101
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Schalatek, Liane, and others (2012). Climate finance thematic briefing: adaptation finance. Climate
Finance Fundamentals, No. 3 (November). London: Overseas Development Institute.
Available from www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/
7910.pdf.
United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) (2012a). Building
Resilience to Natural Disasters and Major Economic Crises. Bangkok.
(2012b). Low Carbon Green Growth Roadmap for Asia and the Pacific - Turning Resource
Constraints and the Climate Crisis into Economic Growth Opportunities. Bangkok.
Available from www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/LGCC%20summary%20for%20
policymakers%202012.pdf.
(2013). Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific: Forward-looking
Macroeconomic Policies for Inclusive and Sustainable Development. Sales No. E.13.II.F.2.
Available from www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Economic-and-Social-Survey-of-Asiaand-the-Pacific-2013_1.pdf.
(2014). Green banking policy: the role of financial sector actors. EDD Briefing Note,
October. Bangkok.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2013). Global forum summary: using country
systems to manage climate change finance. Paper prepared for the Global Forum on
Climate Change Finance and Development Effectiveness. Incheon, Republic of Korea, 2-3
December. Available from www.oecd.org/dac/environment-development/Summary%20
of%20the%20Global%20Forum%20on%20Use%20of%20Country%20Systems%20
to%20Manage%20Climate%20Finance.pdf.
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (2012). Finance. Green Economy Briefing Paper,
June. Available from www.unep.org/greeneconomy/Portals/88/documents/GE_FINANCE%
202juin.pdf.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2007a). Decision 1/CP.13 Bali
Action Plan. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1. Available from http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/
cop13/eng/06a01.pdf#page=3.
(2007b). Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change. Bonn. Available from
https://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/application/pdf/
background_paper.pdf.
(2008). Investment and financial flows to address climate change: an update. FCCC/TP/
2008/7. Available from unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/tp/07.pdf.
(2014a). Focus: climate finance. Available from http://unfccc.int/focus/climate_finance/
items/7001.php#intro. Accessed 3 November 2015.
(2014b). UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance: 2014 Biennial Assessment and
Overview of Climate Finance Flows Report. Bonn. Available from http://unfccc.int/files/
cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/standing_committee/application/pdf/
2014_biennial_assessment_and_overview_of_climate_finance_flows_report_web.pdf.
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2013). Low Emissions Asian
Development (LEAD) Program: Fast Out of the Gate – How Developing Asian Countries Can
Prepare to Access International Green Growth Financing. Bangkok: USAID Regional
Development Mission for Asia.
World Bank (2010). Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities: A Synthesis Report
Washington, D.C.
102
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
TRADE FINANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
Sailendra Narain*
Over the years, the Asia-Pacific region has maintained its global lead
position as the largest user of trade finance. Actively involved in
international trade, Asian and Pacific small and medium-sized enterprises
have been important contributors for sustaining the region’s lead position.
Juxtaposed to the interregional high position enjoyed by the Asia-Pacific
region as the largest user of trade finance in the world market, trade within
the region is facing a persistent demand-supply mismatch and widening of
trade finance gaps. Small and medium-sized enterprises, despite being the
largest contributors to Asian international trade, are more adversely
affected than large companies, giving rise to operational constraints and
challenges. This has prompted some policymakers, national governments
and international organizations to address the issues, invite suggestions to
halt the persistent trend of the widening of trade finance gaps and take
suitable measures to ease the flow of trade finance.
Recognizing the importance and significant role of trade finance as an
engine of growth, this paper reviews the status of and constraints to easy
access to trade finance in Asia and the Pacific; assesses trade finance gaps
estimated by institutional surveys; and identifies emerging issues and
challenges, especially those faced by the small and medium-sized
enterprise sector. Analysing the resultant policy implications, the paper
finally brings to the forefront a set of remedial measures, presents
recommendations together with a road map for policymakers to consider
for implementation. The recommendations are innovative and suggestive of
national action and regional cooperation.
JEL classification: L53, G01, G28.
Keywords: SME trade finance, SME financing, SME sustainable development.
* Sailendra Narain, PhD, Chairman, Centre for SME Growth and Development Finance, India. The
author would like to express his gratitude and sincere thanks to Mia Mikic, Marc Proksch, Yann L. Duval,
Masato Abe and Mona Narain for reviewing and editing the paper and providing comments with valuable
suggestions.
103
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
I. INTRODUCTION
The flow of bank-intermediated trade finance is falling short of meeting the
growing demands in the Asia-Pacific region. While the Asia-Pacific region has been
the largest user of trade finance globally, the persistent trade finance gaps in the
recent past have been inhibiting business development, job creation and growth,
especially for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Even with its large presence
and sizable contribution to the Asia-Pacific economy, the SME sector has been more
adversely affected than the large companies by the gap in bank-intermediated finance
(ADB, 2014). The problems are continuing and the gap is widening. This has
prompted some policymakers to identify the roadblocks and find ways and means to
meet the challenges. The present paper reviews the status of trade finance in the
Asia-Pacific region, highlights the specific issues (obstacles and the needs) faced by
SMEs with regard to accessing trade finance and presents a set of recommendations
for national action and regional cooperation.
Recognizing the importance and significant role of trade finance as an engine
of growth, this paper proceeds with a review of trade finance in the Asia-Pacific
region — its status and constrains, followed by an assessment of trade finance gaps
identified by institutional surveys, the resultant policy implications, emerging issues
and the challenges, especially those faced by the SME sector, and finally, brings to
the forefront a set of recommendations along with a road map for policymakers to
consider. In addition, a few major issues are presented for thinking ahead. The
recommendations are innovative, calling for much-needed conceptual, systemic and
operational changes to be implemented comprehensively at the national level with
a built-in regional cooperation mechanism.
II. TRADE FINANCE IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC:
MODALITIES, STATUS AND CONSTRAINTS
Asia-Pacific international trade
Before an analysis is made of the trade finance situation in the Asia-Pacific
region, it is perhaps useful to review the current trade situation in the region.
Contrary to the global lead position retained by the Asia-Pacific region in terms
of using trade finance, growth in merchandize goods exports in the region slowed
gradually from 29.9 per cent in 2010 to 19.5 per cent in 2011 and then to 2.2 per cent
in 2012 before reaching a new low of 2.1 per cent in 2013. A similar slowdown from
4.3 per cent in 2012 to 2.3 per cent in 2013 was recorded in the imports of
merchandise goods. Despite the gradual slowdown, the region accounted for 36 per
104
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
cent of global merchandise exports and 36.1 per cent of global merchandise imports,
“making it the biggest trading region in the world, in terms of both imports and
exports, overtaking Europe in 2012” (ESCAP, 2014, p. 28). However, the current
slowdown of economic growth and trade in China is likely to put a damper on an
increase in the intraregional trade volume.
The ESCAP Statistical Yearbook 2014 observes that “in order to enhance the
competitiveness of a country in the world of globalized production, focus needs to be
placed on raising domestic value-added rather than just increasing gross exports”.
Overview of trade finance
During the period 2013-2014, despite witnessing phases of both “ups and
downs”, the Asia-Pacific region remained the largest user of trade finance and trade
credit insurance globally (CGFS, 2014, p. 9 and graph 2, p.11).
Over the years, the Asia-Pacific region has been able to enhance and widen
the use of trade finance for business. The progressive increase in trade finance by
volume and demand is indicative of the importance the region attaches to trade
finance as one of the contributory factors and prime movers to growth.
Trade finance mechanisms provide a combination and degree of support in the
following four areas (ITC, 2009):
(1)
Payment facilitation, enabling secure and timely payment across
borders, for example, through proven communication methods, such as
SWIFT 1 (a secure bank-to-bank messaging system used to transmit
bank instruments, such as letters of credit, as well as payments between
financial institutions).
(2)
Financing to one or more parties in a trade transaction, whether it is the
importer, exporter, or one of the banks.
(3)
Risk mitigation, either directly through the features available in a trade
financing mechanism or indirectly through insurance or guarantee
products designed to meet the needs of importers and exporters.
(4)
Providing information on the movement of goods and/or the status of
the related financial flow.
The matrix of trade finance instruments commonly used is given below
(table 1).
1
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication.
105
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Table 1. Matrix of trade finance instruments commonly used for raising capital,
facilitating payments and mitigating risks
Raising working capital for exports: debt financing; asset-based financing; export factoring; and
leasing
Facilitating payments: cash-in-advance; letter of credit (L/C); documentary collection; and open
accounts
Mitigating risks: export credit guarantee; export credit insurance; forfeiting; and hedging.
Source:
Compiled by the author.
Note:
Warehouse receipts are also in use as specialized financial instrument for commodity trade.
The role of the banking sector and other actors in trade finance
Trade finance assistance is mainly provided by the commercial banks and
development financial institutions (DFIs). Bank-intermediated trade finance acts as the
lifeline for trade and commerce, especially in the field of international trade. Banks are
the main providers of trade finance in various forms of working capital at a much
reduced payment risk as compared to the finance from non-institutional sources.
Inter-firm trade credit is slowly emerging as a non-banking channel of trade finance. A
firm’s ability to directly extend credit, however, primarily depends on interfirm
business relationships with trust and is generally backed by purchasing trade credit
insurance to mitigate payment risks.
A commercial bank acts as a trusted third party to guarantee delivery of goods
and services from the exporter and payment by the importer. Many Asia-Pacific
countries have set up national SME Banks, such as BRAC Bank-Bangladesh, Small
Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI), Philippines SME Bank Inc., SME Bank
of Thailand, which, among other things, extend trade finance and offer risk mitigating
products (see Abe and others, 2012).
An overview of the schemes and services offered by SIDBI provides examples
of best practices in SME trade financing. SIDBI, in addition to providing financing in
general and resource support to the banking sector and financial institutions, offers
a full range of traditional and innovative trade finance products/services, including
business development services to the SME sector at large. It has successfully
implemented an innovative collateral-free and third party guarantee-free credit
guarantee scheme for the micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in collaboration
with the Government of India, which had been in operation for about 15 years (box 1).
106
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Box 1. Trade finance schemes, products and services of the Small Industries
Development Bank of India for small and medium-sized enterprises
The Small Industries Development Bank of India, established in April 1990
under an act of the Indian Parliament, is the “principal financial institution for the
promotion, financing and development of the micro, small and medium enterprise
sector and for coordination of the functions of the institutions engaged in similar
activities”. Facilitating access to finance by SMEs has been one of the prime
areas of concern for SIDBI. The bank has therefore designed a number of relevant
financial products and services to meet the demand for finance.
The Small Industries Development Bank of India, in addition to various financial
schemes and business development services (BDS), has effectively implemented
trade finance schemes for SMEs. Some of the widely used trade finance schemes
operated by SIDBI for SMEs are trade financing and factoring services, lines of
credit in foreign currency to commercial banks (LOCFC) for on-lending to exporting
SMEs, export houses/trading houses sourcing their export requirements from micro,
small and medium-sized enterprise receivable finance scheme and discounting
scheme.
The collateral-free and third party guarantee-free Credit Guarantee Fund
Scheme for Micro and Small Enterprises is an innovative and successful credit
risk mitigation initiative of SIDBI. This solves the problem of the inability of SMEs
to meet the most vexing demand for collateral and guarantees to access bank
finance. The scheme helps small entrepreneurs to obtain collateral free loans
(including trade finance) of up to 10 million Indian rupee (Rs) ($147,000). As of the
end of January 2013, more than one million guarantees (by number of entrepreneurs)
for an aggregate loan amount that exceeded Rs480 billion had been provided
under the Credit Guarantee Fund Trust for Micro and Small Enterprises (CGTMSE).
Under the Union Budget 2013/14, the establishment of the Credit Guarantee
Fund for Factoring was announced with a fund of Rs5 billion. This fund will further
pave the way for orderly growth of factoring services and provide an alternative to
bank-intermediated trade credit.
The main channel for institutional trade finance to micro, small and medium
enterprises is the commercial banking sector. SIDBI serves the sector by providing
resource support to a country-wide banking sector network of more than 80,000
branches. It is ranked among the top 30 development banks of the world as rated
by The Banker, London.
Source:
www.sidbi.in.
107
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
In the Asia-Pacific region, there are four common methods of payments
available to firms engaged in international trade: (a) cash-in-advance, (b) letters of
credit (L/Cs), (c) documentary collection, and (d) open account (table 2).
Table 2. Methods of payment in international transactions
Method of
payment
Definition
Applicability
Risk
distribution
Pros/cons for
exporter
Cash in
advance
Full payment
prior to
shipment
Recommended for
high risk export
markets
Exporter is
exposed to
virtually no
risk; burden
is greatest on
the importer
Pros: Payment before
shipment, eliminates
risks of non-payment
Cons: May lose
customers to competition
over payment terms
Letter of
credit (L/C)
A commitment
by a bank on
behalf of the
buyer that
payment will
be made to the
exporter when
the terms and
conditions of
the L/C are met
Recommended in
new and
established trade
relationships;
exporter should
be confident of the
credit worthiness
of buyer’s bank
Evenly
spread
between
seller and
buyer if
conditions
are adhered
to
Pros: Transaction is
secured by a third party.
Goods against payment.
Cons: Complex and
labour-intensive process.
Relatively expensive.
Documentary
collection
Exporter
entrusts the
collection of
payment to
a bank with
payment
instructions
Recommended in
established trade
relationships and
in stable markets
Riskier for
the exporter
but cheaper
than L/Cs
Pros: Payment is made
with the assistance of
a bank. The process is
simple, fast and less
costly than L/Cs
Cons: Bank role is limited,
payment is not guaranteed
Open
account
Payment by
importer after
receiving the
goods, usually
within a
timeframe of
30 to 90 days
Recommended in
low-risk trading
relationships or in
a competitive
market to win new
customers (should
be combined with
one or more trade
finance techniques)
Significant
risk to
exporter
because
buyer could
default
on payment
after goods
are shipped
Pros: Boosts
competitiveness
in the global market;
helps establish and
maintain a successful
trade relationship
Cons: Significant risk of
non-payment; additional
costs associated with
risk mitigation measures
Source:
108
ITC (2009, table 3.1, pp. 35-36).
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Firms in the Asia-Pacific region have been relying mainly on banks’ short term
maturity products, namely L/Cs and documentary collection for their export
transactions. This mode of international payment obligations has so far been
considered as a liquid, low-cost payment risk, time-tested and well-functioning mode
for overseas business transactions. However, in the changing global market and with
growing demand, heavy reliance only on these traditional modes of payment is no
longer sufficient to meet market requirements and unmet credit needs of SMEs.
Therefore, the wider use of interfirm transactions, such as an “open account system”
backed by suitable risk mitigation mechanism and other support mechanisms, is
necessary.
Market size of trade finance: global and regional
There is no comprehensive single source to determine and measure the global
and regional size of trade finance and the composition of the trade finance market.
Different sources use their own modalities and conduct surveys to measure the
bank-intermediated trade finance size, structure and developments, including:
•
The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
(SWIFT) provides a window to trends related to documentary credits,
such as L/Cs. It helps to track high frequency global and regional
transactions.
•
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) collects data from
a number of banks considered to be the global leaders in providing
trade finance. Currently, the ICC Annual Global Trade Finance Survey is
the main broad industry document for exploring drivers and trends (ICC,
2014a).
•
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in conjunction with the Bankers’
Association for Finance and Trade (BAFT) and the International Financial
Services Association (IFSA), undertook a series of surveys (2009, 2010,
and 2011) on volumes, pricing and drivers in the trade finance market.
Another survey was undertaken by ICC in 2011 in collaboration with IMF.
•
The Institute of International Finance (IIF) undertakes the quarterly
Emerging Markets Bank Lending Conditions Survey and currently
collects responses on trade finance markets from 130 banks. IIF
conducts a quarterly survey among banks based in five emerging
markets regions: Emerging Asia, Latin America, Emerging Europe,
Middle East and North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. The available
statistics, however, show significant variation across countries and
regions (see www.iif.com).
109
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Global market
The Committee on the Global Finance System (CGFS) (CGFS, 2014, table 2,
p. 10), based on national statistics, SWIFT and the ICC Trade Register Survey,
estimated that trade finance directly supported about one third of global trade, with
L/Cs covering about one sixth of total trade. The Survey mentions that the
bank-intermediated products are primarily used to finance trade involving emerging
markets economies, particularly in Asia. Global banks appear to provide about one
quarter to a third of the global trade finance, and almost half of their exposure is to
firms in emerging Asia. The global market size of bank-intermediated trade finance
was estimated by CGFS to amount to $6.5 trillion-8 trillion in 2011, of which around
$2.8 trillion was provided through L/Cs. IMF, jointly with BAFT and IFSA (2009; 2010;
2011), estimated that about 40 per cent of global trade was supported by
bank-intermediated trade finance, while industry studies (ICC, 2009) estimated it to be
about 20 per cent.
Regional: Asia-Pacific market
Data of individual economies show a wide variation in the measurements of
trade finance stocks and annual flows, and the percentage of merchandise trade
covered by trade finance, which ranges from 2 per cent for Mexico to more than
40 per cent for China (47 per cent), India (41 per cent), Hong Kong, China (29-38 per
cent), and the Republic of Korea (56 per cent) as compared to global estimates at
36-40 per cent. The percentages of measured intensity of trade finance over trade
ranged from 29-38 per cent to 56 per cent relating to major Asia-Pacific economies
(table 3).
Table 3. Bank-intermediated trade finance markets in 2011
Country/territory
China
Trade finance
$ billion: stocksa
Trade finance $ billion:
annual flowsb
Percentage of
merchandise tradec
218
871
47
Hong Kong, China
44
131-175
29-38
India
82
164
41
Republic of Korea
76
304
56
Global estimates
1 625-2 100
6 500-8 000
36-40
Source:
ICC; IMF, national data; and CGFS (2014, table 2, p.10).
Notes:
a
Average quarterly stock for 2011.
b
Annual flows for national data are derived by assuming a 90-day maturity of stocks, except in India
(and Mexico) where maturities are known to be six months for India (and 12 months for Mexico).
c
Trade is measured as the average of exports and imports of goods.
110
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Figure 1 shows that the Asia-Pacific region relied most heavily on trade finance
among the regions in the world.
Figure 1. Geographical distribution of trade finance
(as a share of total, in per cent)
50
40
30
20
10
0
Africa
Asia-Pacific
ICC trade register1
Europe
SWIFT2
Latin America
US banks3
Middle East
Trade credit insurance4
North America
Trade5
Source:
Committee on the Global Financial System (2014, p. 11)
Notes:
1
Average from 2008 to 2011.
2
Based on average value of sent and received SWIFT MT700 messages in 2011.
3
The US data capture only lending vis-à-vis non-residents resulting in a low share of US banks’
exposure to North America. Average from 2008 to September 2012.
4
Short term credit insurance from the Berne Union. Average for Q4 2011 to Q1 2013.
5
Merchandise trade (average of imports and exports) from Q1 2008 to Q4 2012.
There are various logistic and economic factors contributing to the higher use
of trade finance in the Asia-Pacific region. Among them are long distance trade
transactions between partners, level of local market efficiency, new trade
relationships, expanded trade with countries with weaker legal and contractual
systems, political risks, historical preferences and costs of operating through L/Cs.
The above-mentioned factors may be more pronounced in countries with foreign
exchange regulations or strict banking regulations.
Users of letters of credit
The ICC Trade Register estimates that about 90 per cent of the L/C
transactions go through SWIFT. As noted before, of the total flow of bankintermediated global trade finance, which was estimated at $6.5 trillion-8 trillion,
about $2.8 trillion was through L/Cs in 2011. The Asia-Pacific region accounted for
more than half of all L/C-related transactions, while Europe accounted for one quarter
111
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
and North America, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East each around 5-10 per
cent. The Asia-Pacific region registered the highest volume of L/Cs used, covering
75 per cent of exports and 68 per cent of imports.
Factoring in the Asia-Pacific region
The overall global factoring volume in 2013 was $3.1 trillion, recording nearly
10 per cent growth. Europe followed by Asia and the Pacific jointly accounting for
about 87 per cent of the global factoring volumes (figure 2). Over the past five years,
the factoring industry has grown annually at a rate of 15 per cent, nearly doubling in
size globally.
Factoring in the Asia-Pacific region is gradually gaining popularity as a product
designed to provide finance to SMEs. Funding is offered by the factoring companies
based upon the accounts receivables created by the client. China and Hong Kong,
China are the Asia-Pacific economies with most factoring facilities.
Figure 2. Global factoring by region
(In billions of Euro)
1%
3%
9%
Europe
2012
2013
% change
1 298
1 354
4.3
Asia
572
599
4.7
Americas
188
192
2.1
23
23
0.0
50
62
24.0
2 132
2 230
4.6
27%
Africa
60%
Others
Total
Europe
Asia
Americas
Africa
Others
Source:
Factors Chain International (2014, table 1, p. 20).
Note:
1 euro = $1.12.
Forfaiting in the Asia-Pacific region
Comparative and comprehensive data are not readily available on the volume
of trade finance transactions through forfaiting in the Asia-Pacific region.
112
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Under the forfaiting system of trade finance, international trade receivables,
such as promissory notes, bills of exchange, receivables and deferred payment under
letters of credit guaranteed or issued by banks, with credit periods ranging from 90
days up to 5 years, are discounted without recourse to the exporter. Over the years,
this facility has emerged as an effective sales tool in the Asia-Pacific region. It
improves cash flows and eliminates risks. A number of major companies have started
to offer forfaiting services in the region. This trend is gaining ground.
Global value chains and Asia-Pacific small and medium-sized enterprises
Most Asia-Pacific economies are well integrated into the global trading system.
The Asia-Pacific region is witnessing a gradual emergence and expansion of global
and regional supply or value chains systems benefitting SMEs. However, the process
in the region is slow.
The term “global value chains” (GVCs) refers to the full range of cross-border,
value-added business activities that are required to bring a product or service from
the conception, design, sourcing raw material, and intermediate inputs stages, to
production, marketing, distribution and supplying the final consumer (ESCAP, 2007).
Small and medium-sized enterprises participate as suppliers, distributors and
business service providers by entering into GVCs. In Asia and the Pacific, both
producer-driven chains and networks, such as Tata Motors and Toyota sourcing
automotive components from a large number of small suppliers, and buyer-driven
chains or networks, such as Levi’s in the apparel market, systems are prevalent.
In the supply chains system, the lead firm decides some of the key details,
including, among them, information pertaining to outsourcing, capacity-building of the
suppliers for quality control and product standardization. SMEs as global suppliers
offer the products and services to the lead firm. The GVC framework offers room for
multiple SMEs to provide services based on their experience and expertise as
suppliers, distributors and business service providers (Abe and others, 2012).
The development of GVCs in Asia and the Pacific provides business
opportunities for export-oriented and supporting industry SMEs (ESCAP, 2009b).
GVCs are expected to provide an efficient network by establishing links with large
enterprises or even with other efficient SMEs. They help to boost the value-added
activities of affiliated SMEs in international trade by providing an established market.
However, Asia-Pacific SMEs currently play a limited role due to low value-addition
and lack of proper networking. SMEs are generally at a disadvantage because of their
limited operational capacity and lack of knowledge necessary to penetrate regional
and global markets (ESCAP, 2007). SMEs in the Asia-Pacific developing countries
typically lack the environment to improve their capacity, including a proper policy and
113
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
regulatory framework, supporting infrastructure, access to finance, a strong
entrepreneurship culture, technology incubation and business development services
(ESCAP, 2009a).
Global value chains are an effective way to expose SMEs to foreign markets.
There are a number of benefits for SMEs to join these chains, but the main advantage
is that GVCs increase SMEs competitiveness and widen the scope of international
trade. Some of the initiatives taken to promote supply chains system-related trade
finance are given below:
For instance, the Global Trade Supplier Finance (GTSF), a $500 million
multicurrency investment and advisory programme, was established by the
International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 2010 (box 2). It has started to show positive
Box 2. The Global Trade Supplier Finance programme
The following paragraphs have been extracted from the IFC-GTSF website.
“GTSF extends and complements the capacity of banks to deliver trade
financing by providing risk mitigation in new or challenging markets
where trade lines may be constrained. IFC issues credit guarantees
where others won’t and supports trade that would not be possible without
an IFC guarantee. Through the Global Trade Finance Program (GTFP)
bank network, local financial institutions (“issuing banks”) can establish
working partnerships with a vast number of major international and regional
banks (“confirming banks”) in the programme, thus broadening access
to finance and reducing cash collateral requirements. GTFP offers
confirming banks partial or full guarantees covering payment risk on
banks in the emerging markets for individual trade-related transactions
evidenced by a variety of underlying instruments, such as L/Cs, traderelated promissory notes, accepted drafts, bills of exchange, guarantees,
bid and performance bonds and advance payment guarantees. Guarantees
are available for all private sector trade transactions that meet eligibility
criteria of IFC. Trade Advisory Services extended by IFC include more
than a dozen technical assistance modules to provide basic and
intermediate trade finance skills for issuing banks.
“The GTSF programme aims to: increase access to finance for suppliers
in emerging markets; maximize inclusion of SMEs and their ability to
access finance at competitive terms; support reduction in financing costs;
and develop market appetite for supplier finance.”
Source:
114
www.ifc.org.
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
results in benefitting SME suppliers from emerging economies. SMEs are increasingly,
though slowly, joining the IFC Global Supply Chain support programme for making
cross-border transactions.
Developing more programmes similar to GTSF seems a workable solution and
an alternate source to ease the pressure on banks’ intermediation. Figure 3 shows the
two GVC-related trade finance programmes of IFC, GTSF discussed above and the
Global Warehouse Finance Program.
Figure 3. The global value chain-related trade finance programmes of the
International Finance Corporation
Global Warehouse Finance Program
IFC
Global Trade Supplier Finance
Program partners
3. IFC channels funding
or guarantees for up to
50% on portfolio of
warehouse receipts
Bank
Program partners cofinance with funding or
counter-guarantees
2. Warehouse receipts
issued by warehouse
Buyer
1. Buyer
uploads
invoices
(automated
process)
2. Supplier views invoices and
requests early payment
of approved
Emerging
invoices
SCF
platform
3. Financier accepts
early payment
requests
5. Financier pays discounted
invoice amount
4. WHR facility
Agricultural
producers
1. Commodities
stored in third-party
warehouse
Storage
company
6. Buyer pays full invoice
amount on due date
(automated transfers
established)
Bank
4. IFC provides funding or
guarantee coverage
IFC
Source:
market
suppliers
Mobilization
Program partners
International Finance Corporation (2012).
Gartner, Inc., a leading information technology research and advisory global
company, in its 2014 annual list of the leading supply chains in the Asia-Pacific
region, ranked “ten of the best supply chains in Asia and the Pacific” key strategies,
initiatives and best practices. Samsung, Lenovo and Toyota ranked as the top three of
the list. These multinational companies are benefitting a large number of SMEs
through their supply chains system.
The above scenario of supply chain position in Asia and the Pacific seems
to offer enough potential and scope to enhance SMEs integration into GVCs. The
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), in its survey Integrating SMEs into Global
Value Chains: Policy Principles and Best Practices, which was published in May 2014
(see Zhang, 2014), observed that SMEs in developed and newly industrialized
economies, particularly in the agriculture and electronics sectors, offer higher
potential to participate in GVCs.
115
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Access to trade finance, both globally as well as in the Asia-Pacific region, has
been the key obstacle for exporting SMEs. More than 60 per cent of the exporting
SMEs in the Asia-Pacific region rely on internal financing. Sources other than
bank-intermediated finance, particularly supply chain financing, is perceived as
advantageous to facilitate the direct export participation of SMEs (see Duval and
Utoktham, 2014).
Inter-firm trade credit
The system of inter-firm trade credit between importers (not necessarily
manufacturers) and exporters is an alternative to trade finance extended by the
banking sector; it is different from credit afforded under supply chains system, which
are operated by large manufacturing companies. The system of inter-firm trade credit
is based on business relationships and trusts. It includes open account transactions
in which goods are shipped in advance of payment, or through cash-in-advance
transactions in which payment is made before shipment. This type of transaction
involves lower fees and has greater flexibility, but higher payment risks. Hence,
reliance on this form of transaction is mostly confined to firms with well-established
commercial relationships. In Viet Nam, the system of inter-firm credit has been in
existence for a long time. A firm trusts its customers enough to offer credit when the
customer finds it hard to locate an alternative supplier. A longer duration trade
relationship is associated with large credit. Customers identified through the business
network receive more credit (see MacMillan and Woodruff, 1999).
Other new non-banking products
Global banks see supply chains finance as an important new area of activity,
and a focal point of current competition. Citing new regulatory demands and high
marginal costs of equity capital, the trade finance industry is experimenting, though
on a limited scale, with new structures and products to distribute trade finance to
non-bank companies.
For instance, the Royal Bank of Scotland introduced a suite of non-traditional
global trade finance products, which provide visibility in supply chains events, such as
the purchase-to-payment and order-to-cash cycles. These products enable access to
liquidity by allowing suppliers to sell credit term invoices, unlocking working capital
while mitigating risks and leveraging the lower cost of capital of a well-rated
purchaser to reduce risk and costs throughout the supply chains. Asset-heavy
companies may have to change their mindset to explore alternative forms of financing
also to supplement their financial requirements to conclude the transactions
efficiently. Those that fail to could be forced to sell assets or face a shut market in the
long run (Narain, 2014).
116
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
III. AN ASSESSMENT OF TRADE FINANCE GAPS
Trade finance gaps, particularly during and after the 2008-2009 global financial
crisis, have become a persistent feature of the global trade regime. The Asia-Pacific
region is also witnessing the same trend of a widening gap; “supply falling short of
demand”. Market gaps for trade finance in the Asia-Pacific region have persisted even
as the global economy has recovered. Anti-money laundering regulations and
companies lacking awareness of trade finance options were significant contributors to
trade finance gaps, as observed by ADB (2014). However, measuring the trade
finance gaps has proved to be a challenge.
The lack of comprehensive data on Asia-Pacific trade finance from a single
source makes it difficult to realistically assess the demand-supply constraints and
gaps. For the purpose of making an Asia-Pacific trade finance gap assessment, this
paper, heavily relies on two important sources: (1) 2014 Rethinking Trade & Finance
(prepared by ICC and released in June 2014) and (2) ADB-Trade Finance Gap,
Growth, and Jobs Survey 2013, released in December 2014 (the first series relates to
the year 2012).
ICC-Rethinking Trade & Finance 2014
The ICC-Rethinking Trade & Finance 2014 report brought out three major
findings from its survey participation of 298 banks in 127 countries:
(a)
In comparison to the previous survey of 2012, there was a more positive
global outlook regarding the availability of trade finance in 2013.
However, 55 per cent of the surveyed banks believed that there was a
shortfall of trade finance globally (ICC, 2014b, pp. 94-96).
(b)
A gap between supply and demand persisted, even though more than
80 per cent of the respondents reported an increase in the number of
credit lines offered in 2013. Trade finance constraints became more
pronounced and concentrated in emerging markets for want of
necessary skills to propose bankable propositions by entrepreneurs,
which ultimately led to a high rate of rejections.
(c)
Financial crimes triggering anti-money laundering/know your client
(AML/KYC) requirements proved to be impediments to trade finance.
Among firm types, SMEs were the most negatively affected.
The key findings of the ICC Global Trade & Finance Survey 2014 are
summarized below (box 3).
117
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Box 3. Key findings of the ICC Global Trade & Finance Survey 2014
•
While there are signs that trade finance is more available, the reported increase
is marginal.
•
The shortage of trade finance for international trade remains a major challenge
for economic recovery and development.
•
To finance exports and imports traders, SMEs in emerging markets, in particular,
continue to rely on loans/overdrafts in local currency (rather than in foreign
currency), restricting their ability to trade at optimum levels during challenging
times caused by volatile exchange fluctuations.
•
Encouragingly, 68 per cent of respondents reported that trade finance increased
by value, but the rate was lower that for the previous year.
•
The alarming rise in fees for trade risk after the 2009 trade collapse has
abated.
•
An enigma surfaced: a large gap remains in the market for trade finance and
risk coverage even while 80 per cent reported trade finance pricing is lower
or unchanged.
•
A total of 69 per cent of the respondents noted a decline in reported court
injunctions barring payment under trade finance instruments, indicating
a return to normal trading conditions.
•
Banks remain cautious in examining documents. Worryingly, only 7 per cent
reported a decrease in spurious discrepancies when documents are presented
under a letter of credit.
•
Know your customer principles are seen as hampering the smooth flow of
trade finance.
•
Some 65 per cent said implementation of Basel III regulations is to some
extent or a large extent affecting the cost of funds and liquidity for trade
finance.
•
Documented losses are low on trade finance products.
Source:
118
ICC (2014b, p. 31).
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Results from the above surveys on trade finance gaps bring to focus a number
of common factors responsible for narrowing the supply line across the board. SMEs,
as a sector, were the worst hit subsegment of the Asia-Pacific economy. Despite the
increase in bank credit (by volume), the overall trade finance gaps persisted.
The Asian Development Bank – Trade Finance Gap, Growth, and Jobs Survey
According to ADB, in 2013, the global trade finance gap was estimated at $1.9
trillion. Of that amount, $1.1 trillion was in developing Asia, and $699 billion was
attributed to India and China. Geographically, Asia recorded the highest share of
proposed transactions at 57 per cent of the global trade and had the highest
percentage (79 per cent) of global rejections, with India and China jointly recording 35
per cent of the rejected transactions (table 4).
Table 4. Distribution of proposed and rejected trade finance transactions
in 2013 by region as percentage of global total
Proposed transactions
(per cent)
Rejected transactions
(per cent)
Asia
57
79
Europe
22
13
Region
Commonwealth of Independent States
8
3
Americas
8
1
Africa
5
3
Source:
Compiled by the author using data from ADB Trade Finance Gaps 2013.
About 75 per cent of the banks reported that they had increased the level of
credit lines in 2013 — firms and financial institutions reported a more positive
situation about the availability of finance. As opposed to SMEs, large corporate
companies tended to report sufficient availability of trade finance.
Some of the major findings of the ADB Survey are:
(a)
Small and medium-sized enterprise constraints were more
pronounced:
•
The trade finance gaps affected SMEs more negatively than other
company respondents.
•
Rejection rates of trade finance applications were the highest for
SMEs. 50 per cent of SME proposals were rejected in 2013 as
compared to only 7 per cent for multinational corporations.
119
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
•
(b)
(c)
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
SMEs familiarity with various types of non-traditional methods to
raise trade finance was limited.
Commercial risk averse bank transactions had a negative impact:
•
The risk factor in banking transactions acted as a systemic credit
constraint.
•
Sixty-one per cent of responding banks reported that AML/KYC due
diligence requirements were significant impediments to the provision
of credit.
Costs constrained access to finance:
•
More than 74 per cent of the respondent banks cited factors related
to the price of trade finance as a key bottleneck to access.
•
The high borrowing costs worked out mainly due to high interest
rates/premiums, insufficient collaterals offered by SMEs and hence
stringent credit terms imposed by financial institutions.
Impediments to the provision of trade finance identified by the ADB Survey are
presented in table 5.
Table 5. Impediments to the provision of trade finance
Very significant
(per cent)
Significant
(per cent)
Total
(per cent)
1. Issuing bank’s low credit ratings
30
33
63
2. Low country credit ratings
33
29
62
3. AML/KYC requirements
43
18
61
Impediments
4. Low company/obligator credit ratings
18
40
58
5. Previous dispute or unsatisfactory
performance of issuing banks
31
21
52
6. Insufficient collateral from company
23
28
51
7. Constraints on your bank’s capital
11
32
43
8. Basel regulatory requirements
17
24
41
9. High transaction costs or low fee income
18
21
39
7
28
35
10. Lack of dollar liquidity
Source:
120
Compiled by the author using data from ADB (2014, figure 3).
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
According to the Survey, high interest rates/premiums followed by insufficient
collateral or guarantee, were identified by the respondents as a very significant factor
limiting companies’ ability to obtain trade finance (table 6).
Table 6. Factors limiting companies’ ability to obtain trade finance
Impediments
Very significant
(per cent)
Significant
(per cent)
Total
(per cent)
1. Interest rates/premiums too high
38
20
58
2. Insufficient collateral or guarantee
34
16
50
3. Long processing time
25
25
50
4. Financial institution’s requirements
unacceptable
21
23
44
5. Documentation requirements are too
burdensome
17
20
37
6. No previous transaction/lack of business
relationship
19
16
35
7. My country has “high risk” ratings
19
13
32
8. No law on receivables or invoice financing
18
10
28
9. Company records are incomplete/
unacceptable
14
12
26
10. No law on asset based lending
14
10
24
Source:
(d)
(e)
Compiled by the author using data from ADB (2014, figure 5).
Non-traditional financial products were underutilized:
•
Uptake of innovative products, such as supply chain finance, had been
slow. One reason appeared to be information asymmetries.
•
In the case of non-traditional products, such as factoring, forfaiting, bank
payment obligation and supply chains finance, less than 40 per cent of
companies reported familiarity with these instruments.
Trade finance-contributor to production and employment growth:
•
Responding firms indicated that additional trade finance would have a
positive impact on production and employment levels. A 15-per cent
increase in access to trade finance was estimated by them to increase
production by 22 per cent.
121
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
•
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Responses also suggest that greater access to trade finance would have
a positive impact on employment levels. Respondents noted that a 15-per
cent increase in trade finance may enable the firms to hire 17 per cent
more staff.
The ADB Survey concluded by observing that significant trade finance gaps
remained, and that SMEs continued to be credit constrained in every region.
Narrowing of trade finance gaps would lead to more economic growth and job
creation. Unintended consequences of (overlapping) regulatory requirements,
particularly with respect to financial crimes compliance, were contributing to the gap.
More outreach to companies about “non-traditional” forms of trade finance can
contribute to closing trade finance gaps.
IV. EMERGING ISSUES AND CHALLENGES
Introduction
While the surveys cited above clearly identify the short supply of finance as the
most critical major factor causing trade finance gaps, a close look at the factors other
than finance indicate that non-financial factors, such as high rate of credit rejections,
high collateral/guarantee requirements, non-availability of timely credit, lack of
adequate awareness about international trade and insufficient skills to make
cross-border trade transactions and the risk-averse banking sector not willing to lend
to SMEs, also indirectly affect the flow of trade finance and the efficacy of the
institutional finance framework. This gives rise to a question as to whether the
insufficient supply of institutional funds causing persistent gaps is the only major
factor hindering trade development in the region. While on the one hand paucity of
trade finance has been by far the largest complaint of the private sector, on the other
hand, the Asia-Pacific region, despite the demand-supply gaps, has emerged as the
largest user of trade finance in the global market. Europe, Latin America, Middle East,
North America and Africa have followed the trail. This trend gives rise to certain policy
implications and a clear signal to stakeholders to identify factors other than the
paucity of bank-intermediated funds as barriers to growth. An attempt has been made
in this section to identify the emerging issues and challenges that directly or indirectly
affect credit flow, business growth and sustainability. Recently, many vexing issues
have surfaced, giving rise to policy implications and posing systemic and operational
challenges.
Concerns have also been voiced about the inadequate infrastructure of trade
finance that would geographically cover and adequately service emerging markets in
the region; an inadequate financial corpus, which leaves behind sizable gaps; a rigid
122
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
banking system insensitive to the changing global market; unmet demands
of information and communications technology-related transactions, such as
e-marketing, and mobile banking, an absence of legal provisions and appeals in most
of the Asia-Pacific countries and above all such electronic transactions not being
recognized by the courts of law. The lack of innovative financial products and trade
finance instruments is yet another area of major concern.2
The Asia-Pacific region is the largest user of bank-intermediated trade finance
globally, yet it has lagged behind Europe in making effective use of inter-firm nonbanking trade transactions through supply chains, factoring, and forfaiting. These
innovative non-banking channels offer scope to supplement the dwindling supply of
trade credit available from the formal banking sector. Asia and Pacific economies,
similar to many other economies in other parts of the world, are saddled with various
operational issues and constraints within the region.
Identifying the major factors and challenges
Some of the major factors and challenges affecting credit flow and, more
generally, the systemic and operational efficiency of the trade finance infrastructure in
the Asia-Pacific region are discussed below:
(a)
Trade finance demand and supply gaps persisted
A persistent trade finance gap has been the most critical constraint and
an issue of growing policy concern in the Asia-Pacific region. This
phenomenon, as noted earlier, has become a continuing feature of the
Asia-Pacific financial sector.
(b)
Small and medium-sized enterprises are the most credit
constrained sector
Despite being the largest employer with a high potential of exports and
a significant contributor to national economies, the SME sector is the
most trade credit constrained segment of the Asia-Pacific economies. In
addition, banks generally consider SMEs as highly vulnerable to market
shocks and therefore are largely not viable customers for bank credit.
(c)
Shortages of trade finance affect trade
Whether shortages of trade finance actually affect trade has been an
issue of recent debates in academia, particularly after the global
financial crisis of 2008-2009 (Chor and Manova, 2012; Berms, Johnson
2
See for example, International Trade Centre (2009, p. 36, box 3.4 “Pitfalls in trade transactions-a case
study”).
123
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
and Yi, 2010; Amiti and Weinstein, 2011; Bricongne and others, 2012;
Auboin and Meier-Ewert, 2003; Aubion and Engemann, 2013). While
most scholars agree that a fall in the demand for trade finance has been
largely responsible for the slowdown and drop in trade flows, the debate
has focused on the extent to which other potential culprits, such as
trade restrictions, a lack of trade finance, vertical specialization, and the
composition of trade, may have played a role. Market surveys
conducted by ICC (2009), and IMF and BAFT-IFSA (2009) point to the
sharp fall in trade finance during the financial crisis as the main reason
for the drop in trade flows. Given the rapid decline in trade and emerging
challenges, a number of protectionist trade policy measures were taken
during 2008/09 by the policymakers and central banks around the world.
The major policy responses can be viewed in CGFS (2014, box 3, p. 22).
Although the exact amount of “missing” trade finance may remain
unknown, the literature cited in this context has highlighted the wider
link that exists between financial conditions, trade credit and trade
(Auboin, 2015). Taken together, it transpires that credit shocks, including
working capital and trade finance, possibly account for 15-20 per cent
of the decline in trade during the crisis.
The recent financial crisis revealed that trade finance markets are
vulnerable to abrupt dislocations (Auboin, 2015, para 2.2). The emerging
markets and least developed countries are more prone to such shocks,
making policy interventions and support essential to sustain the
availability and flow of trade finance. Even with its large presence and
pivotal role in making sizable contribution to Asia-Pacific economies, the
SME sector remains highly vulnerable to market dislocations and
exposed to volatility, especially in least developed countries.
(d)
Inadequate trade finance infrastructure and network
The inadequate infrastructure and weak networks of financial institutions
and poor geographical coverage of banking facilities in many parts of
Asia and the Pacific inhibit the timely availability of trade finance to the
private sector, including SMEs.
(e)
Absence of risk-mitigation mechanism
Branch-line managers lend to SMEs only when such loans are backed
by high collateral and third-party guarantees. The stipulation imposed by
the banks asking for high collateral and third party guarantees has been
a major barrier for companies in accessing trade finance.
124
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
(f)
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Problems of least developed countries in accessing affordable trade
finance
Least developed countries, in particular, face the problem of accessing
affordable trade finance. This has gradually resulted in a “trade finance
divide” between the least developed countries and other developing
economies of the Asia-Pacific region. The banking sector is generally
wary of entertaining credit proposals in such countries; it tries to insulate
itself against risks of loan defaults by charging higher interest rates
backed by high collateral requirements and guarantee conditions.
(g)
De-risking bank transactions are a constraint
De-risking requirements in bank transactions and interbank relationships
have become a major systemic credit constraint. Regulatory
requirements to mitigate the risk of financial crimes are compelling
reasons for banks to sever bank-to-bank relationships, particularly
in emerging markets. In particular, the AML/KYC due diligence
requirements have become significant time-consuming impediments to
effective trade finance access and have resulted in high compliance
costs. These reporting requirements have led to a significant reduction
in trade transactions in Asia and the Pacific.
(h)
Advantages of low-risk letters of credits have yet to make inroads in
emerging markets
Given the fact that L/Cs are a low-risk, safe and a more reliable mode of
trade finance transactions, many least developed countries, especially
those in the Pacific subregion, have yet to become fully aware of the
potential and advantages of L/Cs. Unfamiliarity with this instrument and
high transactional costs are perceived as the main obstacles.
(i)
Awareness and uptake of both existing and new financing
structures and products has been limited
Global banks view supply chain finance as an important new area of
activity, and a focal point of current competition. Citing new regulatory
demands and high marginal costs of equity capital, the trade finance
industry is experimenting with new structures and products to distribute
the exposure of trade finance to non-bank investors. To date, the scale
of this activity has been limited and is not likely to pick up considerably
in the near future (CGFS, 2014).
The reach and uptake of non-financial products, such as supply chain
related finance and factoring, has been slow. Information asymmetries
appear as a main reason, as less than 40 per cent of responding
125
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
companies reported familiarity with these non-traditional products in an
earlier cited ADB survey. Even familiarity with established products,
such as credit insurance was limited (ADB, 2014).
(j)
Banking sector does not catch early warning signals
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and consequent strains in
2011-2012 adversely affected the trade finance sector. Bank finance
exposure in almost all countries fell sharply soon after U.S. investment
bank Lehman Brothers filed bankruptcy. The banking sector failed to
effectively catch early warning signals. Trade finance disruptions had
a secondary but economically significant role in the sharp reduction in
global trade volumes. Given their short-term nature, banks have been
able to quickly reduce their exposure in times of stress. However,
because of this latter feature, trade finance has acted as a conduit of
stress from the financial system to the real economy (CGFS, 2014).
(k)
Emerging markets in the Asia-Pacific region tend to be less globally
integrated
Asia-Pacific countries are very well integrated into the global trading
system, but they are lagging in terms of financial integration. Emerging
markets in Asia and the Pacific tend to be less globally integrated than
the markets of other countries. As always, there are exceptions.
Malaysia, with a large and active institutional investor base, is as
globally integrated as any emerging market. In contrast, India and
Indonesia are at the other extreme and have smaller international
investment positions than emerging markets in other regions (Walsh,
2014).
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Implications
The issues and challenges identified above give rise to various policy
implications. The matrix below presents an overview of these implications in a tabular
form (table 7). In this context, it is desirable that the policies are periodically reviewed
and securely aligned with expanding demand for trade finance. They should be
market-oriented and designed to adapt to future change. In particular, they should
aim at (a) strengthening inbuilt stability of the trade finance sector, (b) increasing
competitive resilience, (c) adequately insulating the sector from possible market
shocks, (d) limiting the negative spillover effects likely to affect the national economy,
and in particular, (e) addressing the following issues:
126
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
(i)
How to make trade finance innovative, resilient, stable and relevant to
changes occurring in the trading environment;
(ii)
How to insulate trade finance, such as pre-shipment and post-shipment,
from market shocks and related credit risks;
(iii)
How to structure central banking credit policies to ensure adequate
resource support to the banking sector and set up risk mitigation
mechanisms, which would encourage banks to lend without inhibition;
(iv)
How to effectively monitor market developments and disseminate
market intelligence to policymakers to help them make informed policy
decisions;
(v)
How to design and set up an effective mechanism to catch early
warning signals to alert the financial sector of risks and shocks well on
time.
Table 7. Matrix of trade finance conceptual, systemic and structural issues
and policy implications
Conceptual, systemic and structural issues
Policy implications
Conceptual changes needed to address
the supply side: Some of the traditional trade
finance concepts have become outdated and
are no longer relevant to the changed context
of global trade transactions. As a result, the
supply side of trade finance falls short of
demand and trade finance gaps are increasing.
New concepts and instruments, such as
innovative non-finance and non-bank
intermediated instruments (often supply chains
related), have to be promoted and regulated to
satisfy unmet demand for trade finance and
close the trade finance gap.
SME demand side of trade finance is
not well served
In particular, additional attention should be
given to the trade financing needs of
SMEs through the implementation of viable
government-sponsored financing and credit
guarantee programmes aimed at risk mitigation
and cost reduction of credit.
Systemic and structural changes are
highly required
The administrative, legal and banking systems
need to be given a holistic reassessment, which
leads to an identification of structural factors
and constraints that need to be addressed to
allow steady credit availability.
Lack of skills and capacity: SME borrowers
of trade finance are generally not aware of the
products available; they lack skills and access
to credit
Suitable measures need to be adopted to
sensitize and improve the low credit rating of
banks. Develop capacity-building programmes
for training SME clients.
127
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
The need for change of future trade finance
From the previous sections, an important conclusion emerges: for trade finance
systems in the Asia-Pacific region to be relevant in the future, they need to be globally
competitive, innovative, cost-effective and sustainable to effectively address
needs-based “changes”. The banking system should work with non-banking channels
to supplement the supply side of trade finance. This may partially reduce the pressure
on banks. The systemic and operational changes need to be made on an ongoing
basis, adopting a holistic approach to both financial and non-financial factors of
change.
The Society for World Interbank Fund Transfer (SWIFT) and the Fung Global
Institute have jointly reviewed trade flows in Asia and observed the following: “By
2020, the Asian region is expected to account for almost 35 per cent of world GDP,
compared to 27 per cent today. Finance is still stuck in the letters of credit and
multilateral support world, but [...] times will change quite rapidly.” This raises a very
basic question: whether trade finance and trade finance products in their present form
will be able to keep pace with the expanding demand and changes in the future? The
Asia-Pacific trade finance sector is large, diverse and differs in many ways from
similar sectors in other parts of the world, especially in least developed countries, but
is not yet as sophisticated as those in Europe or America. Most Asia-Pacific banks
also tend to be more focused on providing traditional bank-intermediated trade
finance and are averse to taking commercial risks.
“As Asia leads the world in growth, will its financial systems lead too”, observed
James P. Walsh, Deputy Division Chief of the Monetary and Capital Markets
Department of IMF. He further stated: “Across Asia, the rapid growth of financial
sectors is an important part of the growth miracle that has made Asia the world’s
most dynamic region. Analysts look closely at the financial risks that Asia faces today,
but sometimes it’s interesting to look farther forward. So with this dynamism expected
to continue, what will Asian financial sectors look like in the future?” (Walsh, 2014)
The role of international institutions is important to make trade finance
responsive to change and resilient. ADB, ESCAP and the World Trade Organization
(WTO) could coordinate efforts for this purpose by forming a joint group, which would
initially concentrate on the following:
128
(a)
Play a diagnostic and advisory role to alert, aid and advise the AsiaPacific public and private sector trade finance community on trends,
development, pending changes and shocks;
(b)
Provide international support to Asia-Pacific economies to help them
augment trade finance resources;
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
(c)
Strengthen the capacity of both banking and non-banking actors to
provide trade finance by improving their stress management capacity,
resilience, openness and adaptability to change;
(d)
Work out synergies for providing technical assistance to developing
countries in this area;
(e)
Monitor trade finance markets to disseminate timely market intelligence
and early warning signals.
Policy recommendations
A review of trade finance policies and programmes to identify conflicting
issues, emerging challenges and resultant policy implications is essential. For that
purpose, this paper presents a set of policy recommendations, adopting a holistic
approach. The challenges confronting trade finance have been addressed from the
lenders’ and borrowers’ angle, and after taking due cognizance of the realities on the
ground. The matrix of suggested policy recommendations is presented in table 8.
Table 8. Suggested policy recommendations
Conceptual
•
Redefine the traditional concept of working capital by splitting it
into two: (a) conventional working capital (for day-to-day operations
up to the pre-shipment stage); and (b) trade finance and market
development working capital, such as short-term credit, export credit,
insurance, risk mitigation charges and, exchange fluctuations, and all
post-shipment trade related transactions.
For the latter, trade-related market development services need to be
developed, such as trade fairs, fashion shows, market forecasts,
product and design development, capacity-building for development
of viable and bankable business plans, which will ultimately reduce
the rates of rejections increase the supply of bank intermediated
funds; product development in the global market and identification of
potential markets to attract potential business.
•
Set up and enlarge the scope and coverage of a national exchange
fluctuation fund to cover all export-import transactions. This may be
set up as a national fund to cover the negative impact of exchange
fluctuations. ADB could link up with central banks to design and
operate the fund. Risk coverage should be available for up to 100 per
cent for SMEs and 90 per cent for other companies. SMEs would pay
premiums at subsidized rates. This would halt the default rate.
Modalities can be worked out once this is accepted as a concept.
•
Supply chains and factoring transactions of the private sector should
be defined as negotiable financial instruments. This would promote
129
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
markets for securitization of such instruments and augment supply of
the trade finance.
Government &
sector public
c
Central banks
and the financial
sector
130
•
Design trade-friendly export-import policies aimed at the
development of both domestic value-added trade activities and
exports/imports.
•
National governments and central banks should promote effective
policies to make the trade finance sector stable, forward looking and
vibrant and to cushion the after-effects of any financial crisis.
•
Develop a suitable legal frameworks and appeal system for redressing
grievances arising out of international transactions.
•
Strengthen collaboration with international agencies, such as the
Centre for the Promotion of Imports – the Netherlands and IFC for
ongoing market tie ups, generating market intelligence and technical
assistance.
•
Implement sufficient trade facilitation measures to contain trade
transaction and transportation costs.
•
Strengthen trade facilitation and trade finance mechanisms in
multilateral, regional and bilateral trade agreements.
•
Trade missions attached to the embassies should support the private
sector as central points for trade related matters, such as help in
establishing supply chains contacts, making forecasts.
•
Introduce risk-free e-marketing and online procurement mechanisms
backed by suitable legal and regulatory frameworks.
While most of the Asia-Pacific central banks have been proactive and quite
vigilant in making need-based changes in trade finance policies governing
banks, some of them have to enhance the stability and resilience of their
banking sector.
•
In view of the persisting trade finance gaps, in addition to releasing
liquidity supply to the banks, trade finance supply through nontraditional/non-financial channels with adequate safety net and risk
minimization mechanisms needs to be expanded.
•
Encourage companies to enter open market borrowings. The SME
sector will need special dispensation to do this.
•
Encourage and institutionalize inter-firm credit systems, mainstreaming them in cooperation with banks and with adequate risk
mitigation support.a
•
Instil confidence and encourage banks to lend without any inhibition,
introduce suitable risk mitigation, export credit insurance and
workable guarantee mechanisms. Set up a guarantee fund to extend
guarantee cover to collateral-free cum third party guarantee-free bank
loans to SMEs.
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
International and
multilateral
Institutions
Private sector
Note:
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
•
Central banks should simplify the de-risking element in bank
transactions and AML/KYC due diligence requirements as these
requirements have been identified as a major source of systemic
credit constraint.
•
Asia-Pacific countries are very well integrated into the global trading
system, but financial integration has lagged. Emerging markets in Asia
and the Pacific tend to be less globally integrated. ADB and the World
Bank should lend support to national governments and central banks
to accelerate the financial integration of emerging economies.
•
ADB should take the lead in collaborating with other international
institutions, such as IFC, to set up an Asia-Pacific trade development
fund for funding innovative and non-financial products, inter-firm trade
credits and trade development services that have not been funded by
the banking sector. Assistance can be given to companies through
their local banks backed by a suitable collateral-free guarantee
mechanism. The participating banks/companies need to participate in
the share capital to become members eligible to get a suitable line of
credit from the fund. Detailed operational modalities can be
developed at a later stage.
•
A joint group comprised of ADB, ESCAP and WTO may be set up to
monitor trade and trade finance trends and developments, and alert,
aid and advise Asia-Pacific trading communities and governments to
enhance the resilience of the banking and financial sector in the
region.
•
ICC should be made the central agency for compiling global
and regional trade finance data/information for use by various
stakeholders. This will enhance the capacity of ICC to add value to its
leading publication, the ICC Trade Register. To enlarge the reach and
supplement the coverage of its ongoing annual series of surveys and
publications of the Trade Register, all concerned should agree to
supply relevant information to ICC for this purpose.
•
ICC, in collaboration with ESCAP, ITC and national chapters/apex
chambers and export agencies could organize capacity-building
programmes on, for example, international trade, exports, trade
facilitation and the WTO regime.
a
The Committee on the Global Financial System in its report on trade finance development and issues
2014, has cited the findings of various surveys conducted by the World Bank and others, “firms that were
more reliant on trade credit to fund their own operations (and hence less reliant on bank funding for
working capital) were less affected” during the financial crisis. Fourteen developing countries show that
trade credit was relatively more resilient than bank credit during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis
(CGFS, 2014, p. 55).
131
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
REFERENCES
Abe, Masato, and others (2012). Policy Guidebook for SME Development in Asia and the Pacific.
United Nations publication, Sales No. E.12.II.F.2.
Amiti, Mary, and David Weinstein (2011). Exports and financial shocks. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, vol. 126, No. 4, pp. 1841-1877.
Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2014). ADB trade finance gap, growth, and jobs survey. Briefs,
No. 25 (December). Manila.
Auboin, M., and M. Engemann (2013). Trade finance in periods of crisis: what have we learnt in recent
years? Staff Working Paper, ERSD-2013-01. Geneva: World Trade Organization.
Auboin, M., and M. Meier-Ewert (2003). Improving the availability of trade finance during financial
crises. Discussion Paper, 2. Geneva: World Trade Organization.
Auboin, M.G. (2015). Improving the availability of trade finance in developing countries: an
assessment of remaining gaps. Staff Working Paper, No. ERSD-2015-06. Geneva: World
Trade Organization.
Bems, R., R.C. Johnson, and K.-M. Yi (2010). Demand spillovers and the collapse of trade in the
global recession. IMF Economic Review, vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 295-326.
Bricongne, J.-C., and others (2012). Firms and the global crisis: French exports in the turmoil. Journal
of International Economics, vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 134-146.
Chor, D., and K. Manova (2012). Off the cliff and back? Credit conditions and international trade
during the global financial crisis. Journal of International Economics, vol. 87, No. 1,
pp. 117-113.
Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) (2014). Trade finance: developments and issues.
CFFS Papers, No. 50. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements.
Duval, Yann, and Chorthip Utoktham (2014). Enabling participation of SMEs in international trade and
production networks: trade facilitation, trade finance and communication technology. Trade
and Investment Division Working Paper, No. 03/14 (June). Bangkok: ESCAP.
Factors Chain International (2014). Annual Review 2014. Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Available from
www.fci.nl.
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) (2009-2013). Rethinking Trade & Finance - ICC Global
Survey on Trade Finance. Paris.
(2014a). 2014 ICC Trade Register Report. Paris.
(2014b). 2014 Rethinking Trade & Finance - ICC Global Survey on Trade Finance. Paris.
International Finance Corporation (IFC) (2012). Guide to products: global trade & supply chain
solution, April. Available from www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/2280e4804adf1618d
30ff888d4159f8/GFM-TSC8-IFC-GuideToProducts.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Bankers’ Association for Finance and Trade and International
Financial Services Association (BAFT-IFSA) (2009). IMF-BAFT trade finance survey:
a survey among banks assessing the current trade finance environment.
(2010). Trade finance services: current environment and recommendations: wave 3.
132
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
(2011). Trade finance monitor: 6th annual trade finance survey . Available from http://
baft.org/docs/news-archive-2012/imf_survey_results_aug_2011.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
International Trade Centre (ITC) (2009). How to Access Trade Finance: A Guide for Exporting SMEs.
Geneva.
MacMillan, Johan, and Christopher Woodruff (1999). Interfirm relationships and informal credit in
Vietnam. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 114, No. 4, pp. 1285-1320.
Narain, Raghu (2014). Asset-heavy firms should explore different forms of financing. Insight, July.
Edinburgh, United Kingdom: Royal Bank of Scotland. Available from www.rbs.com/insight.
United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) (2007). Linking
Greater Mekong Sub-region Enterprises to International Markets: The Role of Global Value
Chains, International Production Networks and Enterprise Clusters. Studies in Trade and
Development, No. 59. Bangkok.
(2009a). Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Report 2009: Trade-led Recovery and Beyond.
Sales No. E.09.II.F.19.
(2009b). Globalization of Production and the Competitiveness of SMEs in Asia and the
Pacific: Trends and Prospects. Studies in Trade and Investment, No. 65. Bangkok.
(2014). Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 2014. ST/ESCAP/2704. Bangkok.
Walsh, J. (2014). The future of Asia’s finance. Finance & Development, vol. 51, No. 2 (June). Available
from www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2014/06/walsh.htm.
Zhang, Yuhua (2014). Integrating SMEs into global value chains: policy principles and best practices.
IssuesPaper, No. 6. Singapore: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. Available from
www.insme.org/insme-newsletter/2014/file-e-allegati/newsletter_documents/Integrating_
SMEs.pdf.
133
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
FINANCING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT — WHAT CAN
WE LEARN FROM THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE
OF REFORM?
Wayne Swan*
Finance is fundamental to supporting sustainable development. It drives
investment and jobs, which is the way most people escape poverty.
Countries in the developing world face significant financing needs as they
seek to modernize their economies, hence the importance of mobilizing
all forms of finance (domestic, international, public and private) and
ensuring they are put to their most effective use.
JEL classification: O10, O16, O56, Q56, Q58.
Keywords: Sustainable development, economic growth, Australia, development
finance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Finance is fundamental to supporting sustainable development. It drives
investment and jobs, which is the way most people escape poverty. Countries in the
developing world face significant financing needs as they seek to modernize their
economies, hence the importance of mobilizing all forms of finance (domestic,
international, public and private) and ensuring they are put to their most effective use.
Financing sustainable development presents many challenges, including the
need to balance the desire for growth today with the needs of future generations who
face the impact of climate change and increasingly fragile ecosystems. It needs to
ensure that growth is inclusive, allowing everyone the opportunity to participate in and
* This paper was prepared by the Honourable Wayne Swan MP, formerly the Deputy Prime Minister
and Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia. The views expressed in this discussion paper do not
necessarily reflect those of the United Nations or countries mentioned herein.
135
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
benefit from growth. It also needs to ensure that the benefits of growth reach the
most vulnerable as new and innovative approaches to development finance are
pursued.
Respecting and striking the right balance in relation to each of those
challenges is critical to the global effort to secure sustainable development finance.
Both the private and public sectors play critical roles in this process, with the
private sector serving as an increasingly important source of finance and
development and the public sector being important for investment, the provision of
a social safety net, and for ensuring an enabling economic and regulatory
environment for development.
The experience of the Asia-Pacific region has been mixed with respect to
sustainable development finance. Despite the diversity and varying stages of
development in the region, there are issues and lessons that can inform and guide
how best to approach the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in terms of
sustainable development finance.
The present paper considers a number of proposals that were made at the
Financing for Development meeting, which was held in Addis Ababa from 13 to 16
July 2015; and discusses the experience of Australia in pursuing sustainable
development. Some of these proposals relate to how countries themselves can
expand their access to finance for sustainable development, while others refer to how
developing nations, international agencies and other stakeholders may support
development in the Asia-Pacific region.
The experience of Australia is relevant to this discussion not only as a country
that has thus far successfully navigated economic fluctuations and change, but also
because of the challenges it confronted in pursuing reform. Despite having what are
widely considered to be the prerequisites for development, namely a relatively stable
investment and regulatory environment and the benefit of significant resources and
human capital, financing sustainable development in Australia has still proven to be
challenging.
The Australian experience suggests that mechanisms for sustainable
development finance alone are not enough to deliver the reform and investment that
developing countries require. Instead, a range of other considerations must be
incorporated into sustainable development finance, such as the process for achieving
domestic reform, managing diverse interests and accepting that first-best policy
options may not always be viable. Policy recommendations also need to reflect the
stage of development of local financial markets and the regulatory environment of
136
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
each country given the differences in the stage of development among the countries
in the Asia-Pacific region.
There are opportunities and innovations available to finance development but
the domestic and international constraints to achieving the objective of financing
sustainable development should not be underestimated. These constraints and
possible responses are considered here.
The present paper considers a number of priorities for sustainable
development finance, namely domestic resourcing, financial market strengthening,
infrastructure and climate financing options and overseas development assistance
(ODA).
II. CHANGING SOURCES OF FINANCE FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The availability of finance and investment has been a critical factor in
supporting the growth and development in the Asia-Pacific region in recent decades.
However, the composition of finance and sources of investment continue to change,
presenting both opportunities and challenges for financing development in the region.
Exploring the opportunities for financing development has become a global
priority in the context of the development of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development. Building on the Monterrey Consensus and the Doha Declaration,
renewed commitments to ODA and more innovative approaches are essential for
financing development beyond 2015. Public domestic investment remains critical to
supporting the development agenda and strengthening financial markets to support
international capital flows and foreign and private investment.
Dependence on various sources of finance and related regulatory environments
in development countries is changing. A report by the Institute for International
Finance notes the following: “Since the financial crisis, we’ve seen a retrenchment of
cross-border flows and more fragmentation of financial markets, which jeopardizes
the long-term outlook for global growth. The challenge now is to ensure that financial
globalization regains momentum. Meeting this challenge will require a conscious
decision by policymakers to shift back to global approaches in regulation, regaining
consistency and convergence of local rules, and to encourage development of
resilient market frameworks for investment in areas like infrastructure finance.”
(Institute of International Finance, 2014)
Sources of finance for development are changing from being predominantly
public investment to a range of potential sources, including the private sector, foreign
137
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
direct investment and trade. These sources of finance potentially present
opportunities to fund the necessary investment in infrastructure, social services and
the management of climate change that is necessary to achieve more inclusive
growth in the Asia-Pacific region.
The rise of non-traditional donors such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russian
Federation, India, China and South Africa), philanthropic initiatives and new
development banks also present opportunities to meet the financing needs for
development in the Asia-Pacific region.
III. SOURCES OF FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT —
REFORM AND LESSONS
Domestic resourcing
Public revenue remains a critical source of funding for investment and
infrastructure spending. It is the means by which countries fund education for
children, basic health services and roads and other infrastructure. It is particularly
important for ensuring the inclusion of the least well off in societies and economy.
Domestic public finance is the largest source of revenue available to countries.
Recent analysis by the Brookings Institution has suggested that public revenues of
about $300 per person per year in 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) terms are
necessary to provide the global social floor that is developing through the Sustainable
Development Goals. “The International Comparison Program has worked with
countries’ national income accounts to derive a new database that permits
cross-country comparisons on the amounts they spend on items that can be
consumed individually by households. In high-income European countries, such as
Denmark, Norway and Sweden, governments spend about $10,000 per person per
year in 2011 PPP terms. The average for OECD [member countries] is about PPP
$5,000 per person per year. Kharas and McArthur (2015, p. 11) estimate PPP
$300 per person per year as the approximate amount required to deliver a package of
basic services of education, health and other services consistent with the global
social floor being established through the Sustainable Development Goals. This is
consistent with the United Nations. Millennium Project’s estimates a decade ago of
$120-$140 per capita in nominal 2003 dollars for minimum service delivery to achieve
the Millennium Development Goals. The minimum necessary value will rise as
economies grow into middle-income status and beyond. We therefore further estimate
10 per cent of average per capita incomes as a minimum reference point for
economies with gross national income (GNI) per capita of PPP $3,000 or above.”
138
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Given the role of public revenue to deliver essential services and ensure an
inclusive economy, and in some cases the declining share of revenue to GDP, it is
appropriate that the world’s attention is increasingly turning to strengthening
domestic revenue.
Figure 1. General government revenue (per cent of GDP)
40
Per cent of GDP
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
19
9
19 0
91
19
9
19 2
93
19
9
19 4
95
19
96
19
97
19
9
19 8
99
20
0
20 0
01
20
02
20
0
20 3
0
20 4
05
20
06
20
07
20
0
20 8
09
20
10
20
1
20 1
1
20 2
13
20
14
20 *
15
*
0
Year
Australia
Source:
IMF.
Note:
*IMF forecast.
China
India
Indonesia
Papua New Guinea
Domestic revenue strengthening is relevant to both developed and developing
countries in terms of broadening the tax base and ensuring an efficient and equitable
tax regime, but also with regard to strengthening the capacity of governments to raise
revenue and avoid revenue leakage. Illicit financial flows alone are estimated at
around $1 trillion per year, representing a massive lost revenue source (World Bank,
2013).
Domestic resourcing has domestic and international reform implications.
Countries need to develop their tax regime and build institutional capacity to
administer and collect revenue. For example, in Australia, the decline in taxation
revenue as a share of GDP from 24.9 per cent in 2004/05 to 22.6 per cent in 2014/15
(Australian Government, 2014, Budget paper 1, table 9) requires reform to broaden
the tax base and close tax loopholes and concessions.
139
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
The potential for countries to support these activities through development
assistance should be expanded and prioritized in ODA. As the Brookings Institution
notes and recommends, “Very little ODA is allocated for strengthening domestic
revenue systems, despite a record of considerable success where it has been tried.
On average, less than one per cent of ODA goes towards tax improvements. This
should be expanded in line with developing countries’ needs to meet the target
threshold for domestic revenues that might be agreed upon, focused on both efficient
taxation and, where applicable, robust resource-royalty agreements.” (Kharas and
McArthur, 2015, p. 14)
It is here that multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) have a particular role in strengthening the capacity of countries to design and
implement an efficient tax regime.
Global efforts towards improving international tax arrangements and the
treatment of multinational corporations must also continue to be prioritized. This
includes the work of the G20 on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting and the automatic
exchange of information between tax authorities, as well as the work of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on multinational
taxation and tax transparency.
The international agenda should also continue to pursue standards and agree
to principles of open and transparent government. The Publish-What-You-Pay
principles and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) present real
opportunities to support global standards. Leadership among developed countries is
required in those areas, including further progress in Australia particularly around
extractives.
As Australia identified in its statement on the first drafting session of the
Financing for Development Conference “This sort of global initiative, combined with
greater focus on capacity development for national revenue authorities, plus national
action on tax system strengthening and regulatory frameworks to combat corruption,
can add up to genuine impact.” (United Kingdom, 2015)
One lesson from the efforts of Australia is that the strengthening of the
Australian tax entailed the challenge of building the case for tax reform and dealing
with opposition from various interest groups. In the case of Australia, this was
particularly challenging in terms of reforming the taxation of the mining sector and
resources, but also in other areas of tax expenditures in which existing beneficiaries
sought to maintain the status quo.
Part of the solution to addressing opposition to tax reform in terms of
communication is to link revenue measures to expenditures that the public values and
140
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
expects to be funded. The initiation in Australia of the National Disability Insurance
Scheme (NDIS), a major investment in the services available to people with
permanent and significant disability, had significant public support that enabled the
existing Medicare levy to be increased to fund this major public investment. There
was public support for the Medicare levy increase because the economic and social
case had been extensively made for NDIS over many years. Only after the case for
reform was made for the NDIS, and support built across a broad constituency,
funding mechanisms were developed.
While the Medicare levy itself is not hypothecated to funding NDIS, or other
health expenditure more generally, by linking the expenditure to the revenue, reform
was achieved. This lesson can be applied to a range of other policy discussions. For
example, in the case of climate finance, focus should be first placed on the required
reform and investment and securing an agreement. After that has been achieved, the
next step would be to formulate policy and rally public support for revenue sources. In
Australia, a similar approach was adopted in linking action on climate change through
a price on carbon in part to financing investments in alternative/sustainable energy
(discussed further below).
Tax reform is challenging in the domestic political context. There is a need to
link revenue reform to expenditure that the public values. Existing interests will
challenge tax reform and an approach to manage these interests needs to be factored
into the design and discussion of any tax reform. First best policy will not always
succeed but other approaches and compromises that start the process of reform are
still worth taking.
Domestic and international revenue reform is a win-win situation for all
counties. It builds the capacity of countries to deliver basic and essential services
while providing a foundation for inclusive growth.
Of course, the counterpart to mobilizing domestic revenue for development
purposes is making sure that those revenues are allocated efficiently and effectively.
Ensuring revenue is allocated productively and inclusive growth is achieved is critical
to the success of domestic revenue strengthening. Public sector efficiency is
particularly important here, as is strengthening domestic financial markets and
economic governance, discussed further below.
Financial market strengthening
Strengthening financial markets is also necessary to prepare the Asia-Pacific
region for future sources of finance for development. Having capital available to fund
the significant infrastructure and other investment financing needs is critical to
141
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
sustainable development not only because it provides the means to fund
infrastructure and other investments, but also because it attracts the private sector,
which is critical to development.
A financial system that includes a stable and independent central bank and
deep capital markets is a prerequisite for creating alternative sources of finance for
development and attracting private sector investment.
This is particularly the case in many Asia-Pacific countries that lack sufficient
domestic capital to finance infrastructure and development. The opportunities
presented by international investment suggest the need for further liberalization of
financial markets. The need for additional domestic finance sources is highlighted by
the fact that many Asia-Pacific countries record deficits on their primary income
account.
Figure 2. Primary income account (per cent of GDP)
2
0
Per cent of GDP
-2
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
-4
-6
-8
-10
-12
-14
-16
Australia
Source:
China
India
Indonesia
Papua New Guinea
World Development Indicators.
Asia is expected to account for about half of the global economy by 2050 and
projections suggest that the Asian financial system could be four times its current size
by 2030, and more than twice as large as the United States financial system over the
same period (ANZ, 2014, p. 47).
142
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
The rise of Asian financial markets and investment presents many opportunities
for financing development, but the transition also presents challenges. Ensuring this
transition takes place in a reliable and sound regulatory environment is critical.
Clearly, countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region are at very different stages of
development and therefore the process and sequencing of financial sector reforms
must be analysed and recommended accordingly.
In the case of Australia, central to the sustainability of the country’s financial
system is a strong, independent central bank and regulatory supervision. Maintaining
and continuing to strengthen this independence in the central bank and supervision of
the sector has been important in bringing down sovereign risk. The challenge for the
Asia-Pacific region is to similarly reduce sovereign risk, which will not only involve
institutional strengthening but also require a stable political environment, an improved
policy environment, and an ongoing reform and regulatory effort.
The Central Bank Governor of Australia describes the challenges facing the
region’s financial markets well:
Thanks partly to the painful lessons of the Asian crisis and other
episodes, banks [in the Asia-Pacific region] had generally stronger
capital positions and higher lending standards, while supervisors had
also done their job in the years prior to 2007. Moreover, several banking
systems in the region are among the earliest adopters of the new,
tougher, Basel standards. It goes without saying that we want this
prudence to continue. But unlike the case in some other countries, the
financial sector in the region is well placed to play its role in supporting
the sustainable growth of economic activity and trade. It is noteworthy
that as European banks sought to pull back from some activities in the
region, including trade finance, banks from within the region have
stepped up. So this is a point for confidence. (Stevens, 2013)
Ensuring this “point for confidence” is well founded depends on the ongoing
prudence and regulation of financial markets in the region. There is much reason for
optimism in this regard with financial markets continuing to develop along with the
strengthening of central banks and financial markets. China provides a good example
of this, which is considered further in the case study below.
143
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
The liberalization of the financial system of China
The Chinese authorities have continued to make significant progress in
liberalizing the country’s financial system. In addition to domestic financial
market reform and development, the partial liberalization of the exchange
rate and cross-border capital flows have been key elements of the reform
process. While cross-border trade flows have been subject to relatively
few restrictions for some time, the country’s cross-border capital flows
have been managed much more closely. However in recent times,
restrictions on direct investment flows have been relaxed, and the capital
account liberalization process has also extended to portfolio investment
flows. In particular, the Chinese authorities have started to open up the
country’s debt and equity markets to foreign investment and have also
allowed Chinese residents to invest more freely in offshore markets. The
substantial effects of the country’s earlier trade liberalization process on
the global economy suggest that its ongoing capital account liberalization
process will also have significant implications for the global financial
system. (Hatzvi, Nixon and Wright, 2014)
Related to the liberalization of financial markets of China have been efforts to
make the Chinese yuan (RMB) an international currency. The region has identified
opportunities to support this process. For example, Australian authorities have
worked together with the Chinese authorities to facilitate the development of the
local RMB market.
These steps recognize the already close economic relationship Australia
has with China and the increasingly close financial linkages between the
two countries. Most recently, these initiatives have included:
•
The establishment of an official RMB “clearing bank” in Australia,
which will make it easier for Australian residents to transact in
RMB with their counterparts in mainland China;
•
The establishment of a quota as part of the RMB Qualified
Foreign Institutional Investor (RQFII) programme, which will allow
Australian-domiciled financial institutions to invest RMB obtained
in the offshore market in the onshore bond and equity markets
of China.
These announcements are in addition to existing initiatives, including:
the local currency swap agreement between the Reserve Bank of Australia
144
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
(RBA) and the People’s Bank of China (PBC), signed in 2012; the
commencement of direct trading between the RMB and the Australian
dollar in interbank foreign exchange market in mainland China in 2013;
and the investment by RBA of a portion of its foreign currency reserves
in RMB-denominated assets in the past year. There has also been ongoing
engagement on RMB internationalization between Australian officials
(including RBA and the Treasury) and the private sector through forums,
such as the Australia-Hong Kong RMB Trade and Investment Dialogue
and the newly established “Sydney for RMB” working group, which is a
private sector-led initiative. (Hatzvi, Nixon and Wright, 2014)
Capital controls remain a persistent challenge to the liberalization of the
renminbi. In order to fully integrate the yuan, capital account liberalization, such
as further financial market liberalization, market-determined interest rates and
effective financial regulation and supervision, are necessary (Eichengreen and
Kawai, 2014). This would of course expose the yuan to external risks and
consequently reform would need to be introduced gradually. Given this, the yuan
is still a number of years away from realizing its potential in the region and the
world, but nevertheless the potential opportunity remains for the yuan to be
a common currency for trading.
Figure 3. Cumulative foreign direct outflows to members of
the Asian Development Bank
35 000
160 000
30 000
140 000
US$ million
100 000
20 000
80 000
15 000
60 000
10 000
US$ million
120 000
25 000
40 000
5 000
20 000
0
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
0
Year
Australia (LH)
Source:
India (LH)
Indonesia (RH)
China (RH)
UNCTAD FDI Database.
145
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
The growth in foreign direct investment in the region demonstrates this
potential as a source of finance for development.
Stronger financial market regulation alone will not suffice to increase available
finance. Sovereign risk remains a persistent challenge in reducing the cost and
increasing availability of finance. According to Torsten, Packard and Remolona (2015),
financing is most feasible when the country has a high sovereign rating, especially
when this reflects a credible legal framework, political stability and a reasonably
efficient bureaucracy. It also helps to have well-functioning markets for hedging
currency risks. Establishing this broader environment of stability and human capital
will take time but must continue to be part of any country’s plans for sustainable
development.
Strong financial markets also require strong macroeconomic fundamentals —
strong and stable growth and sustainable levels of inflation. Manageable current
accounts and public sector debt are important to minimize the risks of capital flight
and to provide necessary comfort to offshore investors. Maintaining its AAA credit
rating during and following the financial crisis was critical to the economic
performance of Australia and relative stability during this period. This need not mean
mindless austerity. Instead, options that achieve fiscal reforms, such as the removal of
generous tax concessions for higher earners, should be considered.
The eventual normalization of monetary conditions around the world makes the
risk of capital outflows from the Asia-Pacific region even more pressing. This, in turn,
would place a higher premium on strong macrofundamentals in the region.
Continuing to strengthen financial market regulation and access to capital is
important to the ongoing growth and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. It is also
a critical enabler to increasing investment and the financing of development. There is
a role for the G20 in this process, as demonstrated during the 2007-2008 global
financial crisis when the G20 supported efforts taken by emerging countries, such as
China, India, Indonesia and the Republic of Korea, through such initiatives as the
Basel III agreements. Agreements, such as these, recognize that sound regulatory
policy can support stability in the financial system and a role for regional and
international forums and institutions to support those reforms.
Related to this is the ongoing deepening of local capital, particularly local bond
markets, so that countries in the Asia-Pacific region are less reliant and exposed to
foreign capital flows. Local currency bond markets reduce risks associated with
currency mismatch and are very important for financial stability, especially in the
countries that suffered greatly during the Asian financial crisis. The Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), IMF and other regional and international
146
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
institutions with the requisite capacity, have been supporting the development of local
capital markets. This effort should continue.
Infrastructure financing
While the Asia-Pacific region boasts relatively high savings, the challenge of
financing significant infrastructure remains. The World Bank (2013) finds that the
undersupply of infrastructure in developing economies has been estimated at around
$1 trillion per year through 2020, with an additional $200 billion to 300 billion per year
to ensure that investment in infrastructure projects are for low-emitting and climate
resilient infrastructure.
As discussed above, boosting domestic resources and strengthening financial
markets are critical to addressing the financing gap, but other policy and planning
reforms are also necessary to mobilize finance, particularly in relation to financing
major infrastructure projects.
Meeting the financing needs for infrastructure is critical to development, but
also for generating demand and for growth. As Michael Spence, Nobel Laureate in
Economics, has identified:
Given the extent to which insufficient demand is constraining growth,
investment should come first. Faced with tight fiscal (and political)
constraints, policymakers should abandon the flawed notion that
investments with broad — and, to some extent, non-appropriable —
public benefits must be financed entirely with public funds. Instead, they
should establish intermediation channels for long-term financing. At the
same time, this approach means that policymakers must find ways to
ensure that public investments provide returns for private investors.
Fortunately, there are existing models, such as those applied to ports,
roads, and rail systems, as well as the royalties system for intellectual
property. Such efforts should not be constrained by national borders.
Given that roughly one third of output in advanced economies is
tradable — a share that will only increase as technological advances
enable more services to be traded — the benefits of a programme to
channel savings into public investment would spill over to other
economies. That is why the G20 should work to encourage public
investment within member countries, while international financial
institutions, development banks, and national governments should seek
to channel private capital towards public investment, with appropriate
returns. With such an approach, the global economy’s “new normal”
could shift from its current mediocre trajectory to one of strong and
sustainable growth. (Spence, 2015)
147
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
When the Labor Party came into power in Australia following the 2007 election,
it was apparent that even if funds were available for infrastructure investment a major
constraint was the lack of a pipeline of ready, productive investments. This view has
been confirmed by Australian Financial Services Council (2015) which notes that,
a consistent theme is that the level of fund investment is primarily limited by a lack of
suitable projects reaching the investment market, particularly with respect to
government-sponsored projects.
Australia has sought to address this challenge with the establishment of
Infrastructure Australia, an independent body that undertakes cost-benefit analysis of
potential infrastructure projects and prioritizes those projects. The success of this
process has largely been the focus on better planning and preparedness for
infrastructure needs into the future.
The Reserve Bank of Australia has identified a similar concern for the region
more generally (Ehers, Packard and Romolona, 2014):
Infrastructure investments entail complex legal and financial
arrangements, requiring a lot of expertise. Building up the necessary
expertise is costly, and investors will only be willing to incur these fixed
costs if there is a sufficient and predictable pipeline of infrastructure
investment opportunities. Otherwise, the costs can easily outweigh the
potential benefits of investing in infrastructure over other asset classes
such as corporate bonds. Creating a pipeline of suitable projects
requires a coherent and trusted legal framework for infrastructure
projects. The economic viability of infrastructure projects is often
dependent on government decisions, such as pricing, environmental
regulation, or transportation and energy policy. In some countries,
reliable frameworks do not exist. Cases of political interference — for
example arbitrary cuts in the prices private infrastructure operators are
allowed to charge — greatly increase the perception of political risks,
which are among the greatest concerns of private investors. But even if
solid legal frameworks exist, best practices or experience with large
infrastructure projects can be lacking on the side of the government.
In the case of Australia, it was clear that despite more than a trillion dollars
being held on behalf of members in superannuation funds, there is reluctance to
invest those funds in major infrastructure projects. While the Australian
superannuation funds under management have grown from 140 billion Australian
dollars ($A) ($100 billion) to $A1.3 trillion over the past 20 years, the country’s
infrastructure gap has widened (Financial Services Council, 2011).
148
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Figure 4. Total investment (per cent of GDP)
60
Per cent of GDP
50
40
30
20
10
19
90
19
91
19
9
19 2
9
19 3
94
19
95
19
9
19 6
9
19 7
98
19
99
20
0
20 0
0
20 1
02
20
0
20 3
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
0
20 9
10
20
1
20 1
12
20
1
20 3
14
20 *
15
*
0
Year
Australia
China
Source:
IMF World Outlook Database.
Note:
*IMF forecast.
India
Indonesia
Papua New Guinea
Infrastructure investment models have been particularly
superannuation funds because of the misalignment of interests with
sponsors with short-term investment horizons. This can result in poor
stripping of value due to transaction fees, and inability to achieve
partners for debt, construction, and operations and maintenance.
attractive to
traditional bid
pricing of risk,
best of breed
Under the current procurement model, Australia’s major infrastructure
investors, including Industry SuperFunds via IFM Investors, rarely, if
ever, participate in greenfield [public-private partnership] PPP projects
either as a bid sponsor or primary equity investor. Yet, combined, they
control the majority of infrastructure investment in Australia. Very high
bid costs and long procurement processes with ‘patchy’ deal flow limit
the number of parties who can afford to dedicate large teams for such
projects. Long-term equity investors like superannuation funds do not
see the relative value to divert resources away from pursuing brownfield
infrastructure to greenfield PPP projects that involve such a costly,
lengthy and uncertain process. Their long-term investment horizon and
their appetite for illiquid assets make them ideal partners for such
projects. However, the current process is biased towards short-term
financiers and contractors and requires reform to level the playing field.
(Industry Super Australia, 2014, p. 2)
149
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Feedback from the sector provided guidance on necessary reforms to access
superannuation savings for infrastructure investment. For example, Financial Services
Council (2011) states the following: Institutional investors have particular requirements
around the risk/return mix of long term illiquid investments and projects that do not
conform to these will not attract sustained investor interest. Governments need to
understand these requirements and the impact they have on the structure of
infrastructure projects when developing value for money transactions.
To address this challenge, the Government of Australia announced an
infrastructure tax incentive for nationally significant projects assessed by
Infrastructure Australia. This measure allowed infrastructure investment vehicles to
carry forward their losses uplifted by the 10-year government bond rate, and to be
exempt from the continuity of ownership and same business tests to access this
offset. These incentives mean investors who tend to invest after the asset is already
built and operating, such as superannuation or pension funds, can still access the
benefits of those investments.
These reforms are helping to support greater investment in infrastructure by
Australian superannuation funds. As the Financial Services Council (2011) reports,
Australian superannuation funds have approximately 5-10 per cent allocation to
infrastructure. This allocation is typically higher for industry funds. “In the 2010 client
survey of the consultant firm Mercer, only 2.0 per cent of United Kingdom pension
plans are shown to invest in infrastructure (an increase from 0.7 per cent in 2008). The
average allocation to infrastructure by those plans is 3.8 per cent. For Continental
Europe, only 1.4 per cent of pension plans are said to be invested in infrastructure,
with an average allocation of 5.5 per cent to the asset class by those funds invested.”
A further proposal being developed in Australia by Industry Super is a
proposed “inverted bid model” whereby “the traditional bidding process is reversed
by fixing the terms of project financing through a funding competition prior to the
construction, operation and maintenance (O&M) tender and raising of any additional
debt. In other words, the government tenders initially for the long-term owneroperator followed by separate bids for construction, operation and maintenance and
residual debt.” (Industry Super Australia, 2014, p. 2)
The inverted bid model is intended to support a reasonable return for long-term
investors through the upgrade of services and facilities delivered to meet demand
over time, as opposed to through the initial bidding, structuring and building of the
asset. “Preliminary analysis suggests bid costs can be expected to fall from 1.5 per
cent to 0.8 per cent of the total value of the project and procurement timeframes are
likely to be compressed from 17 to 12 months or by 30 per cent.” (Industry Super
Australia, 2014)
150
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
The inverted bid model may provide an avenue for access to finance through
pension and superannuation funds, not only in countries with large savings pools but
also internationally as those funds continue to expand international investment
opportunities. The key benefit of the inverted bid model is the improved alignment of
investors and projects, in addition to a more open bidding process that should help
reduce financing costs and procurement times.
More generally, increasing available finance for infrastructure depends on the
level of confidence in the broader stability of the economy and investing environment.
Developing economies often lack the regulatory, legal, and political frameworks to
make the risk return viable. These broader policy reforms and institutional
strengthening are therefore be critical to the long-term viability of private sector
financing for infrastructure.
As the Brookings Institute suggests, “The multilateral development banks have
a special leadership role to play on this dimension, since they provide much of the
financing leadership for infrastructure. In practical terms, they need to take on more
risk; invest in project preparation and the development of bankable projects; help
build teams on the ground in priority countries; and ensure projects are moving within
timeframes consistent with [Sustainable Development Goal] achievement by 2030.
Safeguards, for example, still present major barriers to timely implementation. At the
moment, a hydro project can take seven years from concept to approval and then
another seven years for construction. This would imply that new projects conceived in
2015 or 2016 would not even begin operating until the 2030 [Sustainable
Development Goal] SDG deadline is reached.” (Kharas and McArthur, 2015, p. 17)
Improving the infrastructure pipeline and the capacity to deliver projects is
a regional imperative to boost infrastructure investment. The emerging Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has the potential to improve access to finance
for large-scale infrastructure (Elek, 2014).
A related political challenge of infrastructure investment is the growing concern
around public debt, arguably necessary to fund major public investments. With the
10-year bond rate currently at an all-time low in Australia, there is seemingly an
impenetrable reluctance and public concern around borrowing to undertake the
necessary investments that will drive growth and deliver services into the future.
As one seemingly frustrated Australian journalist puts it, “The 10-year bond
rate is the rate at which the Government can borrow for 10 years at a fixed rate of
interest. Right now it’s just 2.55 per cent, an all-time low...If Australia was to borrow,
big time, for important projects that took the best part of a decade to complete, it
would have no risk of ever having to fork out more than 2.55 per cent a year in
151
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
interest. The record low rate would be locked in for 10 years. It’s rare to be offered
money for nothing. All we would need is confidence in the worth of our ideas.”
(Martin, 2015)
Climate change financing
The recent Australian experience of implementing a carbon price provides an
example of how an environmental policy can also generate incentives that finance
sustainable development.
Options for carbon pricing and reform present opportunities not only to finance
further action and abatement on climate change, but can also provide the means to
incentivise investments of a more sustainable nature. The approach applied by
Australia is through:
(i)
The Clean Energy Financing Corporation (CEFC);
(ii) Carbon pricing
The Clean Energy Finance Corporation
The previous Government of Australia established CEFC to act as a catalyst to
increase investment in emissions reduction and accelerate the country’s
transformation towards a more competitive economy in a carbon-constrained world.
The Clean Energy Financing Corporation is the second longest operating
national clean investment bank in the world after the Green Investment Bank of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Since CEFC began operations,
a number of countries have established similar domestic clean energy investment
institutions.
The Clean Energy Financing Corporation is an independent, governmentbacked institution and its role is to work in partnership with other banks and
financiers to mobilize investment in the clean energy sector. This includes investment
in renewable energy, low-emissions technology and energy efficiency.
The Clean Energy Financing Corporation was first announced in 2011 as part
of the country’s national package of climate-change-related reforms. Cumulatively,
the CEFC has committed more than $A1 billion in total finance and, with the
contribution of co-finance partners, has catalysed investments in projects valued at
more than $3.2 billion.
152
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Green Investment Bank of the United Kingdoma
The Green Investment Bank is a corporatized government company, established
in 2012, with the aim of attracting private finances to private sector initiatives for
environmental innovation. The types of projects the bank is intended to fund
include: offshore wind power generation; waste-handling plants; energy efficiency
measures; biofuels; biomass; carbon capture; and storage, marine energy and
renewable heat generation. It was born out of a House of Commons committee,
which found that traditional sources of finance could not meet the funding gap for
green investment projects required for industry sustainability.
The bank started with a 3.8 billion United Kingdom pound sterling (£)
($5.51 billion) government injection and has lent out £1.8 billion. This money has
funded 44 separate projects and is estimated to have created transactions in the
country’s green economy worth £6.9 billion. In some cases, the bank co-invests
with other government departments or the private sector. For example, the bank
has committed £190 million to a renewable energy plant in Thames with the
support of the Irish electricity utility Electricity Supply Board (ESB).
a
For further information on the Green Investment Bank see www.greeninvestmentbank.com/.
The Clean Energy Financing Corporation was established through federal
legislation. Its investment mandate is provided by the Government. The roles and
functions of the CEFC, include that it:
•
Focus on projects at the demonstration, commercialization and
deployment stages rather than at earlier stages of innovation.
•
Apply commercial rigour when making its investment decisions.
•
Can provide concessional finance in certain circumstances but limits the
amount of concessionality to $300 million per annum. To date, CEFC has
been participating largely without making concessional loans.
•
Not invest in nuclear energy or carbon capture and storage and that at
least 50 per cent of the CEFC portfolio is invested in renewable energy,
with the remaining being met from low-emissions technologies or energy
efficiency.
The Clean Energy Financing Corporation operates and makes its investment
decisions independently of Government based on rigourous commercial assessments
of their board. It is not a grants organization; its investments are made with an
153
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
expectation of being repaid. CEFC invests responsibly, manages risk and is expected
to be operationally self-funding through its investment returns.
The Fund looks for gaps in the clean energy finance market and tries to identify
new financing models that can help meet those financing gaps and ensure projects
go ahead.
One of the primary aims of the CEFC is to facilitate increased flows of finance
into the clean energy market. To do this, the Fund also provides significant technical
assistance, working with many project proponents and other financiers to match
project developers with interested parties, such as equity partners. It aims to broker
negotiations and bring parties together, including in financing consortiums and
bringing in other co-financiers. Most private financiers do not have the resources nor
the time to offer these services in new and emerging market segments, electing
instead to fund more well-known technologies because they are perceived as having
less risk. The Fund’s public purpose means that it can work collaboratively with
clients to restructure financing arrangements to help make their projects bankable.
Every dollar CEFC invests leverages more than $A2 in additional private sector
finance into the clean energy sector. The Fund has already partnered with more than
15 co-financiers, including all of the major Australian banks and banks from overseas
that have never before been active in the Australian clean energy market. Its role, as
a government-backed clean investment bank has, in some transactions, been critical
to building the confidence to attract these types of investors into the market.
To date, the projects CEFC has invested in, once operating, are expected to
deliver more than 4.2 million tons of CO2 emissions abatement per annum and involve
more than 600 MW of clean electricity generation capacity.
As Indonesia has identified, “In an increasingly carbon-constrained world, there
is likely to be an expansion of both private market and public finance to support
climate change mitigation in developing countries (figure 5 below). If suitable
mechanisms are put in place internationally and domestically, Indonesia could be
a major recipient of such finance.” (Ministry of Finance, 2009)
There have been regional attempts to deal with this problem. A notable one is
the Carbon Market Program of ADB. A key initiative of this scheme is the Future
Carbon Fund (FCF), which seeks to support energy efficiency schemes and reduce
the risk in adopting low-carbon technologies. Further efforts to build regional
approaches, potentially modeled on CEFC, could provide opportunities to address
a problem threatening every country.
154
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Figure 5. Carbon finance needs in developing countries, financing proposals,
and the size of the Clean Development Mechanism
400
2005 US$ billion/year
Proposals for financing
300
Estimates of developing
country costs
200
Available
under
Kyoto Protocol
100
M
pr
C
D
al
op
os
op
na
C
hi
K
U
m
om
EU
C
pr
ro
.p
ld
os
al
l
po
Ba
sa
nk
C
C
W
or
FC
N
U
om
C
EU
Pr
oj
ec
tC
m
at
is
al
si
ys
t
on
0
Low (or single) estimate
High estimate
Source:
Ministry of Finance (2009).
Note:
UNFCC = United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, EU = European Union,
CDM = Clean Development Mechanism.
Carbon pricing
From 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2014, Australia had a carbon pricing scheme in
place, the centrepiece of the “Clean Energy Future” policy (Clean Energy Act 2011)
passed by the Labor Government in 2011. However, following a change of
government in September 2013, the carbon price was repealed in July 2014.
Australia, therefore, provides a unique test case on the impact of a carbon price
policy on emissions by comparing data before, during, and after its operation.
Under the carbon pricing mechanism, emitters responsible for more than
60 per cent of country’s emissions were covered by a liability to acquire permits for
their emissions arising from the combustion of fossil fuels, as well as for some other
processes and emissions. In 2012/13, this equated to 349 of the country’s highest
emitting entities, including power stations, mines and emissions-intensive
manufacturers (Clean Energy Regulator, 2013).
155
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
The carbon pricing mechanism was a permit scheme in which the price was
fixed at $A23 per ton of carbon dioxide and equivalent in 2012/13 and $A24.15 in
2013/14. The Government sold an unlimited amount of permits at the fixed price and
neither international trading nor banking of permits were allowed. The legislation
called for the fixed price scheme to be moved to a floating price in 2015, linked with
international carbon markets, including the European Union, however it was repealed
before this transition could occur.
Other notable features of the scheme included recycling of about half the
revenue to low and middle-income households through lower income tax rates and
increases in welfare payments; assistance to emissions-intensive trade-exposed
industries through output-linked free permits at a declining rate; an offset mechanism
for agriculture and forestry; funding for investment in renewable technology and
innovation; and newly created independent institutions, such as the Climate Change
Authority, to provide independent advice on national emissions targets.
The impact of the policy on the electricity sector is the most relevant as
emissions from electricity generation are the largest contributor to overall emissions
of Australia, and are the greatest opportunity for reducing emissions both in the near
term and the longer term. The electricity sector also made up the majority of
emissions covered under the carbon price (O’Gorman and Jotzo, 2014).
Research by the Australian National University (ANU) found that carbon
emissions in the country’s national electricity market would have been 11 million to
17 million tons higher during the 2012/13 and 2013/14 if Australia had not introduced
a carbon price.
It found that the carbon price had been performing well in its main job:
delivering emissions cuts in the power sector, which is the largest source of emissions
in Australia and the sector with the biggest opportunity for cuts. Besides helping to
reduce power demand by households and industry, the carbon price had a strong
effect on the relative costs of running different types of power plants, making highly
polluting plants more expensive, and cleaner ones cheaper. Some black and brown
coal generators reduced their hours of operation; others were mothballed. As a result,
electricity generated from renewables and gas increased significantly while the share
of electricity generated from black and brown coal reached a record low. Together,
ANU estimated that the emissions intensity (the amount of carbon dioxide released
per kilowatt hour of electricity produced) of the power grid of Australia fell by 2-3 per
cent as a direct result of the carbon price, while demand fell by 1-2 per cent and
overall emissions by 3-5 per cent.
156
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Because the revenue from the carbon price was recycled to reduce
distortionary taxes for low-income earners and encourage investment in renewable
energy while providing incentives for energy efficiency for households and
businesses, the actual economic cost of the scheme was much smaller than the value
of permits sold, or the tax take.
Political uncertainty, however, dogged the carbon pricing policy over its entire
existence. At the introduction of the carbon price in mid-2012, a survey found that
40 per cent of experts, including decision makers at liable entities under the
Australian carbon pricing mechanism expected the scheme to be repealed by 2016
(Jotzo, 2012, p. 2). As a result its effect was not as great as it would have been under
a stable policy framework.
For investors in assets with lifetimes of several decades, what matters most is
the expectation of policy settings over the medium to longer term. For any country
seriously considering moving to a carbon pricing or emissions trading scheme,
a stable, bipartisan, long-term policy framework that creates economic incentives to
cut emissions would be the foundation of its success. The world’s major economies
are pushing ahead with policies that will clean up their energy systems and modernize
their economies. The Australian experience shows that pricing the emissions is the
most efficient and cost-effective approach to tackling climate change. Other
mechanisms, such as implementing strict regulations or introducing subsidies and
incentive schemes, can play a complementary role.
By adopting a carbon price, Australia was not only putting a price that captures
the externalities of carbon emissions and thereby changing behaviour, but also
incentivising investment in more sustainable forms of energy production.
Development assistance
The international agenda to identify finance for development should not be
a guise for reducing ODA when it is needed. This is particularly the case in the most
vulnerable environments in which alternative sources of finance are unlikely to be
forthcoming in the short, medium and even longer-term.
According to OECD, ODA reached an all-time high $134.8 billion in 2013. At
this level of investment, ODA clearly remains an important source of finance for many
countries and “particularly for countries dealing with widespread extreme poverty
and/or conflict – in the foreseeable future.” (Lomøy, 2015).
157
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Similar to many nations (the United Kingdom being the noteworthy exception)
Australia has not achieved its commitment to 0.7 per cent of GNI for ODA. While
significant increases in ODA were made under the previous government, the
economic and political imperative for ongoing increases in ODA proved challenging in
a drastically changing economic environment. Subsequent cuts to the ODA budget
will put the country’s aid programme at its lowest disbursement level ever in 2016/17
at 0.22 per cent of GNI (Howes and Pryke, 2014).
Central to this challenge was not only the fiscal environment in which declining
revenues were placing pressure on the budget, but there were also concerns around
the effectiveness of an aid programme, which had been growing at a significant pace.
Declining public support for ODA during a period of fiscal consolidation is also a real
consideration for governments.
While there can be no excuse for reduced efforts to alleviate poverty
throughout the world, governments remain accountable to their constituency. The
domestic challenge to maintain commitments to ODA requires significant international
consensus to regain momentum and support.
There is also an ongoing role of the development banks, including in relation to
accountability of development finance and investment. Finance for development must
increasingly reflect the need for sustainable investment, with development banks
supporting this work through both technical expertise and some level of oversight of
investment decisions. For instance, increasingly, investors appreciate the problem of
“carbon bubble” or stranded asset risks of building infrastructure with a 40 to 50-year
life that will be caught by carbon dioxide (CO2) regulations potentially in a 5 to
20-year timeframe. As a consequence, new coal-fired power plants are becoming
increasingly difficult to finance in developed countries. Ensuring finance in the
developing world for similar projects that may become stranded assets over time will
be challenging and critical. The problem is when those building such infrastructure
understand this challenge, and yet continue to expand their markets in the developing
world through ODA and development banks.
It is important that future ODA programmes keep in mind the growth of Asian
nations such as China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Thailand,
and Singapore, in shifting from aid receivers to aid donors. This opens up additional
avenues of finance for ODA and allows priority to be placed on those most in need.
Given that these Asian nations recently underwent transformation, they are perhaps
best placed to provide advice to neighbouring developing Asian countries.
158
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Figure 6. Overseas development assistance (per cent of GNI)
14
Per cent of GNI
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Year
China
Source:
Indonesia
India
Papua New Guinea
Cambodia
World Development Indicators.
Overseas development aid has an ongoing role as a source of financing for
development. All countries must renew their commitment to this as part of the 2030
Sustainable Development Agenda. The world community must agree to another
decade of development that hopefully reaps further gains for the world’s poor.
Summary of policy lessons
The above discussion has identified a range of experiences and lessons from
reform that have the potential to inform future approaches to policy reform across the
Asia-Pacific region. A number of policy implications are briefly summarized below:
•
Given the role of public revenue to deliver essential services and ensure an
inclusive economy, strengthening domestic revenue remains critical to
financing development. Broadening the tax base, ensuring an efficient and
equitable tax regime, and strengthening the capacity of governments to
raise revenue and avoid revenue leakage are critical to financing the 2030
Sustainable Development Agenda.
159
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
–
Countries need to build institutional capacity to administer and collect
revenue. Donor nations and multilateral institutions, such as IMF, have
a role in strengthening the capacity of countries to design and
implement an efficient tax regime.
–
Global efforts towards improving international tax arrangements and
the treatment of multinational corporations must continue to include
the work of G20 on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting and automatic
exchange of information between tax authorities, as well as the OECD
work on multinational taxation and tax transparency.
•
There is a need to continue to strengthen financial systems throughout the
Asia-Pacific region. This includes ensuring stable, independent central
banks, a stronger regulatory environment and deepening capital markets.
Clearly countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region are at very different
stages of development and therefore the process and sequencing of
financial sector reforms must be staged accordingly. There is a role for
international and regional institutions, including ADB, ASEAN, G20 and the
World Bank, in supporting reforms to strengthen financial markets.
•
Meeting the financing needs for infrastructure is critical to development,
but also essential for generating demand and growth. Policies need to be
adopted that recognize the role of public and private finance in
infrastructure in cases which there are clear public benefits.
•
160
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
–
The establishment of institutions, such as Infrastructure Australia, an
independent body that would undertake cost-benefit analysis of
potential infrastructure projects and prioritize projects, could be
beneficial.
–
Opportunities for sovereign wealth or superannuation funds to invest in
major public infrastructure requires stability of the economy and
investment environment, as well as strengthened regulatory, legal and
political frameworks to make investing viable.
Innovative approaches to addressing climate change that can also support
new approaches to financing development exist.
–
The Clean Energy Financing Corporation, a national clean investment
bank that facilitates finance into the clean energy market, is a potential
model that could help transform the Asia-Pacific region in a carbon
constrained world.
–
Carbon pricing, despite having been repealed in Australia, has been
found to be an effective and efficient mechanism for delivering
emissions cuts in the power sector.
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
•
Renewing global commitments to ODA require international consensus,
demonstration of aid effectiveness and accountability for development
finance and investment. Increasing the share of ODA to target the
most vulnerable nations should be part of this increased focus and
accountability.
•
Each of the above approaches to financing development requires
consideration of the political and economic context within each nation.
Innovation in finance and policy reform often challenges the status quo
and as such, countries could do well to share policy experiences and
approaches to achieving lasting reform including through international
forums.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are significant opportunities to pursue finance for development in the
Asia-Pacific region. The above discussion sets out the changing sources of finance
but also considers challenges involved in accessing those sources of finance.
Across all sources of finance for development, whether domestic revenue
strengthening, foreign capital and investment, new sources of finance for climate
change and ODA, among others, the domestic political and economic environment is
critical to delivering the reforms that are necessary access to those sources of
finance.
The lesson from the relatively recent experience in Australia is that delivering
reform to finance and supporting sustainable investment can be challenging. Whether
it is ensuring the economic case is made for reform, managing existing interests in the
design of policy reforms, or ensuring reforms are future proofed, achieving the goal of
financing development through innovative policy and new sources of finance can be
difficult. Emphasis should be placed on financial market liberalization, regulatory
stability and deciphering the public good away from vested interests.
At the same time, the potential sources of finance for development are plentiful
and great. They present a real opportunity to fill the investment gap in many countries
across Asia and the Pacific. The potential for innovative finance and policy also
provides an opportunity to deliver investment that is inclusive and sustainable.
Developed nations have a particular role, along with international organizations,
such as OECD, to support nations in building their revenue systems to be able to
afford the services and public investment necessary for inclusive growth. An
increased share of ODA should be allocated to strengthening domestic revenue
161
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
systems. Efforts to improve revenue collections should also be coordinated with
greater measurement and support for effective allocation of revenue to achieve
inclusive growth.
There are clearly also lessons from developing nations in how they pursue
reform, including the need to plan for domestic reform that is likely to be challenged
by existing interests, and to factor in the need for reform and investments to be
sustainable. Again, there is a role for international forums to support dialogue on the
process of reform and for international organizations to provide greater accountability
and oversight of both ODA and international investment. The Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific may also support member States in this
endeavor at the regional level.
Innovative opportunities exist to finance development. Whether it relates to
new approaches to climate finance or creating the necessary environment to enable
pension funds to invest in development, non-traditional opportunities exist to support
the achievement of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.
There is a clear role for regional partnerships in the delivery of this agenda.
However, those partnerships will be contingent on ensuring greater coordination
across the various international forums, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN and G20, the expanding number of international financial
organizations, new development banks and philanthropists.
The challenge for the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda is to achieve
consensus on what finance for development looks like, ensure that it is realistic in the
domestic political and economic context and that it is capable of achieving the
development outcomes the world needs to see in the next decade.
162
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
REFERENCES
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ) (2014). Caged tiger: the transformation of the Asian
financial system. Research paper, No. 5 (March).
Australian Government (2014). Budget 2014-15, budget papers. Available from www.budget.gov.au.
Clean Energy Regulator (2013). Liable Entities Public Information Database. Available from
www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/Infohub/CPM/Liable-Entities-Public-InformationDatabase.
Ehlers, Torsten, Frank Packer, and Eli Remolona (2014). Infrastructure and corporate bond markets in
Asia. In Financial Flows Infrastructure Financing, Alexandra Heath and Matthew Read, eds.
Sydney: Reserve Bank of Australia. Available from www.rba.gov.au/publications/confs/
2014/pdf/ehlers-packer-remolona.pdf.
Eichengreen, Barry, and Masahiro Kawai (2014). Issues for renminbi internationalization: an overview.
Working Paper Series, January. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute. Available from
www.adb.org/publications/issues-renminbi-internationalization-overview.
Elek, Andrew (2014). The potential role of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. East Asian
Forum, 11 February. Available from www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/02/11/the-potential-roleof-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/.
Financial Services Council (2011). Financing Australia’s Infrastructure Needs: Superannuation
Investment in Infrastructure. Adelaide, Australia: Ernst & Young. Available from
www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Financing_Australia_infrastructure_needs/$FILE/
Superannuation_Investment_In_Infrastructure.pdf.
Hatzvi, Eden, William Nixon, and Michelle Wright (2014). The offshore renminbi market and Australia.
Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, December Quarter, pp. 53-62. Available from www.rba.
gov.au/publications/bulletin/2014/dec/7.html.
Howes, Stephen, and Jonathan Pryke (2014). Biggest aid cuts ever produce our least generous aid
budget ever, 15 December. Available from http://devpolicy.org/biggest-aid-cuts-everproduce-our-least-generous-aid-budget-ever-20141215-2/.
Industry Super Australia (2014). An inverted bid model: an aligned infrastructure investment mode.
Available from www.industrysuperaustralia.com/assets/Reports/The-Inverted-Bid-ModelFinal.pdf.
Institute of International Finance (2014). Financial globalization: maximizing benefits, containing risks,
1 December. Available from www.iif.com/press/financial-globalization-maximizing-benefitscontaining-risks.
Jotzo, Frank (2012). Australia’s carbon price. Nature Climate Change, vol. 2, pp. 475-476.
Kharas, Homi, and John McArthur (2015). Nine priority commitments to be made at the UN’s July
2015 Financing for Development Conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, February. Available
from www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/02/united-nations-financing-fordevelopment-kharas-mcarthur.
Lomøy, Jon (2015). First drafting session of the Conference on Financing for Development. OECD
statement at the Session on International Public Finance. New York, 29 January. Available
from www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/1ds-ipf-Statement-oecdJan2015.pdf.
163
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Martin, Peter (2015). Low 10-year bond rates are the deal of the century but Abbott’s not at the table.
The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 January. Available from www.smh.com.au/comment/low10year-bond-rates-are-the-deal-of-the-century-but-abbotts-not-at-the-table-2015012012tq4j.html.
Ministry of Finance (2009). Ministry of Finance Green Paper: Economic and Fiscal Policy Strategies
for Climate Change Mitigation in Indonesia. Jakarta: Ministry of Finance and Australia
Indonesia Partnership. Available from www.illegal-logging.info/sites/default/files/uploads/
IndonesiasiaranpdfGreenPaperFinal.pdf.
O’Gorman, Marianne, and Frank Jotzo (2014). Impact of the carbon price on Australia’s electricity
demand, supply and emissions. Centre for Climate Economic & Policy Working Paper,
No. 1411 (July). Canberra: Crawford School of Public Policy, the Australian National
University. Available from https://ccep.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/
ccep_crawford_anu_edu_au/2014-07/ccep1411.pdf.
Spence, Michael (2015). Why public investment?, 20 February. Available from www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/public-investment-economic-growth-by-michael-spence2015-02.
Stevens, Glenn (2013). Financing the Asian century. Remarks to the Asia-Pacific Financial Market
Development Symposium. Sydney, 10 April. Available from www.rba.gov.au/speeches/
2013/sp-gov-100413.html.
United Kingdom (2015). Statement for “introduction” discussion in Financing for Development
Conference 1st Drafting Session, 27 January. Available from www.un.org/esa/ffd/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/1ds-gd-Statement-UK-Jan2015.pdf.
World Bank (2013). Financing for Development Post 2015. Washington, D.C. Available from
www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Poverty%20documents/WBPREM%20financing-for-development-pub-10-11-13web.pdf.
164
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
PURCHASE ORDER FORM
(Please type or print)
NAME:
_______________________________________________________________________________
POSITION:
_______________________________________________________________________________
ORGANIZATION:
_______________________________________________________________________________
ADDRESS:
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
COUNTRY: _________________________________ POSTCODE: ______________________
TELEPHONE: ______________________________ FACSIMILE: ___________________ E-MAIL: ___________________
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world.
Please consult your bookstore or write to any of the following:
Customers in: America, Asia and the Pacific
E-mail: [email protected]
Web: un.org/publications
Tel: +1 703 661 1571
Fax: +1 703 996 1010
Mail Orders to:
United Nations Publications
PO Box 960
Herndon, Virginia 20172
United States of America
Customers in: Europe, Africa and the Middle East
United Nations Publication
c/o Eurospan Group
E-mail: [email protected]
Web: un.org/publications
Tel: +44 (0) 1767 604972
Fax: +44 (0) 1767 601640
Mail Orders to:
United Nations Publications
Pegasus Drive, Stratton Business Park
Bigglewade, Bedfordshire SG18 8TQ
United Kingdom
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------For further information on publications in this series, please address your enquiries to:
Chief
Conference and Documentation Service Section
Office of the Executive Secretary
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
(ESCAP)
United Nations Building, Rajadamnern Nok Avenue
Bangkok 10200, Thailand
Tel:
66 2 288-1110
Fax:
66 2 288-1000
E-mail: [email protected]
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
READERSHIP SURVEY
The Macroeconomic Policy and Financing for Development Division of ESCAP is
undertaking an evaluation of the Asia-Pacific Development Journal, with a view to improving the
usefulness of future publications to our readers. We would appreciate it if you could complete
this questionnaire and return it, at your earliest convenience, to:
Director
Macroeconomic Policy and Financing for Development Division
ESCAP, United Nations Building
Rajadamnern Nok Avenue
Bangkok 10200, THAILAND
E-mail: [email protected]
QUESTIONNAIRE
Rating for quality and
usefulness (please circle)
1.
●
●
●
●
●
Average
Poor
presentation/format
readability
timeliness of information
coverage of subject matter
analytical rigour
overall quality
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
How useful is the publication to your work?
●
●
●
●
●
3.
Very
good
Please indicate your assessment of the
quality of the publication in terms of:
●
2.
Excellent
provision of information
clarification of issues
its findings
policy suggestions
overall usefulness
Please give examples of how this publication has contributed to your work:
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
4.
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Suggestions for improvement of similar publications:
.......................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
5.
Your background information, please:
Name: ............................................................................................................................
Title/position: ................................................................................................................
Institution: ......................................................................................................................
Office address: ..............................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
Please use additional sheets of paper, if required, to answer the questions.
Thank you for your kind cooperation in completing this questionnaire.
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
ASIA-PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT JOURNAL
INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRIBUTORS
Published by the Macroeconomic Policy and Financing for Development Division of the United
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the Asia-Pacific Development Journal
provides a platform for the exchange of ideas and experiences on development issues and concerns
facing the region, and aims to stimulate policy debate and assist in the formulation of policy.
Policy-oriented articles and original pieces of work, focusing on development issues and challenges
relevant to the Asian and Pacific region, are welcomed in the Journal, which is published twice a year.
1.
MANUSCRIPTS
Authors are requested to provide copies of their manuscripts in English. Contributors should
indicate in their covering letter to the Editorial Board that the material has not been previously published
or submitted for publication elsewhere. The manuscripts should be typed, double-spaced, on one
side of white A4 paper and the length should not exceed 30 pages. Manuscripts are accepted subject
to editorial revision.
Since all manuscripts will be refereed by professionals in the field, the name(s) of the author(s),
institutional affiliation(s) and other identifying information should be placed on the title page only, in
order to preserve anonymity. The title page should contain the following: (a) title; (b) name(s) of the
author(s); (c) institutional affiliation(s); (d) complete mailing address, telephone number, facsimile number
and e-mail address of the author, or of the primary author in the case of joint authors; and (e) JEL
classification and key words relevant to the article. The second page should contain the title, the
name(s) of the author(s) and an abstract of approximately 150 words. Acknowledgement (if any)
should appear after the abstract.
It is preferred that manuscripts be submitted by e-mail to the address below (if hard copies
are submitted, kindly provide two copies of the manuscript to the address below). The preferred
word-processing software is Microsoft Word. Once a manuscript is accepted for publication, the
author(s) may be asked to submit electronic files of their manuscript, figures, tables and charts, as
appropriate.
2.
FOOTNOTES AND QUOTATIONS
Footnotes, if any, should be numbered consecutively with superscript arabic numerals. They
should be typed single-spaced and placed at the bottom of each page. Footnotes should not be used
solely for citing references. Quotations should be double-spaced. A copy of the page(s) of the original
source of the quotation, as well as a copy of the cover page of that source, should be provided.
3.
TABLES AND FIGURES
All tables and figures should be numbered consecutively with arabic numerals. Each table
should be typed double-spaced. Tables and figures should be planned to fit the proportions of the
printed page. Full information on the source(s) should appear below the table/figure, followed by
notes, if any, in lower-case letters.
4.
REFERENCES
Authors should ensure that there is a complete reference for every citation in the text.
References in the text should follow the author-date format, followed, if necessary, by page numbers,
for example, Becker (1964, pp. 13-24). List only those references that are actually cited in the text or
footnotes. References, listed alphabetically, should be typed double-spaced on a separate page in
the following style:
Africa achieving healthy and steady growth rate (2007). World Bank News, 14 November. Available
from http://go.worldbank.org/6AJB33NOF0.
Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2015
Desai, Padma, ed. (1883). Marxism, Central Planning, and the Soviet Economy. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Husseini, Rana (2007). Women leaders attempt to bridge East–West cultural divide. Jordan Times,
9 May.
Krueger, Alan B., and Lawrence H. Summers (1987). Reflections on the inter-industry wage structure.
In Unemployment and the Structure of Labour Markets, Kevin Lang and Jonathan S. Leonard,
eds. London: Basis Blackwell.
Moran, Theodore H., and Gerald T. West, eds. (2005). International Political Risk Management, vol. 3,
Looking to the Future. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Sadorsky, P. (1994). The behaviour of U.S. tariff rates: comment. American Economic Review, vol. 84,
No. 4, September, pp. 1097-1103.
Salagaev, Alexander (2002). Juvenile delinquency. Paper presented at the Expert Group Meeting on
Global Priorities for Youth. Helsinki, October.
Stiglitz, Joseph, and others (2006). Stability with Growth: Macroeconomics, Liberalization and
Development. Initiative for Policy Dialogue Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Straub, Stephane (2008). Infrastructure and growth in developing countries: recent advances and
research challenges. Policy Research Working Paper, No. 4460. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
United Kingdom, Department for Education and Skills (2007). Care Matters: Time for Change. London:
The Stationery Office. Available from www.official-documents.gov.uk.
For further details on referencing, please refer to the editorial guidelines at: www.unescap.org/
sites/default/files/apdj_editorial_guidelines.pdf. The Editorial Board of the Asia-Pacific Development
Journal would like to emphasize that papers need to be thoroughly edited in terms of the English
language, and authors are kindly requested to submit manuscripts that strictly conform to the attached
editorial guidelines.
Manuscripts should be sent to:
Chief Editor, Asia-Pacific Development Journal
Macroeconomic Policy and Financing for Development Division
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
United Nations Building
Rajadamnern Nok Avenue
Bangkok 10200
Thailand
Tel: 66 2 288-1902
Fax: 66 2 288-1000; 66 2 288-3007
E-mail: [email protected]
United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world.
Please consult your bookstore or write to any of the following:
Customers in: America, Asia and the Pacific
E-mail: [email protected]
Web: un.org/publications
Tel: +1 703 661 1571
Fax: +1 703 996 1010
Mail Orders to:
United Nations Publications
P.O. Box 960
Herndon, Virginia 20172
United States of America
Customers in: Europe, Africa and the Middle East
United Nations Publication
c/o Eurospan Group
E-mail: [email protected]
Web: un.org/publications
Tel: +44 (0) 1767 604972
Fax: +44 (0) 1767 601640
Mail Orders to:
United Nations Publications
Pegasus Drive, Stratton Business Park
Bigglewade, Bedfordshire SG18 8TQ
United Kingdom
United Nations
Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific
Macroeconomic Policy and Financing for
Development Division
United Nations Building, Rajadamnern Nok Avenue
Bangkok 10200, Thailand
Fax:
66 2 288-3007
E-mail: [email protected]
[email protected]
Website: www.unescap.org
United Nations publication
Sales No. E.15.II.F.17
Copyright © United Nations 2016
ISBN: 978-92-1-120712-5
e-ISBN: 978-92-1-057888-2
ISSN: 1020-1246
ST/ESCAP/2747
The Asia-Pacific Development Journal (APDJ) is published twice
a year by the Macroeconomic Policy and Financing for Development
Division of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission
for Asia and the Pacific.
The primary objective of the APDJ is to provide a platform for the
exchange of knowledge, experience, ideas, information and data
on all aspects of economic and social development issues and
concerns facing the region and to stimulate policy debate and assist
in the formulation of policy.
The development experience in the Asian and Pacific region has
stood out as an extraordinary example of what can be achieved
when policymakers, experts, scholars and people at large harness
their creativity, knowledge and foresight. The APDJ has been
a proud partner in this process, providing a scholarly means for
bringing together research work by eminent social scientists and
development practitioners from the region and beyond for use by
a variety of stakeholders. Over the years, the Journal has emerged
as a key United Nations publication in telling the Asian and Pacific
development story in a concise, coherent and impartial manner to
stimulate policy debate and assist in the formulation of policy in
the region.
16-00069
ISBN 978-92-1-120712-5
Fly UP